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   This dissertation studies the historical development of salmon fisheries in Bristol Bay off 
southwest Alaska from the pre-contact era to the 1970s. More specifically, it examines how Anglo-
Americans constructed and maintained vibrant salmon fisheries in Bristol Bay during the period. 
This project focuses on institutions and regimes and discusses how the structure of perpetual 
exploitation of Bristol Bay salmon emerged and developed in the twentieth century. 
   This dissertation demonstrates that Anglo-American cannery businessmen and government 
officials at Washington created what I call an ichthyological empire in Bristol Bay. The 
ichthyological empire was science-oriented resource extractive colonialism and its essence was to 
dominate and keep access to sockeye salmon by expanding scientific knowledge about the fish’s 
ecology and achieving the total control of the fish’s lifecycle. To control and promote the lifecycle 
of sockeye salmon, Washington officials conducted scientific research in the Bristol Bay region 
and redesigned the local environmental and ecological landscape. Washington officials also carried 
out scientific investigations not just in Bristol Bay but also in the Bering Sea and the North Pacific 
and established what I term a bio-sphere of influence, an extraterritorial spatial area where a state 
exercised exclusive jurisdiction over the flora and fauna flourishing there, in order to deny foreign 
pelagic fishermen access to Bristol Bay salmon. Although earlier scholarship has often overlooked 
the relationship between science and colonialism and undervalued inter-imperial contexts, this 
dissertation argues that extending scientific knowledge about sockeye salmon’s ecology through 
inter-imperial entanglements was a key to making the structure of America’s perpetual resource 
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   When I conducted research in salmon fisheries in Bristol Bay off southwest Alaska, I 
encountered a fascinating photograph (figure 1). It shows a scene in which some white fishers and 
canners carry a banner on their fishing vessels moored in Bristol Bay. The banner says, “PROTECT 
BRISTOL BAY PERMANENTLY!!” The term “Bristol Bay” is a code readable in two ways here: 
Bristol Bay as ahistorical geography and historical industry. The banner is critical reaction to a 
recent plan by the Donald J. Trump administration to open up and exploit the Pebble Mine, a 
massive deposit of gold, copper, and other minerals worth up to $500 billion, near Bristol Bay.1 
In this context the banner clearly reflects a desire of the white fishers and canners to preserve the 
environment and ecology of the Bristol Bay region. More profoundly, however, what the white 
fishers and canners have sought is to retain the industrial structure of salmon fisheries in Bristol 
Bay by not destroying the environment and ecology of the bay. How did this salmon fisheries 
structure emerge and develop in Bristol Bay? Also, how have white fishermen and canners 
sustainably enjoyed their access to and exploitation of profitable sockeye salmon in Bristol Bay 
without experiencing depletion or exhaustion of the fish?  
 
 
1 Juliet Eilperin and Brady Dennis, “Trump Administration Says Massive Alaska Gold Mine Won’t 





Figure 1: Protect Bristol Bay Permanently!! Available at https://www.bbrsda.com/ (accessed 
March 19, 2021). 
 
   My dissertation (hereafter “The Making of an American Ichthyological Empire”) examines the 
historical development of sockeye salmon fisheries in Bristol Bay from 1883, when the first 
cannery was built in the region, to 1977, when the United States established the 200-mile exclusive 
economic zone off Alaska. The main questions are who possessed legal and physical access to 
Bristol Bay salmon and how they managed and controlled the fish. I argue that the United States 
constructed what I call an “ichthyological empire,” an exploitative and conservationist salmon 
fisheries structure, in Bristol Bay in the twentieth century by fully mobilizing the power of law 
and science. The work of reconciling the seemingly inconsistent concepts and practices of 
exploitation and preservation is a key to understanding how Bristol Bay salmon fisheries have 
become what they are now. 
“The Making of an American Ichthyological Empire” engages with imperial historiography of 
the United States. 2  Looking at Alaska is essential to understanding the U.S. empire in a 
comprehensive manner. As Paul Kramer describes, recent scholarship, especially in the last two 
 
2 Regarding the importance of looking at the U.S. history through imperial lens, see, for example, 
Amy Kaplan, “Left Alone with America: The Absence of Empire in the Study of American Culture,” in 
Cultures of United States Imperialism (Durham: Duke University Press, 1993): 3–21. 
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decades, has seen a growing number of historians studying U.S. history within an imperial 
framework.3 Still, many historians, including Kramer himself, have had what I call a “tropical 
bias” in discussing the U.S. empire, focusing mainly on tropical regions and eliminating Alaska 
from their objects of analysis.4 Contrary to Kramer, Daniel Immerwahr uses a concept of the 
“Greater United States” and emphasizes the significance of looking not just at America’s familiar 
overseas possessions in tropical regions but also at its less familiar non-contiguous territories, 
particularly Alaska.5  However, Immerwahr’s explanation is problematic in defining the U.S. 
empire too narrowly in legal and territorial terms. In fact, Immerwahr pays attention to the legal 
status of overseas territories as the most crucial indicator of colonialism and interprets Alaska and 
Hawai‘i not as America’s colonies because they achieved statehood.6 In contrast, “The Making of 
an American Ichthyological Empire” captures more fundamental nature of the U.S. imperialism 
and argues that Alaska has remained a colony of the United States despite its achievement of 
statehood in 1959. 
Three factors have prevented historians from seeing Alaska as part of the U.S. empire. First, 
as discussed above, the tropical bias is powerful and we are too accustomed to the rigid binary 
geographical consciousness which holds that imperial centers were in the northern hemisphere and 
their colonies were in the southern one, especially in climatically tropical areas. Second, a 
 
3 Paul A. Kramer, “How Not to Write the History of U.S. Empire,” Diplomatic History 42, no. 5 
(2018): 911–931, especially 911. See also Paul A. Kramer, “Power and Connection: Imperial Histories of 
the United States in the World,” American Historical Review 116, no. 5 (2011): 1348–91. 
4 Kramer, for example, claims, “[A]s the result of self-conscious politics and terminological inertia, 
‘empire’ and ‘imperialism’ continued to cleave tightest to U.S. histories involving the Philippines, Puerto 
Rico, Hawai‘i, Guam, Samoa, the Virgin Islands, and the Panama Canal Zone.” Kramer, “How Not to 
Write the History of U.S. Empire,” 914. 
5 Daniel Immerwahr, “The Greater United States: Territory and Empire in U.S. History,” Diplomatic 
History 40, no. 3 (2016): 376–77. 
6 Immerwahr argues, “The promotion of Hawai‘i and Alaska to statehood can be seen as part of the 
global decolonization movement,” suggesting that Hawai‘i and Alaska are no longer colonies of the 
United States. Ibid., 389, n. 41. 
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conceptual category of either “continental empire” or “overseas empire” is ineffective to analyze 
Alaskan history because of the northern land’s ambivalent and idiosyncratic geographical 
characteristics. Michael Hill, a scholar of U.S. foreign relations, recently says, “Conceived of as 
both continental and overseas, yet fully neither one nor the other, Alaska allowed Americans to 
build upon a tradition of Westward conquest while simultaneously justifying overseas imperial 
ambitions.”7 Third, we are exceedingly familiar with the “empty, but full” discourse on Alaska.8 
This is a colonial discourse saying that Alaska is “empty” of indigenous inhabitants “but full” of 
natural resources to be commodified and extracted. This wild and “primitive” image of Alaska, 
represented by the existence of pristine untamed natural environment and ecology, has silenced 
and hidden indigenous Alaskans and their historical experiences.9 By ceasing to provincialize 
Alaska and instead centering this northern territory, I emphasize that U.S. imperialism played a 
crucial role in shaping the development of Alaska and that Alaska was a site where America’s 
novel imperial structure emerged and rose in the twentieth century. 
   Historians who focus on U.S. imperialism in Alaska have approached it in different ways. 
 
7 Michael A. Hill, “Imperial Stepping Stone: Bridging Continental and Overseas Empire in Alaska,” 
Diplomatic History 44, no. 1 (2020): 78, 83. 
8 Daria Gritsenko, “Arctic Future: Sustainable Colonialism?,” The Arctic Institute: Center for 
Circumpolar Security Studies, October 24, 2016, available at https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/arctic-
future-sustainable-colonialism/ (accessed August 22, 2020). 
9 Alaska’s unofficial motto is the “last frontier” and this colonial perception allowed Americans to 
view the northern territory through the conceptual lens of Frederick J. Turner’s frontier theory. Regarding 
Turner’s frontier thesis, see, Frederick J. Turner, “The Significance of the Frontier in American History 
(1893),” in Rereading Frederick Jackson Turner: “The Significance of the Frontier in American History” 
and Other Essays (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1994): 31-60. 
More notably, prevailing popular discourse about Bristol Bay salmon stresses their “wilderness.” For 
example, a contemporary magazine article about sockeye salmon in the Bristol Bay region says, “Every 
summer, during a period lasting a few weeks, 30 to 40 million adult sockeye return to the bay. . . . But 
salmon are not the only outstanding feature of this Alaska wilderness.” It also writes, “In summer, 
millions of fish disperse up Bristol Bay’s watershed to rivers and lakes that are breeding grounds for five 
species of salmon. If the Pebble mine is built, it will alter this wilderness and could, in time, wreck havoc 
with the salmon.” Edwin Dobb, “Alaska’s Choice Salmon or Gold: If Built, a Huge Mine Would 
Transform Alaska’s Bristol Bay Region, Possibly Jeopardizing the World’s Richest Sockeye Salmon 
Fishery,” National Geographic 218, no. 6 (2010): 100-125. 
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Defining U.S. imperialism in Alaska in mercantile terms, Hill argues that Alaska was a U.S. colony 
as a supplier of raw materials and natural resources and that its colonial status ended when the 
significance of salmon canning industry and gold mining industry declined after World War II and 
Alaska finally achieved statehood in 1959. 10  Hill’s argument is simplistic because salmon 
fisheries are still a very vibrant industry in Bristol Bay, which is still called “the World’s Salmon 
Capital.”11 Moreover, when we pay attention to the development of other extractive industries, 
particularly the rise of crabbing and oil drilling, in Alaska after the Second World War, it is hard 
to conclude that Alaska is no longer a colonial supplier of raw materials and natural resources for 
the U.S. mainland. It also should be added that Alaska’s legal status as a state of the United States 
has not fundamentally changed the mercantile economic and industrial relationship between the 
northern territory and the U.S. mainland. 
In fact, regardless of their different approaches, scholars of U.S. imperialism in Alaska 
generally believe that the northern land is still a mercantile colony of the United States. Robert 
Campbell, for example, highlights the importance of cultural forces in the making of an empire 
and examines how travelogues and travel writings created specific images about Alaska in white 
Americans’ imagination that helped them occupy the northern territory and exploit its natural 
resources. Campbell also suggests that this imperial culture still powerfully keeps Alaska 
America’s colony.12 Although historians have offered different opinions about the current status 
of Alaska, it is important that they have agreed that vibrant commercial resource extraction 
 
10 Hill, “Imperial Stepping Stone,” 90-91. 
11 Commercial Fishermen for Bristol Bay, “Bristol Bay: The World’s Salmon Capital,” available at 
http://fishermenforbristolbay.org/bristol-
bay/#:~:text=The%20World's%20Salmon%20Capital.&text=of%20years%2C%20Bristol%20Bay%20re
mains,economic%20benefits%20locally%20and%20nationally. (accessed August 24, 2020). 
12 Robert Campbell, In Darkest Alaska: Travel and Empire Along the Inside Passage (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007), 272. 
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activities made Alaska a colony of the United States. 
   Contrary to earlier scholarly works on Bristol Bay, which have failed to place the region in the 
context of U.S. imperialism, 13  I refer to Stephen Haycox’s explanation about extractive 
colonialism to analyze the structure of salmon fisheries in Bristol Bay.14 According to Haycox, 
Alaska has been a colony of the United States since 1867, when it purchased the northern territory 
from Russia, because of Alaska’s political and economic dependence on the U.S. mainland. 
Alaska’s economy has relied on capital from absentee investors outside the territory and their 
investment has provided jobs on which residents depend on their livelihood. The investors’ primary 
objective is not to provide the perceived economic and social needs of Alaskans but to exploit for 
their own wealth the only thing Alaska has to offer: natural resources, particularly minerals, 
seafood, timber, furs, petroleum, and natural gas. In addition, because of Alaska’s status as a 
territory, it had experienced much federal government intervention until 1959, when Alaska 
achieved statehood. But the statehood did not give Alaskan residents complete freedom to decide 
their interests by themselves. Rather, as the story about the Pebble Mine shows, the White House 
and Congress still exercise overwhelming influences on Alaska’s interests by issuing executive 
orders and enacting federal laws.15 This model of extractive colonialism provides the basis of my 
 
13 Representative works include James W. VanStone, Eskimos of the Nushagak River: An 
Ethnographic History (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1967); Tim Troll, Sailing for Salmon: The 
Early Years of Commercial Fishing in Alaska’s Bristol Bay, 1884-1951 (Dillingham, AK: Nushagak-
Mulchatna/Wood Tikchik Land Trust, 2011); John B. Branson, The Life and Times of John W. Clark of 
Nushagak, Alaska, 1846–1896 (Anchorage, AK: Lake Clark National Park and Preserve, 2012); Bridget 
Groat, “The Changing Tides of Bristol Bay: Salmon, Sovereignty, and Alaska Natives” (Ph.D. 
dissertation, Arizona State University, 2019). One exceptional study is Sarah Jane Braund, “Set the Net: 
The Heritage Significance of Fish Camp and Wild Salmon in Bristol Bay, Alaska” (Ph.D. dissertation, 
University of Montana, 2017). But Braund’s work takes an anthropological approach, not referring to 
archival sources. 
14 Regarding the concept of extractive colonialism, see also Margaret D. Jacobs, White Mother to a 
Dark Race: Settler Colonialism, Maternalism, and the Removal of Indigenous Children in the American 
West and Australia, 1880-1940 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2009), 12-13. 
15 Stephen Haycox, Alaska: An American Colony (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2002), 
159-169. The Bristol Bay region consists of 27.5 million acres of land and 12.5 million acres of marine 
 
 7 
concept of “ichthyological empire” and the model helps to explain how Bristol Bay turned into 
America’s northern colony from the 1880s to the 1970s. 
   Contrary to historians who have focused on terrestrial resource extraction, such as mining and 
logging, in Alaska, I look at marine resource exploitation there.16 As maritime historians have 
recently pointed out, the dry-land-centered approach has misleadingly trivialized the ocean as an 
ahistorical place, assuming that the sea is stable and timeless and that it is merely a space across 
which humans travel. But the ocean is not a static and constant two-dimensional area; rather, it is 
a dynamic and fluctuating three-dimensional space that needs historicization.17 Indeed, we cannot 
 
waters. The largest landowners in the Bristol Bay region are the federal and state governments. Most of 
the federal lands are managed as national parks, preserves, and wildlife refuges. The National Park 
Service manages the national parks and preserves, and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service controls the 
wildlife refuges. These parks and refuges are as large as 11 million acres. The Bureau of Land 
Management manages federal lands outside of these conservation areas and these BLM lands occupy 1.6 
million acres. The state government owns inner spaces of the region, the Bristol Bay side of the Alaska 
Peninsula, and, all tide and submerged lands offshore to three miles and the beds of all inland navigable 
water bodies. The state lands are as large as 11.3 million acres. Apart from these federal and state lands, 
the Bristol Bay Native Corporation, created under the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act of 1971, 
which offered Alaskan natives 44 million acres of public land in Alaska and $962 million as settlement of 
their aboriginal claim to land, controls 3.7 million acres of land in the Bristol Bay district. This means that 
indigenous lands constitute only 13.5 percent of the Bristol Bay region. See Bristol Bay Native 
Corporation, “Land: Maps,” available at https://www.bbnc.net/our-corporation/land/maps/ (accessed 
January 31, 2021); Stadum Group, “Bristol Bay Regional Economic Opportunity Plan” (Anchorage, AK, 
April 2004): 4-5. 
16 Mary J. Barry, A History of Mining on the Kenai Peninsula (Anchorage, AK: Alaska Northwest 
Pub. Co., 1973); William Cronon, “Kennecott Journey: The Paths out of Town,” in Rethinking America’s 
Western Past (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1992): 28–51; Kathryn Morse, The Nature of Gold: 
An Environmental History of the Klondike Gold Rush (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2003); 
Terrence Cole, Crooked Past: The History of a Frontier Mining Camp, Fairbanks, Alaska (Fairbanks, 
AK: University of Alaska Press, 2003); James Mackovjak, Tongass Timber: A History of Logging and 
Timber Utilization in Southeast Alaska (Durham: Forest History Society, 2010). 
17 See, for example, Kären Wigen, “AHR Forum: Oceans of History: Introduction,” American 
Historical Review 111, no. 3 (2006): 717–21; W. Jeffrey Bolster, “Opportunities in Marine Environmental 
History,” Environmental History 11, no. 3 (2006): 567–97; W. Jeffrey Bolster, “Putting the Ocean in 
Atlantic History: Maritime Communities and Marine Ecology in the Northwest Atlantic, 1500-1800,” 
American Historical Review 113, no. 1 (February 2008): 19–47. Given that maritime historians have often 
focused on the Atlantic and neglected the Pacific, Matt Matsuda’s indigenous-centered narrative on the 
“Pacific worlds” is significant. But Matsuda geographically looks at tropical regions of the Pacific and 
pays scant attention to the North Pacific. Matsuda also treats the ocean as a two-dimensional space and 
rarely observes beneath the waves. See Matt K. Matsuda, Pacific Worlds: A History of Seas, Peoples, and 
Cultures (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012). Contrary to Matsuda, Ryan Jones highlights 
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understand the historical development of Alaska holistically without exploring the northern 
territory’s relationship with surrounding waters, especially the Bering Sea.18 While historians 
have studied maritime resource extraction activities in Alaska, focusing on sealing, whaling, and 
crabbing, I pay attention to salmon fisheries, which have been one of the most important industries 
in Alaska in social and economic terms and one of the main pillars that have supported America’s 
colonization of this northern land.19 
“The Making of an American Ichthyological Empire” demonstrates that salmon fisheries in 
 
the importance of the North Pacific and analyzes the ocean as a three-dimensional historical space. See 
Ryan Tucker Jones, “Running into Whales: The History of the North Pacific from below the Waves,” 
American Historical Review 118, no. 2 (2013): 349–77. Hellen Rozwadowski agrees with Jones, saying 
that historians should pay attention to the ocean’s “depths as well as its surface.” Helen M. Rozwadowski, 
Vast Expanses: A History of the Oceans (London: Reaktion Books, 2018), 7. 
18 Although the Bering Sea is generally treated as part of the North Pacific, this study separates the 
former from the latter. I will do the same when referring to the Sea of Okhotsk. The main reason is for 
precise geographical delineation because the North Pacific is spatially too large. 
   The importance of looking at surrounding oceans is applicable to studying U.S. history too. Scholars 
often describe America’s historical development within two conceptual frameworks: continental and 
overseas expansion. Both concepts explain only terrestrial expansion on North America and outer lands 
across the sea, overlooking the fact that the United States did expand in the ocean too. Indeed, the 
historical formation of the United States is inextricable from complicated relations between the United 
States and its surrounding oceans. Given that “more than half of the U.S. lies underwater,” terrestrial 
interpretations of U.S. history tell only half of America’s historical experiences and it is significant to 
adopt an amphibious approach to studying U.S. history. See “More than Half of the U.S. Lies 
Underwater?” (CBS News, May 7, 2015), available at https://www.cbsnews.com/news/more-than-half-of-
the-u-s-lies-underwater/ (accessed October 11, 2020). 
19 James Thomas Gay, American Fur Seal Diplomacy: The Alaskan Fur Seal Controversy (New York: 
Peter Lang, 1987); Natalia S. Mirovitskaya, Margaret Clark, and Ronald G. Purver, “North Pacific Fur 
Seals: Regime Formation as a Means of Resolving Conflict,” in Polar Politics: Creating International 
Environmental Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993); Kurkpatrick Dorsey, The Dawn of 
Conservation Diplomacy: U.S.-Canadian Wildlife Protection Treaties in the Progressive Era (Seattle: 
University of Washington Press, 1998), pt. 2; Scott Barrett, “The North Pacific Fur Seal Treaty and the 
Theory of International Cooperation,” in Environment and Statecraft: The Strategy of Environmental 
Treaty-Making (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); John R. Bockstoce, Furs and Frontiers in the 
Far North: The Contest among Native and Foreign Nations for the Bering Strait Fur Trade (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2009); Ryan Tucker Jones, Empire of Extinction: Russians and the North Pacific’s 
Strange Beasts of the Sea, 1741-1867 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014); Bathsheba Demuth, 
Floating Coast: An Environmental History of the Bering Strait (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 
2019); M. I. H. Macallister, “Seals, Empires and Mass Politics: The 1893 Fur Seal Arbitration,” 
International History Review (November 2019): 1–18 (online); John Soluri, “Fur Sealing and Unsettled 
Sovereignties,” in Crossing Empires: Taking U.S. History into Transimperial Terrain (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2020): 25–45. 
 
 9 
Bristol Bay consisted of a hybrid of intrinsic and extrinsic imperialism. More generally, this means 
that empire emerges and develops not merely within itself, but also in relation to other imperial 
powers. Historians have studied how salmon fisheries in Alaska made it possible for the United 
States to colonize the northern territory after the 1880s by dispossessing Native Alaskans of their 
traditional fishing grounds and their access to salmon. They have focused on law as a colonial 
technology and described how white fishermen used federal and state fisheries laws based on race 
and nationality to claim exclusive proprietary rights to fishing grounds and salmon in Alaska.20 
Although “The Making of an American Ichthyological Empire” draws on this scholarship and 
views resource extraction as an inherently colonial enterprise, it differs from the previous studies 
in adopting an inter-imperial framework.21 It is notable that the earlier scholarship has centered 
 
20 See, for example, David F. Arnold, The Fishermen’s Frontier: People and Salmon in Southeast 
Alaska (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2008). Although Douglas Harris looks at salmon 
fisheries in British Columbia, not Alaska, his studies are also useful to understand how law functioned as 
colonial technology. See Douglas C. Harris, Fish, Law, and Colonialism: The Legal Capture of Salmon in 
British Columbia (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001); Douglas C. Harris, Landing Native 
Fisheries: Indian Reserves and Fishing Rights in British Columbia, 1849-1925 (Vancouver: University of 
British Columbia Press, 2008). For another good example of the relationship between fisheries laws and 
colonialism in the context of indigenous rights, see JoAnna Poblete, Balancing the Tides: Marine 
Practices in American Sāmoa (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2020). More generally, concerning 
the importance of law in fisheries management, see Arthur F. McEvoy, The Fisherman’s Problem: 
Ecology and Law in the California Fisheries, 1850-1980 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1986).  
21 For studies discussing the formation of the U.S. empire in inter-imperial contexts, see, for example, 
Paul A. Kramer, “Empires, Exceptions, and Anglo-Saxons: Race and Rule between the British and United 
States Empires, 1880–1910,” Journal of American History 88, no. 4 (2002): 1315–53; Julian Go and 
Anne L. Foster, eds., The American Colonial State in the Philippines: Global Perspectives (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 2003); Ned Blackhawk, Violence over the Land: Indians and Empires in the Early 
American West (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006); Brian DeLay, War of A Thousand 
Deserts: Indian Raids and the U.S.-Mexican War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008); Pekka 
Hämäläinen, The Comanche Empire (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008); James Belich, 
Replenishing the Earth: The Settler Revolution and the Rise of the Anglo-World, 1783-1939 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2009); Anne Foster, Projections of Power: The United States and Europe in 
Colonial Southeast Asia, 1919-1941 (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010); John R. McNeill, Mosquito 
Empires: Ecology and War in the Greater Caribbean, 1620-1914 (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2010); Takashi Fujitani, Race for Empire: Koreans as Japanese and Japanese as Americans during 
World War II (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011); Augusto F. Espiritu, “Inter-Imperial 
Relations, the Pacific, and Asian American History,” Pacific Historical Review 83, no. 2 (2014): 238–54; 
Stephen Tuffnell, “Anglo-American Inter-Imperialism: US Expansion and the British World, c.1865–
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on intrinsic imperialism, treating Alaskan waters as America’s bordered imperial space and 
narrating competitions for fishing grounds and salmon between Anglo-American colonizers and 
indigenous Alaskans. The framework of intrinsic imperialism is useful and effective as far as 
historians investigate salmon fisheries in southeast Alaska. In contrast, however, salmon fisheries 
in Bristol Bay off southwest Alaska offers a more complicated story than this simplistic 
dichotomized story of white-indigenous competitions for fishing grounds and salmon. “The 
Making of an American Ichthyological Empire” reveals that Bristol Bay was never America’s 
enclosed waters even after 1867, when Alaska was transferred from Russia to the United States, 
and that extrinsic imperialism played key roles in forming the historical trajectory of salmon 
fisheries in Bristol Bay. More specifically, I treat the Bering Sea and the North Pacific as a basic 
geographical unit of analysis and pay attention to the interplay between the United States and other 
circum-Pacific empires, particularly Canada, Japan, and Russia, showing that Bristol Bay salmon 
fisheries emerged and developed from complex interactions between these imperial powers over 
the fish.22 
   “The Making of an American Ichthyological Empire” analyzes institutions and the structure of 
salmon fisheries in Bristol Bay rather than the lived experiences of indigenous peoples inhabiting 
in the region. To be sure, it is crucial to place indigenous peoples and their lives at the center of 
historical analysis in studying U.S. imperialism in Alaska. In fact, Haycox writes, “In reviewing 
the history of Alaska, the development of Native cultures and peoples is an integral element in the 
 
1914,” Britain and the World 7, no. 2 (2014): 174–95; Stephen Tuffnell, “Engineering Inter-Imperialism: 
American Miners and the Transformation of Global Mining, 1871–1910,” Journal of Global History 10 
(2015): 53–76. 
22 Ryan Jones stresses the significance of having a circum-Pacific framework for historical analysis of 
any North Pacific region. Jones writes, “In order to understand humans’ relations with each other and with 
the ocean at any place on the North Pacific littoral, then, it is necessary to adopt a circum-Pacific 
viewpoint attuned to movements above and below the waves.” Jones, “Running into Whales,” 360. 
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story, the absence of which would render that story incomplete at best and prejudicial at worst.”23 
Although Haycox’s assertion is well-taken and justifiable, I approach the U.S. imperialism in 
Alaska from colonizers’ viewpoints with a focus on multiple-level salmon fisheries regimes. This 
is because of my conviction that understanding colonizing institutions and structures provides 
necessary contexts in which to properly explore and interpret lived experiences of native Alaskans. 
It should be noted that focusing mostly on Anglo-American colonizers does not necessarily mean 
that indigenous peoples were inert and powerless and that their lived experiences were negligible 
as an object of historical observation. 
The most important element of salmon fisheries in Bristol Bay has been structure of perpetual, 
not temporary, exploitation of sockeye salmon. Different from mining and drilling, which deplete 
fixed amounts of underground natural resources, absentee investors have exploited, and continue 
to exploit, sockeye salmon in Bristol Bay for their wealth and the bay has been, and will continue 
to be, if sustainable practices followed, a colonial supplier of the fish for the mainland. This has 
been possible because of salmon’s anadromous habits and reproductive capabilities. These two 
elements have crucially helped Anglo-Americans reproduce the colonial structures of white 
dominance and extractive capitalism that primarily benefits outsiders in Bristol Bay for more than 
a century. But, more significantly, Bristol Bay salmon fisheries have experienced growing human 
efforts to reduce environmental and ecological agency in shaping the lifecycle of sockeye salmon. 
Indeed, absentee investors on the West Coast and government officials in Washington have sought 
to attain what is often called “maximum sustainable yield” (hereafter MSY) of sockeye salmon in 
Bristol Bay throughout the twentieth century.24  MSY is conceptually defined as “the largest 
 
23 Stephen Haycox, Alaska: An American Colony (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2002), 22. 
24 This project relies on scholarship focusing on science’s roles in fisheries management. See, for 
example, Eric L. Mills, Biological Oceanography: An Early History, 1870–1960 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1989); Joseph E. Taylor, Making Salmon: An Environmental History of the Northwest 
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average catch or yield that can continuously be taken from a stock under existing environmental 
conditions” “without affecting significantly the reproduction process.”25 Historians of fisheries 
science argue that the concept of MSY originated from a policy paper written in 1949 by an 
American ichthyologist named Wilbert M. Chapman, who explained MSY as “mak[ing] possible 
the maximum production of food from the sea on a sustainable basis year after year.”26 The 
scholars of fisheries science treat MSY as a concept produced after World War II, give Chapman 
much credit, and suggest that the concept spread from the United States to the rest of the world in 
the latter half of the twentieth century, supporting the “Americanization of the world” paradigm.27 
In contrast, “The Making of an American Ichthyological Empire” offers a more nuanced and 
broader understanding of MSY and stresses genealogical and philosophical continuity in MSY by 
revealing that ichthyologists of not only the United States but also Japan paid as much attention to 
trying to base salmon fisheries on the idea of sustainability before the Second World War as 
Chapman did after the conflict. 
 
Fisheries Crisis (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1999); Jacob D. Hamblin, Oceanographers and 
the Cold War: Disciples of Marine Science (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2005); Ki Won Han, 
“The Rise of Oceanography in the United States, 1900-1940” (Ph.D. dissertation, Berkeley, University of 
California, 2010); Carmel Finley, All the Fish in the Sea: Maximum Sustainable Yield and the Failure of 
Fisheries Management (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011). 
25 W. E. Ricker, “Computation and Interpretation of Biological Statistics of Fish Populations,” 
Bulletin of the Fisheries Research Board of Canada, no. 191 (1975), 4; “Maximum Sustainable Yield,” 
FAO Term Portal, Entry: 98610 - Collection: Fisheries, available at 
http://www.fao.org/faoterm/viewentry/en/?entryId=98610 (accessed August 27, 2020). 
26 Carmel Finley and Naomi Oreskes, “Maximum Sustainable Yield: A Policy Disguised as Science,” 
ICES Journal of Marine Science 70, no. 2 (2013): 247; Wilbert M. Chapman, “United States Policy on 
High Seas Fisheries,” Department of State Bulletin XX, no. 498 (1949), 67. 
27 Carmel Finley, for example, writes, “MSY became part of American foreign and domestic policy in 
1949 when it was formally adopted by the State Department as the goal of American fisheries policy. It 
had actually been deployed earlier, in the management of Japanese fisheries during the American 
Occupation of Japan and again in 1946 with the creation of the International Whaling Commission. 
Between 1949 and 1958, American diplomats pushed to have MSY adopted internationally as the goal of 
fisheries science. MSY is the basis for many of the international fisheries agreements signed during the 
1950s, and it was formally recognized as a legal concept during the Law of the Sea negotiations in 1958.” 
Finley, All the Fish in the Sea, 2. 
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 I regard MSY’s conservationist aspects as an inherently colonial technique to dispossess 
indigenous peoples of their fishing grounds and maintain white’s dominant access to marine 
resources.28 It is notable that the concept and practice of MSY have persistently created a more 
sophisticated and modern form of extractive colonialism in Bristol Bay than mere mining and 
drilling. To achieve MSY in Bristol Bay, the absentee investors and federal officials paid 
considerable attention to advancing the entire lifecycle of sockeye salmon, seeking to maximize 
the number of salmon that were spawned, hatched, grew enough to travel to the ocean, and returned 
to their natal river and lake in Bristol Bay for spawning. Although prevailing popular discourse on 
Alaska emphasizes its pristine and untouched wilderness immune from human intervention, I 
deconstruct this widespread myth by revealing the degree to which Anglo-American businessmen 
and industrialists and government officials at Washington have artificially reconfigured, managed, 
and controlled the Alaskan environment and ecology for the purpose of perpetual commodification 
and exploitation of the northern territory’s terrestrial and maritime landscape. 
In addition to their salmon fisheries in Bristol Bay were also expansive in two ways: 
geopolitical and scientific. To promote the entire lifecycle of Bristol Bay salmon, the United States 
constructed what I call “bio-sphere of influence” not only in Bristol Bay but also in the Bering Sea 
and the North Pacific. The bio-sphere of influence is a coined term by combining a prefix “bio-” 
and a political concept of “sphere of influence.”29  I define “bio-sphere of influence” as an 
extraterritorial spatial area where a state exercises exclusive jurisdiction over the flora and fauna, 
 
28 See, for example, Mark David Spence, Dispossessing the Wilderness: Indian Removal and the 
Making of the National Parks (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999); Alexander Zaitchik, “How 
Conservation Became Colonialism,” Foreign Policy, no. 229 (2018): 56-63. 
29 The term, “bio-” is a prefix connected with life and living things. The concept, “sphere of 
influence,” refers to “a political claim to exclusive control, which other nations may or may not recognize 
as a matter of fact,” or an extraterritorial space within which “another state or states pledge themselves to 
refrain from interference.” Daniel H. Deudney, “Sphere of Influence,” Encyclopedia Britannica, available 
at https://www.britannica.com/topic/sphere-of-influence (accessed August 26, 2020). 
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particularly the latter, flourishing there. By projecting political authority far beyond Bristol Bay 
and building a bio-sphere of influence in the Bering Sea and the North Pacific according to Bristol 
Bay salmon’s migration patterns, the United States indeed tried to prevent foreign pelagic 
fishermen from intercepting the fish on the high seas, where the United States could not exercise 
its sovereignty, before they returned to Bristol Bay for spawning. 
Besides, extending scientific knowledge about sockeye salmon was important for salmon 
fisheries in Bristol Bay to advance the lifecycle of the fish. Bristol Bay salmon fisheries 
experienced dramatic changes conceptualized as modernization after the late nineteenth century. 
Among these changes was the Anglo-American introduction of capitalism, a contract labor system, 
and industrialization and mechanization to Bristol Bay based on the idea that non-human animals 
were resources, or objects of commodification, for making wealth. More notably, salmon fisheries 
in Bristol Bay became science-oriented on the assumption that humans should and could tame and 
transform the oceanic environment and ecology to their benefit. Sockeye salmon’s habits 
especially after their descent to the ocean were full of mysteries and this absence of scientific 
knowledge about the fish prevented Anglo-Americans from limiting environmental and ecological 
agency in shaping the lifecycle of Bristol Bay salmon. Environmental and ecological forces were 
problematic for Anglo-Americans because they were too unpredictable and uncertain factors to 
maintain continuous and efficient exploitation of Bristol Bay salmon on an MSY basis. A key to 
complete management of the lifecycle of sockeye salmon in Bristol Bay was to exclude as much 
unpredictability and uncertainty as possible caused by the non-human forces. The work of 
producing and updating scientific knowledge about sockeye salmon allowed Anglo-Americans to 
comprehensively control the lifecycle of Bristol Bay salmon, accurately predict future behavioral 
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patterns of the fish, and securely reproduce and exploit them on an MSY basis.30  
Looking at how American ichthyologists deepened their scientific understanding about 
sockeye salmon makes it possible for us to spotlight an overlooked aspect of the United States as 
an importing country. Historians have overemphasized the “outgoing tide” from the United States 
and paid scant attention to the “incoming swells.”31 In fact, Eric Foner says, “Historians are fully 
aware of how American military might, commodities, and culture have affected the rest of the 
world, especially in the twentieth century. We know how the United States has exported everything 
from Coca-Cola to ideas about democracy and ‘free enterprise.’ Far less attention has been devoted 
to how our history has been affected from abroad.”32 “The Making of an American Ichthyological 
Empire” reveals that the popular Americanization-of-the-world model cannot explain the historical 
development of ichthyology; rather, American scientists imported ichthyological theories and 
research methods from countries with more advanced fishing industries, such as Norway and Japan, 
to make MSY-based exploitative colonial structure in Bristol Bay. As Ian Tyrrell points out, it is 
important to put the formation and development of America’s modern environmentalism in a 
global context.33  
 
30 I follow Helen Rozwadowski’s emphasis on the importance of investigating historical production 
of scientific and cultural knowledge about the ocean in studying the sea. Rozwadowski writes, 
“Knowledge has helped people exploit marine resources, control ocean space, extend imperial or national 
power, and attempt to refashion the sea into a more tractable arena for human activity.” Rozwadowski, 
Vast Expanses, 9. See also Helen M. Rozwadowski, The Sea Knows No Boundaries: A Century of Marine 
Science under ICES (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2002); Helen M. Rozwadowski, Fathoming 
the Ocean: The Discovery and Exploration of the Deep Sea (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 
2005). 
31 Kristin L. Hoganson, Consumers’ Imperium: The Global Production of American Domesticity, 
1865-1920 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 5. 
32 Eric Foner, “American Freedom in a Global Age,” American Historical Review 106, no. 1 (2001): 
4. 
33 Ian Tyrrell, Crisis of the Wasteful Nation: Empire and Conservation in Theodore Roosevelt’s 
America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015). Contrary to Tyrrell, who looks at the Atlantic 




Scientific knowledge about sockeye salmon was also crucial to excluding foreign competitors 
from America’s bio-sphere of influence in the Bering Sea and the North Pacific. To be sure, 
multiple fisheries institutions created by U.S. federal laws and diplomatic agreements between the 
United States and other imperial powers crucially determined who had the legal authority to exploit 
Bristol Bay salmon. More significantly, however, the legal legitimacy for catching Bristol Bay 
salmon was dependent on the extent to which various habits of the fish were scientifically legible. 
Indeed, understanding migration routes of Bristol Bay salmon not only in the bay but also in the 
Bering Sea and the North Pacific had significant impacts on the development of salmon fisheries 
in Bristol Bay. Moreover, legal access to Bristol Bay salmon did not always guarantee physical 
access to the fish, and secure physical access to Bristol Bay salmon was contingent upon the quality 
and quantity of available scientific information about the fish. “The Making of an American 
Ichthyological Empire” demonstrates that American ichthyologists conducted intensive research 
on Bristol Bay salmon throughout the twentieth century and sought to scientifically visualize the 
ecology of the fish in order to keep other imperial powers from having any access to Bristol Bay 
salmon. I argue that the ichthyological work of producing and updating scientific knowledge about 
Bristol Bay salmon was essential for Anglo-Americans to establish the colonial structure of 
perpetual exploitation of the fish on an MSY basis.34 
Regarding the definition of nature, I refer to William Cronon’s theorization of it and consider 
natural environment and ecology to be an amalgam of “first nature” and “second nature.” 
According to Cronon, first nature is conceptualized as “original, prehuman nature” and the second 
 
34 I have received much inspiration from Nadin Heé’s study that stresses the significance of scientific 
knowledge for controlling transnational migratory fish through inter-governmental negotiations. Nadin 
Heé, “Negotiating Migratory Tuna: Territorialization of the Oceans, Trans-War Knowledge and Fisheries 
Diplomacy,” Diplomatic History 44, no. 3 (2020): 413–27. 
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nature “the artificial nature that people erect atop first nature.”35 To be sure, as Cronon admits, 
these reductionist definitions of nature prevent us from grasping ambiguities and complexities of 
the relationship between humans and what we call nature.36 Still, the concepts of first and second 
nature allow us to have a broad picture of the historical development of salmon fisheries in Bristol 
Bay. I reveal that Bristol Bay salmon fisheries reflected a historically fluctuating spectrum of first 
and second nature and that the salmon fisheries were a product of Anglo-American colonizers’ 
efforts, both successful and unsuccessful, to manipulate landscape of the bay and outer oceans. 
“The Making of an American Ichthyological Empire” consists of seven chapters and they are 
divided into two units according to chronology and context. Unit one includes chapters one, two, 
and three, and analyzes salmon fisheries in Bristol Bay from the pre-1880s to the 1930s in the 
national context. Unit two contains chapters four, five, six, and seven, and discusses Bristol Bay 
salmon fisheries in relation to interactions with other imperial powers. 
Chapter one describes indigenous salmon fisheries in the Bristol Bay region before Anglo-
Americans systematically started engaging in commercial salmon fisheries there in the 1880s. This 
chapter explores how indigenous peoples in Bristol Bay practiced salmon fishing and what salmon 
meant for them. I demonstrate that Bristol Bay natives were conscious conservationists who paid 
special attention to not overexploiting migrating salmon. In fact, the fish were crucially a source 
of livelihood and a means of subsistence for the aboriginal inhabitants. Thus, Bristol Bay natives 
invented various unwritten communal customs and rules to prevent the depletion of valuable 
salmon on the assumption that natural environment and ecology were vulnerable to human 
intervention. But salmon were more than just edible food for them; instead, abundant salmon in 
 
35 William Cronon, Nature’s Metropolis: Chicago and the Great West (New York: W. W. Norton & 




summer allowed Bristol Bay natives to keep their cultural identity vibrant by working and 
interacting together beyond gender and generational barriers to harvest, process, and preserve the 
fish. This chapter claims that salmon and salmon fisheries constituted an important cultural and 
social nodal point in the community of Bristol Bay natives before their encounter with Anglo-
Americans in the late nineteenth century. 
Chapter two examines the dawn of commercial salmon fisheries in Bristol Bay, covering the 
period from 1883, when the first cannery was constructed in the region, to 1919, when Anglo-
American canneries saw a significant drop in sockeye salmon catches there. This chapter shows 
that Anglo-American cannery managers advanced what I call “laissez-faire salmon fisheries” 
without federal restrictions and interventions. Anglo-American canners pursued capitalistic 
rationality and efficiency in catching sockeye salmon in Bristol Bay and sought to maximize the 
production of the fish for short-term economic interests by mobilizing abundant capital, industrial 
technology, customary Anglo-American legal practices, and unique ecological views. This chapter 
argues that laissez-faire salmon fisheries by Anglo-Americans established fundamental structures 
of extractive colonialism in Bristol Bay by making the region a mercantile supplier of canned 
salmon for the U.S. mainland. 
Chapter three describes the end of the laissez-faire salmon fisheries in Bristol Bay due to 
increasing federal control over them during the interwar period. The significant decline in sockeye 
salmon catches in Bristol Bay in 1919 led to the enactment of the White Act of 1924 in Congress 
and created a different vision for and practice of salmon fisheries in the bay. The law allowed the 
federal government to place tough restrictions on salmon fisheries in Bristol Bay in the name of 
conservation. The conservation-minded federal government also imposed a redefined concept of 
rationality, which was a key to perpetual exploitation of Bristol Bay salmon. The reconceptualized 
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idea of rationality encouraged fishermen and canners not to seek to maximize salmon catches for 
short-term profit; instead, they should pay more attention to maximizing their long-term economic 
interests by restraining salmon catches. In addition to this kind of “passive conservation,” which 
was characterized by restriction and prohibition, the federal government advanced what I term 
“active conservation,” which primarily sought to reconfigure local environment and ecology with 
the help of science for promoting the lifecycle of Bristol Bay salmon. Field agents of the Bureau 
of Fisheries at Washington investigated the Bristol Bay region, observed the local environmental 
landscape and ecosystem, and redesigned them in ways that would advance reproduction, survival, 
and growth of sockeye salmon there. This chapter contends that the federal government’s passive 
and active conservation efforts, both of which aimed to achieve MSY, played key roles in 
developing the extractive empire and laying a structural foundation for a more sophisticated and 
modern ichthyological empire. 
Contrary to unit one, which discusses intrinsic imperialism in Bristol Bay in the national 
context, unit two studies extrinsic imperialism with focus on inter-imperial rivalries and 
collaboration over Bristol Bay salmon. Chapter four looks at the development of Japanese salmon 
fisheries in the northern sea [hokuyō] during the interwar period. This chapter pays attention to the 
Japanese invention of the factory ship in the late 1920s and addresses how it changed structure of 
Japanese salmon fisheries in the northern sea. The use of factory ships allowed Japanese salmon 
fishers to leave conflict-ridden Russian territorial waters and catch as many salmon as they wanted 
on the high seas thanks to the freedom of the seas doctrine, the core of the customary Law of the 
Sea.37 As more Japanese fishermen operated salmon fisheries offshore, they sought to create their 
 
37 The Law of the Sea had not been codified until 1982, when the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea was signed at the end of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS III). The convention is described as a “constitution for the oceans” and more than 160 states 
have ratified it. In this dissertation, I use the term “customary Law of the Sea” to say that what powerful 
 
 20 
bio-sphere of influence in the Bering Sea and the North Pacific where they would dominate access 
to migrating salmon. In this context, scientifically understanding migration patterns of salmon in 
the Bering Sea and the North Pacific became more significant than ever. In fact, Japanese 
ichthyologists conducted intensive research about the fish in the northern waters before the 
outbreak of the Pacific War in December 1941. This chapter claims that the expansion of Japan’s 
salmon fisheries in the Bering Sea and the North Pacific during the interwar period was contingent 
upon its extension of scientific knowledge about the fish swimming in the waters. 
   Chapter five spotlights the so-called Bristol Bay crisis, a U.S.-Japanese fisheries dispute over 
sockeye salmon in the bay in the 1930s. The expansion of Japanese science-oriented salmon 
fisheries in the Bering Sea and the North Pacific challenged the Anglo-American domination of 
sockeye salmon in Bristol Bay, transforming the bay into an inter-imperial space where the United 
States and Japan contested secure access to Bristol Bay salmon. This chapter reveals that the 
fisheries controversy in Bristol Bay offered two crucial lessons to U.S. government officials in 
Washington. First, the United States must dispossess Japan of its legal privileges guaranteed by 
the customary Law of the Sea and the freedom of the seas principle, which constituted the core of 
the customary Law of the Sea. Second, more significantly, the United States must have 
comprehensive understanding of migration patterns of Bristol Bay salmon. This chapter insists that 
the U.S.-Japanese fisheries dispute helped Washington officials realize that these two steps were 
essential to retaining dominant access to sockeye salmon in Bristol Bay by remaking the waters 
into America’s bio-sphere of influence. 
 
states said and did about ocean uses constituted a basis of contemporary unwritten maritime regimes and 
functioned practically as the de-facto law of the sea before the codification in 1982. Robin R. Churchill, 
“Law of the Sea,” Encyclopedia Britannica, available at https://www.britannica.com/topic/Law-of-the-Sea 
(accessed February 17, 2021); Tullio Treves, “Historical Development of the Law of the Sea,” in Donald 
Rothwell, Alex Oude Elferink, Karen Scott, and Tim Stephens, eds., The Oxford Handbook of the Law of 
the Sea (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016): 2. 
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Chapter six analyzes how the United States addressed the two problems found in the Bristol 
Bay crisis and constructed a bio-sphere of influence not just in Bristol Bay but also in the Bering 
Sea and the North Pacific. This chapter looks at the process leading up to the conclusion of the 
International Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean (hereafter North 
Pacific Convention) by the United States, Canada, and Japan in May 1952. World War II and its 
geopolitical consequences in the Asia-Pacific region created new imperial structure in the Bering 
Sea and the North Pacific. Prewar Japanese efforts to build its bio-sphere of influence in the Bering 
Sea and the North Pacific finally collapsed when Japan accepted unconditional surrender in August 
1945, and the United States began constructing its own bio-sphere of influence in the same waters. 
America’s intensive scientific research about Bristol Bay salmon after 1938 allowed its 
policymakers to realize that they would need to expand jurisdiction over Bristol Bay salmon into 
the eastern half of the Bering Sea and the North Pacific. America’s newly acquired hegemonic 
status after 1945 offered a political means to achieve this objective by imposing the North Pacific 
Convention on Canada and Japan. The convention required Canada and Japan to “abstain” from 
catching Bristol Bay salmon in the eastern half of the Bering Sea and the North Pacific. 
   Chapter seven focuses on the International North Pacific Fisheries Commission (hereafter the 
INPFC), a tripartite research board established by the North Pacific Convention in 1953. This 
chapter examines how the United States managed its bio-sphere of influence in the Bering Sea and 
the North Pacific through the INPFC. America’s bio-sphere of influence in the Bering Sea and the 
North Pacific was neither static nor stable; rather, its legal legitimacy was dependent on the quality 
and quantity of scientific evidence about Bristol Bay salmon’s ecology. This chapter reveals that 
American ichthyologists created and updated their scientific knowledge about Bristol Bay salmon 
to further expand America’s bio-sphere of influence into western parts of the Bering Sea and the 
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North Pacific. This chapter contends that deepening scientific understanding about Bristol Bay 
salmon’s migration patterns in the Bering Sea and the North Pacific was critical to controlling the 
lifecycle of the fish and dominating access to them. 
By the end of the 1970s, a sophisticated and well-managed ichthyological empire had emerged 
in Bristol Bay. Tough measures for restricting sockeye salmon catches were in effect in Bristol 
Bay and enormous projects were ongoing to remake the local environment and ecology in sockeye-
salmon-centered way. More significantly, the United States enclosed vast extraterritorial areas in 
the Bering Sea and the North Pacific in which to exclusively exercise jurisdiction over Bristol Bay 
salmon. These conservation efforts, crucially founded on ichthyologists’ devoted work of 
continuously expanding and updating scientific knowledge about sockeye salmon, were a key to 
perpetual exploitation of the fish in Bristol Bay on an MSY basis. This is a story about how this 
colonial structure appeared and developed in southwest Alaska in the twentieth century. 
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CHAPTER 1: INDIGENOUS SALMON FISHERIES AND 
 THE FUR TRADE IN BRISTOL BAY BEFORE 1883 
 
Bristol Bay and Pacific Salmon 
 
Bristol Bay, one of the remotest places in the United States, climatically belongs to the Arctic 
region. The Arctic area extends in a two-hundred-mile-wide band around the western and northern 
coast of Alaska from Bristol Bay to the Canadian border. Because cold winters and cool summers 
characterize the Arctic region, tundra, composed of ground-hugging flora such as mosses, lichens, 
sedges, and shrubs, with few or no trees, is found throughout the area.1 In fact, the country 
bordering on Bristol Bay is, for the most part, a virtually treeless swampy lowland characterized 
by a tundra type of vegetation.2 
Bristol Bay is a large, shallow sub-arctic bay. Bristol Bay is often called the easternmost arm 
of the Bering Sea after its geographical location. The bay indents for 200 miles the southwestern 
coast of Alaska and its mouth extends for 270 miles between Cape Newenham in the north and the 
southwestern end of the Alaska Peninsula in the south. 3  The bay’s benthic topography is 
essentially flat with an average gradient of 0.02 percent and a maximum depth of approximately 
70 meters at the 162° West longitude line.4 Glaciation marked the terrestrial Bristol Bay region by 
carving out deep valleys, lakes, and rivers. Ice melted and created shallow and large freshwater 
lakes there.5 Many rivers flow into the bay, particularly the Nushagak, Naknek, Kvichak, Egegik, 
 
1 Steve Langdon, The Native People of Alaska (Anchorage, AK: Greatland Graphics, 2002), 6. 
2 James W. VanStone, “Mainland Southwest Alaska Eskimo,” in Handbook of North American 
Indians, vol. 5 (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution, 1984), 226. 
3 “Bristol Bay,” Encyclopedia Britannica, available at https://www.britannica.com/place/Bristol-Bay 
(accessed November 12, 2020).  
4 National Marine Fisheries Service, “Biological Characterization: An Overview of Bristol, 
Nushagak, and Kvichak Bays; Essential Fish Habitat, Processes, and Species Assemblages” (December 
2013), 1. 
5 Bridget Groat, “The Changing Tides of Bristol Bay: Salmon, Sovereignty, and Alaska Natives” 
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and Ugashik, and each river shapes the individually named bay on the shoreline of Bristol Bay.6 
The weather pattern of the region is unpredictable at best and it is notorious for fog, rain or snow, 
and a seemingly endless wind.7 
   It is a sheer coincidence that the unique geographical and topographical features and dynamic 
meteorological conditions have made Bristol Bay a salmon-rich place. The bay is an extension of 
the eastern Bering Sea and North Pacific currents move through the bay in a counter-clockwise 
gyre under the influence of tides ranging from 3 to 23 feet. The currents deliver marine nitrates, 
carbon, phosphates, and silica into Bristol Bay. Meanwhile, the rivers in the region offer fresh 
water and dissolved organic materials at the eastern end of the bay. This terrestrial freshwater is 
more abundant and colder in spring and summer when snow and ice melts and rains are prevalent, 
and the rivers bring warmer freshwater to Bristol Bay by mid-summer. The ocean and rivers mix 
saltwater and freshwater in Bristol Bay and the bay has turned into a nutrient-wealthy estuary that 
feeds plentiful sockeye salmon.8 
   Over thousands of years, Pacific salmon (Oncorhynchus spp.), which migrate in most of the 
North Pacific rim and adjacent oceanic regions across the Pacific, have developed different 
adaptations that allow each species to coexist in Bristol Bay. Pacific salmon consist of the five 
species (figure 2): Chinook salmon (Oncorhynchus tshawytscha); chum salmon (Oncorhynchus 
keta); coho salmon (Oncorhynchus kisutch); pink salmon (Oncorhynchus gorbuscha); and sockeye 
salmon (Oncorhynchus nerka). Differences in development, size, reproductive habits, spawning 
locations, and diet made it possible for these five different Pacific salmon species to adapt to 
 
(Ph.D. dissertation, Arizona State University, 2019), 15-16.  
6 “Bristol Bay,” Encyclopedia Britannica. 
7 Walter R. Borneman, Alaska: Saga of a Bold Land (New York: HarperCollins, 2003), 246. 
8 National Marine Fisheries Service, “Biological Characterization,” 2-3. 
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common surroundings and thrive, returning to spawning grounds in great numbers every year.9 
 
Figure 2: Five Species of Pacific Salmon. Available at https://noyocenter.org/ocean-salmon/ 
(accessed November 13, 2020). 
 
Sockeye salmon have preserved themselves in Bristol Bay and the North Pacific since the pre-
historic time for the last 15,000 to 20,000 years. For the most part, salmon belong to a group of 
fish known as anadromous fish. They hatch in gravel-lined streams and rivers, spend several years 
in the freshwater rivers and lakes, transform physiologically into saltwater-tolerant fish, and make 
the journey to the open sea where they grow and mature.10 It is notable that Bristol Bay salmon 
do not stay within the bay until maturity; instead, they are known to travel thousands of miles 
following major currents in vast areas of the Bering Sea and the North Pacific for some years 
(figure 3). Although marine scientists generally agree on this great mobility of sockeye salmon as 
a scientific fact, “The Making of an American Ichthyological Empire” explains how ichthyologists 
obtained this scientific knowledge in the twentieth century. Upon maturity, sockeye salmon return 
 
9 Groat, “The Changing Tides of Bristol Bay,” 27-28. 
10 Ibid., 6. 
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to their natal rivers and streams and spawn in freshwater nests dug in gravel-bottomed streams and 
rivers. Their decaying bodies after the reproduction provide abundant nutrients for terrestrial and 
aquatic life in the Bristol Bay region.11 
 
 
Figure 3: Migration Route for Sockeye Salmon from Bristol Bay. Available at 
https://www.gi.alaska.edu/alaska-science-forum/do-salmon-navigate-earths-magnetic-field 
(accessed September 4, 2020). 
 
 
Indigenous Peoples and Their Salmon Cultures in the Bristol Bay Region 
 
In general, Alaskan natives are categorized according to languages they speak and indigenous 
peoples in the Bristol Bay region are called the Yup’ik or Yuit (figure 4). The Yup’ik are the most 
diverse group of Alaskan natives and they were the most numerous of the Alaska native groups at 





aboriginal Alaskans.12 The Yup’ik are usually divided into Bering Sea groups and Pacific groups 
based on technological, subsistence, and linguistic differences. About 3,000 Yup’iks inhabited the 
Bristol Bay region at the time of encounter.13 
 
 
Figure 4: Distribution of Alaskan Natives in the Bristol Bay Region. Steve Langdon, The Native 
People of Alaska (Anchorage: Greatland Graphics, 2002), 40. 
 
Little is actually known concerning pre-contact history of Bristol Bay natives, and pre-
encounter history of the Bristol Bay drainage has not been documented as much as in other parts 
of Alaska.14 But these facts never lessen the importance of studying lived experiences of Bristol 
 
12 This “time of encounter” means the earliest time when a native group had significant direct 
interaction with Euro-Americans. Alaskan natives encountered Russian explorers in the mid-18th century 
but this timing was different according to geographical location. This time of encounter for natives in 
northern and interior parts of Alaska was in the mid-19th century. Langdon, The Native People of Alaska, 
4. 
13 Ibid., 4, 42-43. 
14 James W. VanStone, Eskimos of the Nushagak River: An Ethnographic History (Seattle: University 
of Washington Press, 1967), xxiii; Alan S. Boraas and Catherine H. Knott, “Traditional Ecological 
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Bay natives. They first arrived in the Ugashik region in search of resources about 9,000 years ago 
or longer.15 Like other indigenous peoples inhabiting the Arctic region, natives in the Bristol Bay 
district practiced adaptation to what the local landscape provided, turning to the ocean for their 
livelihood. About 4,000 years ago, the Arctic Small Tool Tradition, a cultural movement for the 
widespread use of microlithic stone tools, appeared in western Alaska, including the Bristol Bay 
region. Maritime hunting of seals emerged and the people of the region refined marine mammal 
hunting to great sophistication.16 More significantly, a recent archaeological study has discovered 
that indigenous peoples began fishing salmon in the Bristol Bay area almost at the same time.17 
The Bristol Bay natives created a maritime economy, relied on abundant salmon for their 
livelihood, and developed their cultures based on the fish for thousands of years. 
Indeed, salmon have constituted the core of cultural identity for native inhabitants in Bristol 
Bay. An indigenous informant in the district said: 
Salmon more or less defines this area. It defines who we are. When you look at our art, you 
will see salmon. . . . It is who we are. When you listen to the stories and take a steam, even 
in the middle of winter, people talk about salmon. It is in our stories; it is in our art. It is who 
we are; it defines us.18 
 
Another native informant in the Bristol Bay region stated: 
 
[If the salmon were to be impacted by the Pebble Mine,] it would stop 10,000 years’ plus 
tradition, culturally and spiritually for my people; not only my people, all the other 
communities and villages in this region will go away. We would cease to exist. We can’t go 
anywhere. Where are we going to go?19 
 
 
Knowledge and Characterization of the Indigenous Cultures of the Nushagak and Kvichak Watersheds, 
Alaska,” in An Assessment of Potential Mining Impacts on Salmon Ecosystems of Bristol Bay, Alaska, 
Volume 2—Appendices A-D (Seattle: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2014), 21. 
15 However, there is little agreement among scholars when the ancestors of contemporary Alaska 
Natives arrived in current Alaska. Langdon, The Native People of Alaska, 7. 
16 Ibid., 8-9. 
17 Boraas and Knott, “Traditional Ecological Knowledge and Characterization of the Indigenous 
Cultures of the Nushagak and Kvichak Watersheds, Alaska,” 22. 
18 Quoted in ibid., 1. 
19 Quoted in ibid., 21. 
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As these indigenous voices clearly reveal, salmon have been at the center of their everyday lives 
for Bristol Bay natives as a means of not only their biological and social subsistence but also their 
cultural integrity and persistence.  
In fact, archaeologists have found that indigenous inhabitants in southwest Alaska developed 
a sophisticated salmon culture called the Norton tradition, dating from around 300 B.C. to A.D. 
1,000, after the Arctic Small Tool tradition. The Bristol Bay district possessed the interior Norton 
tradition and it was apparent thanks to the archaeological evidence of large sedentary villages 
adjacent to salmon fishing locations and polished fishing artifacts, including nets and notched 
stones used as net weights.20 Salmon migration cycles crucially shaped the way of life of Bristol 
Bay natives.21 An important job to be completed in the spring was repairing nets and traps in 
preparation for the first salmon runs.22 When salmon started their ascent in their natal river or 
stream in early summer, the indigenous peoples left their winter communal settlements and 
travelled to family fish camps near salmon-rich rivers and streams.23 Bristol Bay natives hunted 
other fish, seals, beluga whales, and terrestrial mammals. In addition, migratory waterfowl and 
their eggs were a crucial early spring resource for the indigenous inhabitants and they collected 
and stored various greens, roots, and berries for winter consumption.24  
Salmon also mattered for Bristol Bay natives to feed the main form of winter transportation: 
dogs. While the indigenous peoples engaged in catching, processing, and preserving salmon during 
summer, they hunted furbearing animals, including wolves, foxes, beavers, river otters, minks, and 
muskrats, during winter to obtain fur and meat and supplement their incomes. Before the advent 
 
20 Ibid., 25. 
21 Groat, “The Changing Tides of Bristol Bay,” 58. 
22 VanStone, “Mainland Southwest Alaska Eskimo,” 231. 
23 Groat, “The Changing Tides of Bristol Bay,” 58. 
24 Langdon, The Native People of Alaska, 44. 
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of snowmobiles, cars, and airplanes in modern times, the indigenous peoples relied on sled dogs 
to travel snowy long distance to catch furbearing animals and gather firewood.25 One indigenous 
informant recalled, “They [people] go get wood with the dog team, they hunt with their dog teams, 
and they travel to village with their dog team.”26 The Bristol Bay natives fed sled dogs with 
salmon and the fish constituted the hub of the indigenous peoples’ communal lives. 
Gender played a key role in communal lives of the Bristol Bay natives. A village in the Bristol 
Bay region contained eight to nine houses on average and up to about thirty people lived there. 
The village typically had a men’s house known as qasgiq and men and boys older than seven or 
eight lived in the large communal men’s house. Meanwhile, women and girls lived in a smaller 
house called an ena, and both types of houses were built from sod and wood.27 Although the 
difference in size of houses suggests that male villagers enjoyed superior social positions to their 
female counterparts in the Bristol Bay district, women’s labor was essential to communal lives. 
Bristol Bay peoples developed a gendered division of labor to catch, process, and preserve salmon 
during summer. Men typically harvested salmon and women processed and preserved the fish 
(figure 5). It is said that family groups handled as much as 5,000 salmon for their subsistence and 
feeding their dogs.28 Completing the labor was the top priority for the community and all family 
members across generations participated in salmon harvest and preservation. While engaging in 
strenuous work during summer, time spent at riverside fish camps made cultural interactions 
between multigenerational family members possible.29 
 
 
25 Groat, “The Changing Tides of Bristol Bay,” 79-80. 
26 Quoted in Boraas and Knott, “Traditional Ecological Knowledge and Characterization of the 
Indigenous Cultures of the Nushagak and Kvichak Watersheds, Alaska,” 31. 
27 Ibid., 32. 
28 Ibid., 33. 





Figure 5: Eskimo Woman Dressing Salmon. National Geographic Society Katmai Expeditions 
Photographs, Archives and Special Collections, Consortium Library, University of Alaska 
Anchorage. 
 
Two different visions and ways of life met in Bristol Bay when indigenous peoples and Euro-
Americans encountered each other there. Euro-American colonizers lived in a society of market 
economy and industrial capitalism. They believed that the relationship between humans and the 
natural environment and ecology was hierarchical according to Judeo-Christian teachings and 
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viewed the latter as objects of domination and commodification.30 Thus, Euro-Americans neither 
possessed any special attachment to what the natural environment and ecology had to offer to them 
nor tried to adapt themselves to their surrounding environment and ecosystem. In contrast, the 
natural environment and ecology were sources of life, means of subsistence, and origins of cultural 
identity for indigenous peoples. The native inhabitants felt intimate connections with the animals 
they exploited and with the locations where they did so. Adaptation to the local environment and 
ecology was a symbolic process the indigenous peoples went through to pay their respects to 
them.31  
This does not mean that native Alaskans were unable to tame and dominate natural 
environment and ecology. Although indigenous peoples are often described as conservationists in 
nature who were incapable of exhausting local flora and fauna as resources, that is a romanticized, 
West-centric stereotype and myth. Instead, because salmon formed an important part of their daily 
communal lives, Alaskan natives consciously cared considerably about avoiding the depletion of 
the fish. Village chiefs often controlled privileges to catch salmon based on lineage or place in the 
tribal group. Moreover, tribal members did not conduct fisheries intensively; rather, they scattered 
throughout the landscape and dispersed their fishing efforts so that sufficient numbers of salmon 
could reach their spawning grounds.32 In addition, indigenous peoples in Bristol Bay tried to let 
sufficient numbers of spawning salmon escape by temporally splitting harvests. In fact, for 
example, native peoples called Dena’ina fished salmon twice a year: while the fish were ascending 
their natal river before spawning during summer and after they finished spawning in the fall.33 
 
30 David F. Arnold, The Fishermen’s Frontier: People and Salmon in Southeast Alaska (Seattle: 
University of Washington Press, 2008), 54. 
31 Groat, “The Changing Tides of Bristol Bay,” 55, 57. 
32 Ibid., 53-54. 
33 Ibid., 65-66. 
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Indigenous peoples in southwest Alaska also intentionally refrained from fishing ascending salmon 
deemed not fully developed. Indeed, a newspaper correspondent reported, “So plenty are they 
[salmon], and so easy caught, that the wary Indian—fastidious in this, if nothing else—singles out 
for his spear only the largest, fattest and plumpest specimens.”34 Further, Bristol Bay natives 
consciously lessened the pressure put on spawning salmon by selectively exploiting other 
subsistence food on different locations. An indigenous informant recalled: 
Site selection of those communities [indigenous villages] was very important and it was 
because of the production of subsistence foods at each of those sites processed. Most of those 
produced salmon in addition to [other foods], for example you go to the village of Manokotuk, 
and it is rich in berries. If you go to the upriver villages they are rich in caribou and moose 
and other resources. Each village was selected by the folks . . . because of their subsistence 
resources.35 
 
This story shows that the indigenous peoples adapted themselves to the local landscape, that they 
perceived salmon as common living property for all local communities beyond village boundaries, 
and that they intentionally sought to avoid overexploiting spawning salmon. In sum, Bristol Bay 
natives defined rationality based not on the calculation of how many salmon they could catch but 
on the consideration of how many salmon they should get for their subsistence. 
Even when they operated intensive salmon fisheries, Bristol Bay natives paid special attention 
to not wasting salmon. Indigenous peoples in the Bristol Bay area used nets, traps, weirs, hooks, 
and spears to harvest salmon.36 Weirs, for example, were a cost-effective fishing gear and the 
Dena’ina dug weirs into the bottom of rivers and streams to direct salmon toward their traps as the 
fish swam upriver. The Dena’ina understood how much they could process per day and their 
 
34 “Alaska: Salmon Fisheries—Human Sacrifices by the Indians,” New York Times, July 24, 1870. 
35 Quoted in Boraas and Knott, “Traditional Ecological Knowledge and Characterization of the 
Indigenous Cultures of the Nushagak and Kvichak Watersheds, Alaska,” 31. 
36 Bristol Bay natives used kayaks for tending drift and set gillnets as well as for long-distance travel, 
trading, sealing, and hunting beluga. The gillnets were made from Caribou skin or willow bark. Langdon, 
The Native People of Alaska, 45. 
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everyday capability to process salmon determined how many salmon they should catch per day. 
Thus, once the indigenous inhabitants got a sufficient amount of salmon, they opened the weir 
gates and freed ascending salmon.37  The natives were well aware that natural ecology was 
vulnerable to human intervention and they tried to maintain ecological resiliency by restraining 
their extraction activities and not wasting migrating salmon. 
In addition, natives in the Bristol Bay area created and attached a sacred and monstrous image 
to salmon to make indigenous inhabitants be afraid of the fish and thus not overfish them. An 
American field agent who investigated the Tikchik district in 1924 reported an anecdote: 
According to a story common among the natives of the Bristol Bay region, the Tikchik is 
the home of a great fish known as the “chieginuk,” which is said to become so large and 
vicious as to attack and destroy caribou and other animals that attempt to cross the river and 
lakes, and the natives in the Tikchik never use brightly painted kayaks for fear that the story 
was true with respect to the painting of the kayaks and also that the natives are afraid of the 
fish. Excitement became keen when one of the natives volunteered to catch a small cheginuk, 
large ones never having been seen by them, but our disappointment was keen next morning 
when the native paddled up to camp, and with the word “chieginuk” tossed a fine specimen 
of lake trout (Crislivomer namaycush) on the beach. Great numbers of lake trout were found 
in all parts of the lakes. The natives reported that each fall, shortly before the freeze-up, a 
great run of these fish occurs from First Nuyakuk Lake up the Tikchik River, and it is from 
this run that they take most of their winter’s supply of fish.38 
 
This anecdote demonstrates that natives in the Tikchik district adapted themselves to the local 
ecosystem and lived in harmony with it. The myth about “chieginuk,” which was a way to show 
respect and awe to the fish to ensure their continued availability, was ecologically rational for the 
natives and it worked as an unwritten socio-cultural mechanism in their community to prevent the 
indigenous inhabitants from overexploiting lake trout, which were essential for their biological 
and social subsistence and cultural persistence. 
   Bristol Bay natives’ adaptation to the local environment and ecology was apparent in their 
 
37 Groat, “The Changing Tides of Bristol Bay,” 58, 66-67. 
38 Ward T. Bower, “Alaska Fishery and Fur Seal Industries in 1924” (Washington, DC: Government 
Printing Office, 1925), 112. 
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processing and preserving harvested sockeye salmon. The indigenous inhabitants processed the 
fish in multiple ways according to the final product. To dry salmon, they removed the fin and head, 
cut both sides of the fish away from the backbone, and kept the salmon fillets outside or inside 
smokehouses until they became dry and cured (figure 6). The Bristol Bay natives did not waste 
even the salmon guts that come off with the backbone—these they gave to their dogs.39 Indeed, 
an indigenous informant recollected, “One of the things we were taught and we are teaching our 
kids and grandkids are that you do not waste. Boy if they let the fish [salmon] get rotten boy they 
would be disappointed in us really bad. So we teach and pass that on, don’t waste nothing.”40 This 
indigenous approach to processing salmon clearly contrasted with that of Anglo-Americans, who 
discarded without hesitation all parts except salmon flesh for canning, after the 1880s. Another 
indigenous informant proudly stressed cultural sophistication of freeze-drying harvested salmon, 
saying, “Freeze drying is not a new thing. That’s been going on with my people for over 10,000 
years, eating freeze dried food.”41 In addition to drying salmon, the indigenous peoples in Bristol 
Bay consciously fermented harvested salmon. For example, the Yup’ik took advantage of the fact 
that the ground was cool enough to allow controlled fermentation. They buried grass-wrapped 
salmon heads at the end of summer and kept them underground for some weeks until the rotten 
salmon heads turned into a mash like oatmeal.42 Both drying and fermentation were sophisticated 
techniques that allowed indigenous inhabitants in the Bristol Bay area to effectively consume all 
parts of harvested salmon without any waste for the entire year until salmon returned to the region 
next summer. Adapting themselves to frigid climate patterns and abundant migrating salmon, 
 
39 Groat, “The Changing Tides of Bristol Bay,” 76-77 
40 Quoted in Boraas and Knott, “Traditional Ecological Knowledge and Characterization of the 
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41 Quoted in ibid., 21. 
42 Nicolaas Mink, Salmon: A Global History (London: Reaktion Books, 2013), 45. 
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Bristol Bay natives paid respect to their surrounding environment and ecology, created traditional 




Figure 6: Yup’iks Drying Salmon. Steve Langdon, The Native People of Alaska (Anchorage: 
Greatland Graphics, 2002), 47. 
 
 
Bristol Bay as a Commercial Hub of the Fur Trade in Southwest Alaska 
 
   The colonization of Bristol Bay as a site of commercial resource extraction began inside the 
imagination of European explorers when they reached the region and gave a European name to it. 
Bristol Bay is not an indigenous name, or autonym, but a Euro-American name, or exonym. British 
Captain James Cook reached a large bay at the easternmost end of the Bering Sea and named it 
Bristol Bay in 1778 in honor of his friend, the third Earl of Bristol, Augustus John Harvey.43 As 
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Maurice Amutabi claims, the naming legitimized Euro-American possession and appropriation 
and signified complete takeover.44 Renaming Bristol Bay was the first step to the Euro-American 
colonization of the region and allowed them to erase long history of the local indigenous peoples 
and their socio-cultural relationship with the bay. 
   Before America’s purchase of Alaska in 1867, the chief Europeans who explored Alaska and 
exploited its resources were Russians. Russian explorers and traders traveled in Alaska in the 19th 
century not just to obtain geographical knowledge on the vast unknown northern landmass; but, 
more significantly, to obtain furs.45 In fact, the maritime sea otter trade declined in about 1815 
when Euro-Americans exhausted the animals virtually throughout their entire range on the West 
coast of North America. 46  This development led to a shift to trade of terrestrial furbearing 
mammals, particularly beaver, mink, marten, and fox. Between 1820 and 1840, Russians gradually 
expanded into the coast of western Alaska and established trading posts in the Bristol Bay region.47 
The expansion of the fur trade economy into the Bristol Bay region opened access to lucrative fur-
bearing animals in southwest Alaska to Euro-Americans and exposed the local aboriginal peoples 
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to the Euro-American way of life. Although Russians pursued fur-bearing animals, not salmon, in 
the Bristol Bay area, the commercial fur trade laid the foundation for colonial structure there by 
undermining the natives’ traditional subsistence activities and increasing their dependence on 
European goods and credit. In other words, it is crucial to pay attention to the historical continuity 
between the Russian fur trade in southwest Alaska until the mid-19th century and Anglo-American 
salmon canning business there after the 1880s. 
It is impossible to determine the date of the first Russian penetration of the Bristol Bay region 
with accuracy. In 1791 Dmitri Ivanovich Bocharov, a naval officer acting under orders from 
Alexander Andreevich Baranov, the first Russian governor of Alaska, explored some of the 
northern part of the Alaska Peninsula. The main objective of the exploration was to establish 
friendly relations with the local aboriginal peoples in the interest of the fur trade, which meant that 
Russians had to rely on indigenous inhabitants for obtaining pelts. It is believed that Bocharov 
reached Iliamna Lake and the Nushagak River in the Bristol Bay area. It was not until 1818 when 
the Russian-American Company, a Russian trading monopoly in North America, dispatched an 
expedition to the north of Bristol Bay to thoroughly explore the territory by land. The expedition 
aimed to construct a redoubt named Alexandrovski, at the mouth of the Nushagak River and 
establish trade relations with the aboriginal peoples living in the neighborhood.48 Contrary to 
Anglo-Americans who later took the risk of being shipwrecked and drowned in Bristol Bay 
because of its shallowness and treacherous shoals of the rivers flowing into the bay, the Russians 
avoided the danger when supplying the redoubt Alexandrovski and exporting furs from the region 
by crossing the Alaska Peninsula and the Cook Inlet.49  
 
48 VanStone, Eskimos of the Nushagak River, 4-6. 
49 Ibid., 7. Foggy weather during summer made it difficult for fishermen and mariners to travel 
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   When Russians built Alexandrovski Redoubt in 1818, Fedor Kolmakov of mixed Russian and 
aboriginal American ancestry, was put in charge of the new trading post. Kolmakov established 
trade relations with neighboring natives and even baptized some of them, playing a key role in 
spreading the influence of the Russian-American Company in the area near the station.50 Although 
Russian Orthodox missionaries penetrated into the Bristol Bay region after 1841, little is known 
about their explorations.51 Alexandrovski Redoubt soon functioned as a commercial hub of the 
southwestern Alaska where aboriginal peoples participated in the market economy and fur trade 
flourished. Indeed, as early as 1828, Kolmakov made an annual shipment of more than 4,000 
beaver and otter pelts from the trading station. The fur trade network created by Kolmakov reached 
even the Kuskokwim River region, several hundred miles away from Alexandrovski Redoubt, and 
more than 200 indigenous peoples of Kuskokwim came to Lake Aleknagik to trade with 
Kolmakov.52 
In order to maintain and expand the fur trade network, Kolmakov and other field agents of the 
Russian-American Company used the technique of sending gifts, particularly silver medals with 
the Tsar’s picture on one side, to the village member whom they regarded as the community leader. 
Although Russians tried to use these occasional gifts as a source of their authority in native 
communities and as an incentive to make the indigenous peoples hunt more furs for Russians, it 
 
Unimak and the Alaska Peninsula. These rugged snow-covered mountains and lofty peaks would serve as 
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the Albatross made no pretense of using them as landmarks. The shore line and objects near the sea level 
were often seen beneath the fog when the higher lands were obscured, and, therefore, most of the 
available landmarks were found on or near the beach.” Zera L. Tanner, “The Fishing Grounds of Bristol 
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seems that this gift-giving did not work effectively for aboriginal peoples in southwest Alaska.53 
The indigenous peoples in the region received through the fur trade tobacco, beads, clothing, 
blankets, and cast iron kettles.54 The Bristol Bay natives also probably got other European goods, 
such as knives, iron spears, steel for striking a fire, needles, combs, pipes, cooking pots, large cups, 
mirrors, copper rings, earrings, bracelets of copper and iron, leather pouches, pestles and mortars, 
small bells, navy buttons, and Aleutian axes.55 The emerging relationship between Russians and 
Bristol Bay natives was interdependence on a common ground rather than one-way hegemonic 
domination.  
   In addition to sending gifts, Russians used credit as colonial technique to exploit more fur-
bearing animals. The Russian-American Company encouraged indigenous peoples in the Bristol 
Bay region to become indebted to the company in order to ensure that the local natives had to trade 
with or work for the company. The more closely the aboriginal peoples were bound to the Russian-
American Company and the more heavily they relied on Russian traders for supplies, necessities, 
and luxuries, the less likely they were to pursue their traditional subsistence activities. 56 
Generously providing credit to Bristol Bay natives allowed Russians to effectively exploit fur-
bearing animals in southwest Alaska by institutionalizing the exploitation of the indigenous 
inhabitants and reconfiguring their traditional way of life around the fur trade economy. 
   The shift in political and legal frameworks, more specifically Russia’s cession of its North 
American colony to the United States, led to the withdrawal of Russian agents from Alaska and 
paved the way to Anglo-American colonization of the northern territory. The Russian government 
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was interested in selling Russian America to the United States in the early 1850s. The major reason 
was the sense of vulnerability and insecurity Russian government officials felt about Russian 
America. They feared that their archenemy, the British, would occupy their American colony and 
this worry became stronger when the Crimean War broke out in October 1853. 57  Russian 
statesmen at St. Petersburg were also concerned about what they perceived as unstoppable 
territorial expansion of the United States. For example, Nicholai Muraviev warned that Anglo-
Americans would soon spread all over North America and suggested that Russia should peacefully 
retreat from Russian America and build a closer relationship with the United States based on 
mutual distrust in Great Britain.58 Russian government officials, including Muraviev and Admiral-
General Konstantin, brother of Tsar Alexander II, also believed that it was more advantageous in 
strategic terms to reconsolidate Russian strength in the newly acquired Amur and Far East 
maritime regions rather than spreading limited Russian forces too thin across the Pacific.59 This 
claim was particularly the case after the Crimean War ended in March 1856 and Imperial Russia 
could no longer expand westward. As a consequence, the United States paid $7.2 million to Russia 
and Alaska officially became the U.S. territory in October 1867. 
   The purchase of Alaska did not necessarily attract much attention of Washington officials. For 
many years after the purchase of Alaska, the U.S. government did not actively explore the Bristol 
Bay area. All the U.S. government did in the region was to make a revenue cutter visit there on an 
occasional basis to enforce the treaty about the cession of Alaska. Captain J. W. White, commander 
of the U.S. Revenue Cutter Wayanda, was the first American government employee to visit Bristol 
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Bay after the purchase. Although White arrived in the bay in June 1868, he did not ascend the 
Nushagak River to explore the interior areas of southwest Alaska. White just visited Alexandrovski 
Redoubt and noted that the assets of the Russian-American Company had been transferred to 
Hutchison, Kohl and Company of San Francisco.60 
   The transfer of Alaska from Russia to the United States did not fundamentally change the 
structure of extractive colonialism founded by Russians. In 1867, Hutchison, Kohl and Company 
purchased practically all the commercial assets of the Russian-American Company, including the 
outlying trading posts and the warehouse stocks. In order to monopolize access to furs, especially 
seal skins, in Alaska, Hutchison, Kohl and Company reorganized itself to form the Alaska 
Commercial Company in 1868 by integrating Williams, Haven and Company, its major sealing 
and whaling competitor in Alaska, and John Parrott, a San Francisco banker who financially 
supported competing sealing expeditions to Alaska.61 In addition to the financial assets, the Alaska 
Commercial Company inherited the exploitative fur trade system from the Russian-American 
Company. One big difference from the fur trade in southwest Alaska under the Russian rule was 
that managers of the Alaska Commercial Company stopped the credit system because they 
believed that indebtedness would decrease, rather than increase, the natives’ willingness to catch 
fur-bearing animals for foreign traders. Otherwise, the company continued relying on the 
indigenous labor to obtain furs in southwest Alaska, keeping the relationship of interdependence.62 
The Alaska Commercial Company maintained a moderately flourishing fur trade with the 
aboriginal peoples in southwest Alaska for the rest of the 19th century. Whether Russians or Anglo-
Americans occupied the trading station in Bristol Bay did not matter much to the local natives; 
 
60 VanStone, Eskimos of the Nushagak River, 13. 
61 Ibid., 57; Frank H. Sloss, “Who Owned the Alaska Commercial Company,” Pacific Northwest 
Quarterly 68, no. 3 (1977): 122-123. 
62 VanStone, Eskimos of the Nushagak River, 57-58. 
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rather, they cared most about the availability of European goods. For example, when a “chief” of 
aboriginal peoples in Bristol Bay brought 2,000 beaver skins to a trading station in the region in 
1868 and an Anglo-American field agent requested more beaver pelts, the chief complained about 
restrictions imposed on the sale of ammunition. The native leader said, “more powder, more fur,” 
demanding that he should be able to receive more ammunition if the Anglo-American trader 
wanted to obtain more beaver skins.63 This anecdote shows that Bristol Bay natives could bargain 
with Anglo-American agents to maximize their interests. More crucially, the anecdote 
demonstrates that the indigenous peoples had already depended heavily on European products and 
that the fur trade economy penetrated deep into their everyday lives when the United States 
replaced Russia as the sovereign in Alaska. Although the fur trade remained profitable and vibrant 
in the Bristol Bay district well into the twentieth century, much more powerful forces of 
colonialism transformed the region after 1883 when Anglo-American businessmen turned to 
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CHAPTER 2: THE BIRTH OF AMERICAN LAISSEZ-FAIRE SALMON 
 FISHERIES AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF EXTRACTIVE COLONIALISM 
 IN BRISTOL BAY, 1883-1919 
 
This chapter discusses the rise of “modern,” i.e., commercial and industrial, sockeye salmon 
fisheries in Bristol Bay through the canning business from 1883, when the Arctic Packing 
Company constructed the first cannery in the region, to 1919, when sockeye salmon catches 
dramatically dropped there. I pay attention to the canning industry because it was a main engine 
for making structure of Anglo-American extractive colonialism in Bristol Bay. In fact, most 
sockeye salmon caught in the bay were processed and canned in nearby factories and Anglo-
American canners played major roles in shaping the marine ecology of southwest Alaska. I argue 
that cannery officials created the structure of extractive colonialism in Bristol Bay by advancing 
what I call the laissez-faire salmon fisheries based on capitalistic rationality. I define capitalistic 
rationality as a way of thinking that controlled the cannery managers’ approach to and practice of 
salmon fisheries and prioritized maximizing sockeye salmon catches for short-term economic 
benefits with the mythical belief of great environmental and ecological resiliency and 
inexhaustibility. 
Although it is true that both Russians and Anglo-Americans engaged in colonial enterprises in 
southwest Alaska, commercial and industrial salmon fisheries by Anglo-Americans were 
institutionally a more sophisticated, drastic, and exploitative form of extractive colonialism than 
Russia’s “proto-extractive colonialism” through the fur trade there. Robert Porter, Superintendent 
of the Census, explained structural differences between the Russian fur trade and Anglo-American 
salmon fisheries in southwest Alaska. He wrote: 
The salmon fishery of Alaska resembles the fur trade in so far as it is conducted by 
corporations and individuals who do not reside within the territory, and that both are carried 
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on with outside capital; but while the expenditure of money in the shape of wages and 
payment for furs on the part of the firms engaged in the fur trade is to a great extent 
distributed among native and other residents of Alaska, the vast sums paid out every season 
by the canning companies fall almost entirely into the hands of nonresidents of the territory, 
both white and Chinese. The number of native laborers employed in any of the fishing 
establishments is insignificant compared to that of imported laborers.1 
 
This chapter examines how Anglo-American commercial and industrial salmon fisheries emerged 
and developed in Bristol Bay in the first few decades after 1883. 
In this chapter, I show that the federal government’s authority was severely limited vis-à-vis 
Anglo-American canners in southwest Alaska because of a chronic lack of material resources. The 
federal government possessed only insufficient manpower and patrol vessels to project its authority 
into Bristol Bay and impose its vision for salmon fisheries on cannery officials. More significantly, 
I also demonstrate that the development of the laissez-faire salmon fisheries was contingent upon 
complex interactions between the maximum fishing and canning capability, unpredictable marine 
and weather conditions, and dynamic and unstable market trends for canned salmon. Anglo-
American cannery businessmen on the West Coast wanted to maximize the production of canned 
salmon by investing capital intensively in promoting industrialization and mechanization and 
hiring experienced migrant labor forces. To maintain maximum profits, moreover, the canners also 
tried to minimize the economic loss caused by uncertain oceanic and weather conditions and 
fluctuating markets by catching more sockeye salmon than they could process. Indeed, the action 
of securing surplus catches allowed the cannery managers to alleviate undesirable impacts exerted 
by the factors they could not control. The continuous practice of wasteful overfishing and the 
consequent dramatic decline in sockeye salmon catches in the entire Bristol Bay region in 1919 
were perceived to be logical results of the cannery businessmen’s desire for quick profits by 
 
1 Robert P. Porter, “Report on Population and Resources of Alaska at the Eleventh Census: 1890” 
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1893), 218. 
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recklessly intensive salmon fisheries rather than for long-term sustainability of vibrant salmon 
fisheries in Bristol Bay. 
 
“Go North”: The Beginning of the Salmon Canning Industry in Southwest Alaska 
The rise of the salmon canning industry in Bristol Bay started as an outcome of multiple 
coincidences. For thousands of years humans across the globe took salmon and transformed them 
into a storable food in various ways. The method of curing by applying heat, smoke, and salt to 
salmon, as Bristol Bay natives had traditionally done, represented one of the primary ways of 
preserving the fish. In the mid-19th century, industrialization made it possible for cured salmon to 
be mass produced and shipped around the world. But curing became antiquated soon when canning 
technology was invented.2 This was because for producers with capitalistic mind curing was 
inefficient and did not allow salmon to be stored indefinitely or transported easily, while canning 
was efficient and produced an eminently malleable, shippable, storable, and edible food. Moreover, 
the canning technology brought revolutionary changes to Euro-American dietary cultures and 
offered consumers access to various foods, such as not only salmon but also peaches and peas, 
beyond geographical or spatial and temporal or seasonal barriers. In fact, canned food inspired 
respect, reverence, and even awe, and it was a symbol of civilization and modernity for mainstream 
Euro-Americans.3 A newspaper article once wrote, “The [canning] industry . . . has so materially 
enhanced the comforts and pleasures of the table, that we could no longer do without it. The high-
toned stomach of modern civilization is no longer content with the simple bills of fare with which 
 
2 Regarding how the canning technology was first invented in France and the salmon industry 
adopted the technology across the Atlantic, see Nicolaas Mink, Salmon: A Global History (London: 
Reaktion Books, 2013), 54-56. 
3 Ibid., 34-35, 46, 54; Anna Zeide, Canned: The Rise and Fall of Consumer Confidence in the 
American Food Industry (Oakland: University of California Press, 2018), 2. 
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our forefathers had to struggle through the months when nature is hibernating, but demands variety 
as well as plenty all the year round . . .”4 
When San Francisco businessman Carl Rohlffs of the Arctic Packing Company built and began 
operating the first cannery in the Bristol Bay region in 1884, the center of canned salmon 
production in the world was still the Pacific Northwest, particularly the Columbia River. The 
development of salmon fisheries on the river had crucial impacts on the initial progress of the 
salmon canning industry in Alaska in two ways. First, the Columbia River was rather too saturated 
with canners for newcomers to start the packing businesses there in the mid-1880s. Hapgood, 
Hume and Company, founded by salmon fishing brothers of George, John, and William Hume and 
canning expert Andrew Hapgood, packed the first 4,000 cases of 48 one-pound salmon cans on 
the Columbia River in 1866.5 Although the salmon canning business was not competitive there at 
the time, the “salmon rush” followed soon. Other packing companies heard the success and rushed 
to the river to engage in the lucrative business. There were dozens of canneries on the Columbia 
River by the early 1880s and fierce competitions over access to salmon consequently developed.6 
Second, salmon runs on the Columbia River had shown the sign of decline by the mid-1880s. 
To win over their rivals and maximize profits, canners operated on a zero-sum game assumption 
and caught and processed as many salmon as possible, causing the “tragedy of the commons,” the 
situation in which individuals overexploited and finally depleted common-pool resources to 
maximize their personal gains for their short-term interests. The canned salmon output in the 
Columbia River region steadily and rapidly increased to 250,000 cases in 1872, 460,000 cases in 
 
4 “Canned Goods and Canning,” Sun, October 5, 1882. 
5 For a more detailed account of canning operations of Hapgood, Hume and Company, see Chris 
Friday, Organizing Asian American Labor: The Pacific Coast Canned-Salmon Industry, 1870-1942 
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1994), 9-21. 
6 Mink, Salmon, 57. 
 
 48 
1878, and almost 630,000 cases in 1883.7 However, the salmon catch dropped sharply in the late 
1880s. Indeed, the canners packed 553,800 cases in 1885, 448,500 cases in 1886, and 356,000 in 
1887.8 The overfishing theory offered a most convincing explanation to these falling salmon 
catches on the Columbia River, suggesting that tight restrictions be imposed on fishing practices 
to preserve salmon runs there.9 In a report of 1894, Marshall McDonald, U.S. Commissioner of 
Fish and Fisheries, indeed blamed “the great commercial fisheries” for a dramatic decline in 
salmon in the Columbia River basin.10  
In the 1880s, Alaskan streams, lakes, and bays looked like alternative promising fishing 
grounds for American cannery businessmen on the Pacific Coast. Canners contested over access 
to salmon in Alaska much less intensely than on the Columbia River. Fewer than ten canning 
factories operated within an entire vast territory of Alaska in the mid-1880s and their output was 
just about 100,000 cases in total.11 Thus, even newcomer canners could do their business in Alaska 
without large financial investments and intense competitions. In fact, an Alaskan newspaper article 
had stressed “advantages” in operating salmon fisheries in the northern territory rather than the 
Columbia River basin, insisting: 
As the season for catching salmon is now near at hand, and that this source of part of our 
future territorial wealth will engage the attention of many who are at present oblivious to the 
 
7 Rupert L. Purdon, “World Trade in Canned Salmon” (Washington, DC: Government Printing 
Office, 1925), 3. 
8 Ibid. 
9 “Decline of the Columbia Salmon Fisheries,” Sun, September 15, 1887. 
10 Marshall McDonald, “Report of the Commissioner of Fish and Fisheries on Investigations in the 
Columbia River Basin in Regard to the Salmon Fisheries” (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 
1894), 5. Concerning more detailed explanations about the historical development of salmon fisheries in 
the Columbia River basin, see, for instance, Courtland L. Smith, Salmon Fishers of the Columbia 
(Corvallis: Oregon State University Press, 1979); Jim Lichatowich, Salmon without Rivers: A History of 
the Pacific Salmon Crisis (Washington, DC: Island Press, 1999); Joseph E. Taylor, Making Salmon: An 
Environmental History of the Northwest Fisheries Crisis (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1999). 
11 Jefferson F. Moser, “The Salmon and Salmon Fisheries of Alaska: Report of the Operations of the 
United States Fish Commission Steamer Albatross for the Year Ending June 30, 1898” [hereafter “The 
Salmon and Salmon Fisheries of Alaska in 1898”] (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1899), 
50; Purdon, “World Trade in Canned Salmon,” 4. 
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profits which will result from a prosecution of this enterprise, we will endeavor to present 
them with a few facts which may convince them of the advantages to be derived from it.12 
More significantly, oral and written stories offered by sailors, whalers, newspaper 
correspondents, and government agents helped the cannery businessmen believe a myth about the 
abundance of salmon in Alaska. The geographical position of San Francisco as a commercial hub 
on the West Coast was advantageous for gathering information about Alaska and its profitable 
marine ecology. Alaska’s rich salmon runs were well known to American cod fishermen and 
whalers, who often travelled northward up to the Bering Sea and Arctic waters, even before 
America’s purchase of Alaska in 1867.13 They stopped at San Francisco and provided “credible” 
information about Alaska’s abundant salmon runs. A newspaper article, for example, stated in 1887, 
“The schooner Compeer, from Nushegak river [sic], Bristol Bay, Alaska, with salmon, reports that 
the run of fish had been very great. The canners and salters were working night and day.”14 In fact, 
it is said that Rohlffs heard stories about great salmon runs in Bristol Bay from captains of ships 
at San Francisco. 15  Moreover, a newspaper correspondent at Sitka, Alaska, emphasized “an 
inexhaustible supply of salmon,” writing, “there are numerous streams in all portions of the 
Territory [of Alaska] that swarm with a fine quality of bright red salmon.”16 He also highlighted 
how easy it was to catch salmon in Alaskan waters even with indigenous peoples’ “primitive” 
fishing methods due to the fish’s abundance. He reported, “one can wade the shallow streams and 
drive them out of the water. The Indians catch them by means of a large hook attached to a pole 
 
12 Quoted in “Salmon Fisheries of Alaska,” Chicago Tribune, July 22, 1870. 
13 John N. Cobb, “The Commercial Fisheries of Alaska in 1905” (Washington, DC: Government 
Printing Office, 1906), 5-6. 
14 “Interesting News of the Whalers’ Catch: Forty Whales Caught by San Francisco Ships—A Big 
Run of Salmon on Bristol Bay,” San Francisco Chronicle, August 22, 1887. 
15 John B. Branson, The Life and Times of John W. Clark of Nushagak, Alaska, 1846–1896 
(Anchorage, AK: Lake Clark National Park and Preserve, 2012), 109-110. 
16 “Alaskan Fisheries: An Inexhaustible Supply of Salmon,” San Francisco Chronicle, July 7, 1884. 
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and in this way will fill their canoes in an incredibly short time.”17 Further, in the Tenth Census 
report published in 1884, special agent Ivan Petroff wrote, “The salmon family . . . frequent in 
astonishing numbers the Nushegak and other streams emptying into Bristol Bay. . . . The only 
drawback to this business [commercial salmon fisheries] is the short period over which the run 
extends, necessitating the employment of a very large number of hands while it lasts.”18 These 
kinds of information created a popular mythical understanding of Alaskan salmon as “unlimited” 
and “inexhaustible” and helped American canneries engage in and promote reckless, wasteful, and 
exploitative salmon fisheries in southwest Alaska thereafter. 
Moreover, salmon in southwest Alaska attracted attention of Anglo-American cannery owners 
because of the fish’s uniquely pleasant taste and smell. A British merchant engaged in the salmon 
export business at San Francisco once praised the quality of salmon caught in the Bristol Bay 
district as “the best in the market.” He remarked, “The article has a delicate and aromatic taste, 
and is entirely free from the oily and fat-favored smell of salmon found in more Southern waters. 
Aromatic salmon isn’t bad.”19 Thus, the English trader purchased 210 barrels of salted Bristol Bay 
salmon and shipped them to Liverpool via Cape Horn.20 Americans acquainted with Alaskan 
salmon concurred with the English businessman and highly evaluated the quality of Alaskan 
salmon. An American clipper ship captain, for instance, called Alaska a “fisherman’s paradise” 
because of wealthy salmon runs and said, “prime Alaskan salmon are as far ahead of Columbia 
River fish as the latter are superior to those of California.”21 The fact that the British preferred the 
taste of salmon harvested in southwest Alaska mattered for Anglo-American salmon businessmen 
 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ivan Petroff, “Report on the Population, Industries, and Resources of Alaska” (Washington, DC: 
Government Printing Office, 1884), 16. 
19 “Alaska Salmon for Europe,” San Francisco Chronicle, September 22, 1871. 
20 Ibid. 
21 “Fisheries of Alaska,” New York Tribune, July 9, 1882. 
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because, as Ross Coen points out, the vast majority, up to 90 percent in some years, of salmon 
products went to Great Britain from the beginning of salmon-packing industry in the mid-19th 
century.22 In other words, distinctive food culture in the United Kingdom and British gustatory 
preference for Bristol Bay salmon crucially impacted the developmental pattern of salmon 
fisheries in the northern territory half the globe away. 
The advancement of the salmon canning business in southwest Alaska was also contingent 
upon the local environment. Although the districts along the Yukon River and the Kuskokwim 
River possessed rich salmon runs, both basins were not desirable for Anglo-American cannery 
businessmen in logistical terms. Because of the existence of enormous shoals, the Yukon River 
mouth and the Kuskokwim Bay lacked a ship channel which would have allowed vessels to enter 
the rivers. In contrast, the Nushagak Bay, which became the center of salmon fisheries in the 
Bristol Bay region, had a dangerous but good harbor with sufficient depth and “excellent” 
indigenous pilots to take vessels inside.23 This unique topographical condition and the availability 
of indigenous resources—traditional native environmental knowledge and labor forces—captured 
Anglo-American cannery businessmen’s attention to and financial investments in salmon fisheries 
in Bristol Bay. 
The news of financial success in salmon fisheries in Alaska soon prompted many packing 
companies to start operations there (figure 7). To be sure, cannery businessmen on the Pacific 
Coast felt the necessity to find a new alternative fishing ground to make profits and were familiar 
with stories about abundant salmon runs in Alaska. But they were also worried about potential 
financial risks involved in establishing canning plants and operating salmon fisheries in Alaska far 
 
22 Ross Coen, “Selling Salmon to the World: The Export Market for Pacific Northwest Canned 
Salmon,” Pacific Northwest Quarterly 105, no. 1 (2014 2013): 24. 
23 Porter, “Report on Population and Resources of Alaska at the Eleventh Census: 1890,” 91. 
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away from San Francisco, the commercial hub on the Pacific Coast.24 The first report about a 
success in salmon canneries in Alaska led to a rapid increase of financial investments in the 
industry there.25 As a result, the Alaska Packing Company, the Bristol Bay Canning Company, 
and the Nushagak Canning Company erected cannery plants in the Nushagak Bay district in 1885, 
1886, and 1888, respectively.26 The output of salmon cans in the Bristol Bay region consequently 
dramatically grew from just 400 cases in 1884 to 115,985 cases in 1889.27 
 
 
Figure 7: The First Cannery Built in the Bristol Bay Region in 1883 by the Arctic Packing 
Company. Jefferson F. Moser, “The Salmon and Salmon Fisheries of Alaska: Report of the 
Alaskan Salmon Investigations of the United States Fish Commission Steamer Albatross in 1900 
and 1901” (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1902). 
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Government Printing Office, 1895), 297. 
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26 Alaska Fisheries Board and Alaska Department of Fisheries, “Annual Report 1950” (Juneau: 
Alaska Fisheries Board and Alaska Department of Fisheries, 1950), 56. 
27 Willis H. Rich and Edward M. Ball, “Statistical Review of the Alaska Salmon Fisheries” 
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1928), 53. 
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In addition to capital and information, legal principles mattered for the development of salmon 
fisheries in Bristol Bay. The concept of common-pool resource, a resource made available to all 
by consumption and to which access can be limited only at high cost, provided a legal foundation 
for Alaskan salmon fisheries, and Anglo-American cannery businessmen used the idea selectively 
to maximize their economic benefits.28 When cannery owners started consistent salmon fisheries 
in southwest Alaska in the 1880s, they disregarded Native Alaskans’ proprietary rights to salmon 
and instead dominated access to the fish with the logic that fisheries were open to all comers as a 
common-pool resource.29 Howard M. Kutchin, a federal investigator of Alaskan salmon fisheries, 
for example, reported in 1899, “[T]here is the common notion, often stubbornly maintained by the 
best of men, that the fish of the sea, the birds of the air, and the game of the woods and fields are 
free to all men.”30 
But cannery owners did not always implement the idea of common pool resource as strictly as 
they claimed; rather, they used it inconsistently as a convenient rhetorical tool for exclusively 
enclosing rich fishing grounds. In 1895, for instance, L. A. Pederson, an independent canner, 
petitioned to the Commission of Fish and Fisheries to request the federal government’s 
intervention in an ongoing fisheries dispute with the Alaska Packers’ Association (APA), the 
biggest, monopolistic salmon canning cartel in Alaska, on Naknek River. According to Pederson, 
he and the association were establishing a cannery on each side of the river. He wrote that he had 
tried to avoid a possible fisheries row by paying the association for the use of “their side” of the 
 
28 Concerning the definition of common-pool resource, see Xavier Basurto, “Common-Pool 
Resource,” Encyclopedia Britannica, available at https://www.britannica.com/science/common-pool-
resource (accessed February 4, 2021). 
29 Patrick J. Daley and Beverly A. James, Cultural Politics and the Mass Media: Alaska Native Voices 
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2004), 53. 
30 Howard M. Kutchin, “Report on the Salmon Fisheries of Alaska, 1899” (Washington, DC: 
Government Printing Office, 1900), 32. 
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river, but the attempt had failed. Pederson also complained that the APA planned to put traps on 
“my side” of the river and that he would be totally shut out.31 Pederson’s petition shows that 
American businessmen customarily claimed proprietary rights to specific fishing grounds 
regardless of indigenous peoples’ reliance on salmon for biological and social subsistence and 
cultural persistence. Pederson’s complaint also demonstrates that access to salmon was 
fundamentally class politics for Anglo-Americans, and that wealthy cannery managers could 
practically exclude their rivals by outcompeting them in financial investment and selectively 
employing the legal principle of common-pool resource.  
 
Limited Federal Power: Restrictive Salmon Fisheries Laws and the Tension between 
Cannery Managers and Federal Investigators 
 
It is notable that Anglo-American canners, the federal government, and Bristol Bay natives 
possessed different visions for and practices of salmon fisheries in southwest Alaska. In addition, 
there was tension between the three groups, and the federal government’s limited authority 
characterized pre-1919 salmon fisheries in Bristol Bay. Contrary to the cannery owners, who paid 
scant attention to their extractive activities’ impacts on the local marine ecology, the federal 
government tried to restrict the laissez-faire salmon fisheries by enacting fisheries laws to prevent 
the depletion of the fish in southwest Alaska.32 Officials of the U.S. Commission of Fish and 
 
31 Joseph Murray, “Report on the Salmon Fisheries in Alaska, 1894” (Washington, DC: Government 
Printing Office, 1896), 31-32. 
32 As Bathsheba Demuth points out, the United States emerged in the Progressive Era as an 
environmental management state where governing the non-human was as critical to modern state 
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vigorous conservation efforts at the turn of the twentieth century because of their perceived apprehension 
over possible worldwide depletion of all major raw materials essential to America’s economic growth. 
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Fisheries (later U.S. Bureau of Fisheries) assumed that salmon fisheries in Bristol Bay would 
develop in the same way as they did on the West Coast and were concerned about a more rapid 
decline of salmon schools in southwest Alaska if there was no restrictive legal measures for salmon 
fisheries. 33  As a result, Congress directed its attention to restraining the improvident and 
destructive methods employed for the capture of the salmon in Bristol Bay. Upon the 
recommendation of the Commissioner of Fisheries, Congress passed an act for the protection of 
Alaskan salmon and it became law on March 2, 1889.34 The law prohibited the erection of dams, 
barricades, or other obstructions in any rivers of Alaska “with the purpose or result of preventing 
or impeding the ascent of salmon or other anadromous species to their spawning grounds.” The 
law also required the Secretary of Treasury to take necessary measures to strictly enforce this 
fisheries regulation.35  
Federal fisheries laws did not play major roles in salmon fisheries in southwest Alaska before 
1919 for several reasons. The first reason was that federal investigators did not always have 
sufficient scientific knowledge about salmon’s habits to crack down violations of the 1889 fisheries 
law. Indeed, cannery officials tried to circumvent the federal government’s supervision and 
surveillance with better understanding on salmon’s habits. In June 1890, for instance, Lieutenant 
Commander Zera L. Tanner, who was responsible for enforcing the 1889 fisheries law, found a 
trap or dam set up on Wood River (figure 8). John W. Clark, a projector of the trap, explained to 
Tanner, “the plans contemplated two forty-foot square traps, with wings extending to the shore on 
either side, an open channel of 100 feet being left in midstream for the passage of the salmon.” 
 
33 Marshall McDonald, “Report of the Commissioner of Fish and Fisheries Relative to the Salmon 
Fisheries of Alaska” (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1892), 15. 




Clark also assured Tanner that “this passage should be left unobstructed at all times.”36 Since 
Tanner, who was a navy officer and not an ichthyologist, could not judge if the trap was an 




Figure 8: A Trap Set up on Wood River in 1890. Marshall McDonald, “Report of the Commissioner 
of Fish and Fisheries Relative to the Salmon Fisheries of Alaska” (Washington, DC: Government 
Printing Office, 1892), 8. 
 
   Expertise on salmon’s habits was essential to effectively enforce the 1889 restrictive salmon 
fisheries law. Tanner’s inquiry was referred to Tarleton H. Bean, an ichthyologist of the Fish and 
Fisheries Commission. Having looked at the sketch of the trap, Bean found Clark’s statement 
unreliable and dubious. According to Bean, the trap ingeniously took advantage of the salmon’s 
habit of following along the shores in shallow waters to escape from enemies. Thus, Bean claimed, 
the trap would catch most ascending salmon if the shores were barricaded and “In all probability 
few salmon will swim in midchannel and reach the upper waters and lake sources of the river.” 
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Bean concluded that the trap was a violation of the fisheries law and suggested that Clark and his 
colleague businessmen were consciously trying to maximize their catches by pretending to be 
ignorant of salmon’s habits, cheating federal investigators, and disregarding the federal fisheries 
law.37 When the Fish and Fisheries Commission finally instructed Tanner to remove the trap in 
mid-August, two months after his first report to Washington, because it violated the 1889 fisheries 
law, the salmon fisheries season was already over in the Bristol Bay region. 
Even if federal investigators had expertise on salmon fisheries, the chronic lack of necessary 
human and material resources made it difficult for federal agents to inspect all fishing activities in 
Bristol Bay to properly enforce federal fisheries laws. In a report about the salmon fisheries 
investigation in 1899, for example, Howard M. Kutchin, a special agent for the surveillance, 
pointed out that the investigation was inevitably ineffective because, due to insufficient material 
resources, federal investigators had to rely on cannery managers’ voluntary help and self-reports, 
and the cannery owners could easily hide their infractions of federal fisheries laws. Kutchin 
complained: 
With a single cutter assigned to this work, it is impracticable to devote sufficient time to each 
fishery to enable the agent to explore the different streams and fishing grounds as thoroughly 
as should be done; and the want of local pilots for neighborhood waters is a further 
impediment in the way of independent and exhaustive surveillance of each fishery. This was 
strongly impressed upon me in several instances, when I had word of set nets or fences at 
places it was impossible for me to get to except by accepting the amiable attentions of the 
packing companies.38  
 
In southwest Alaska, on the edge of the U.S. territory farthest away from Washington, federal 
government officials had to compromise and negotiate their authority with Anglo-American 
cannery managers over their vision for and practice of salmon fisheries. 
This situation of insufficient material resources, especially patrol vessels, necessary for 
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effective surveillance of fishing grounds in southwest Alaska continued until at least 1919 because 
of the lawmakers’ lack of interests in this issue. Until 1917, Osprey (23 tons) was the only boat the 
federal government possessed for the purpose of investigating salmon fisheries in Alaska, and it 
was assigned to the southeastern district.39 In 1918, Ward T. Bower, an Alaska service agent 
employed by the Bureau of Fisheries, complained about this situation, charging that federal agents 
customarily relied on cannery owners for material assistance and that the investigators were not 
politically independent from the canners. Bower also suggested that Congress should pay more 
attention to addressing and improving this undesirable, miserable, and shameful situation. Bower 
claimed: 
The representatives of the Alaska service in central and western Alaska are not able to cover 
the districts to which they are assigned without some assistance from the canning companies. 
As usual, several of the companies furnished free transportation to the agents in those districts. 
Were it not for these gratuities, much of the territory could not be visited, as suitable boats 
can not be chartered. Gratuitous service of this character is wrong in principle, but until 
Congress provides additional funds for more vessels, there appears to be no alternative in the 
case of those employees of the Bureau who are called to certain remote and inaccessible 
regions.40 
 
Moreover, the annual salmon fisheries investigation in southwest Alaska was essentially 
ineffective and insufficient because federal agents had very limited resources and did not inspect 
all canneries and fishing grounds in the region. For instance, Kutchin reported in 1905, “I was so 
fortunate as to meet Mr. Wetherby, superintendent of the Alaska Packers’ Association cannery at 
Egagek, at Nushagak, which made it unnecessary to visit that most inaccessible place.”41 Kutchin 
took cannery managers’ self-reports at face value because he had to depend on them and also 
because he possessed naively favorable feelings toward white cannery managers. Kutchin wrote, 
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“On the part of the responsible companies, and their white employees under their instructions, in 
a general way it would be scarcely fair to question their good faith.”42 But a more significant 
reason was Kutchin’s optimistic assumption that violating the 1889 federal fisheries law was 
technically impossible due to uniquely harsh environmental conditions in Bristol Bay. He stated, 
“Outside of southeastern Alaska, . . . the common physical conditions afford their own protection 
against disregard of the existing law. The wide streams, fierce currents, and tremendous tides fully 
protect Cook Inlet and the Bering Sea country.”43 Thus, Kutchin confidently but naively reported 
in 1905, “It is not to be understood that there was a total absence of infractions of the spirit as well 
as the letter of the enactment and regulations, but it is a pleasing fact that the steady improvement 
in this regard which has been witnessed from year to year gave no sign of retrogression in 1904.”44 
 
The Making of “Modern” Salmon Fisheries in Bristol Bay 
   The federal government’s authority over and influences on salmon fisheries in southwest 
Alaska had been severely limited until the enactment of the White Act in 1924. Instead, Anglo-
American cannery officials enjoyed considerable autonomy in the Bristol Bay region, and they 
were the chief human architects of the bay’s ecological landscape. But several major factors 
conditioned their salmon fisheries in southwest Alaska before the passage of the White Act. The 
first factor was unpredictable and dynamic seasonal weather patterns and oceanic conditions. 
Cannery businessmen hypothesized that southwest Alaskan marine ecology was a result of 
uncontrollable meteorological conditions, particularly winds and water temperature. Cannery 
businessmen often experienced rough fluctuations in sockeye salmon runs and catches in the 
 





Bristol Bay region. Because they could not offer a rational and persuasive explanation about why 
some rivers in the area saw big salmon runs while others saw only small, they observed maritime 
and meteorological changes and ascribed the main causes of fluctuating salmon runs to the natural 
environment’s autonomous work. For example, cannery officials considered ice in rivers and the 
ocean to be an obstacle to the migration of sockeye salmon. They observed that ice in rivers 
delayed salmon ascending the rivers until the water temperature increased and ice melted away, 
consequently causing a shorter fisheries season for them.45 Cannery businessmen also believed 
that winds were a key to the migration of salmon. For instance, they hypothesized that 
southwestern winds brought abundant salmon runs at Koggiung, Naknek, Egegik, and Ugashik 
and that southern and southeastern winds did so at Nushagak.46 Although there was a possibility 
of overexploitation of sockeye salmon in explaining violent fluctuations of the fish runs, cannery 
officials had paid scant attention to the effects of their fishing operations on salmon runs. This was 
because they saw bad catches in some rivers and good catches in other rivers in Bristol Bay at the 
same time at least until 1919, when salmon runs significantly dropped in all rivers in the entire 
region. Until then, therefore, Anglo-American canners had been convinced that the total amount 
of salmon runs was stable and static, and that it was up to luck if they could see a wealth of salmon 
ascending for spawning in a given season. The cannery officials sought to maximize their 
economic gains while accepting the impact of unpredictable and uncontrollable oceanic conditions 
on ascending salmon schools. 
 
45 Z. L. Tanner, “Report upon the Investigations of the U.S. Fish Commission Steamer Albatross from 
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   Ichthyologists provided scientific credibility to cannery officials’ observations about salmon 
runs in southwest Alaska. Charles H. Gilbert, a zoologist of Stanford University who worked for 
the U.S. Commission of Fish and Fisheries and later the U.S. Bureau of Fisheries, for example, 
conducted investigations in Bristol Bay in 1903 and supported the theory that good and bad catches 
of salmon took place at the same time in the Bristol Bay region. Gilbert wrote: 
[A]lthough the mouths of these streams are in such close proximity, they may differ widely 
in abundance of fish during any one year. The present year [1903] showed a very heavy run 
on the Kvichak, a rather poor run on the Nushagak, . . . The fact that the principal streams, 
the Kvichak and the Nushagak, do not have heavy runs the same year suggests the theory 
that all the Bristol Bay streams draw from a single school of salmon which may chance to 
run most heavily in one or the other river in any given year. . . . If a single school supplies all 
these streams it may be that during some seasons the greater part of the run may proceed 
directly to the head of the bay and up the Kvichak, while in other seasons the run may turn 
principally into the side streams (analogous shiftings occur yearly in each stream).47 
 
In sum, even ichthyologists could not know with certainty what factors caused rough fluctuations 
in salmon runs in the Bristol Bay region,48 and their emphasis on environmental agency allowed 
cannery managers to pay little attention to the theory and possibility of overexploitation by their 
reckless and intensive extractive activities. 
   Two more factors played key roles in shaping salmon fisheries in southwest Alaska before 
1919. One was how many salmon canners could produce, or the maximum production capability, 
and the other how many salmon they should produce, or the ideal production amount. The former 
was theoretical and the latter moral in nature. The actual production output fluctuated as a 
negotiated consequence of these two factors. Many elements conditioned the maximum production 
capability, such as weather and climate patterns, the length of a fishing season, the number of 
fishermen, the type of fishing gear, and daily working hours. The maximum production capability 
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was often equivalent to maximum canning capability and canners sought to catch as many salmon 
as their canneries could process into canned salmon. The maximum canning capability was 
determined by multiple factors, particularly the number of cannery hands, daily working hours, a 
management system, and canning technology. But cannery managers did not always try to 
maximize the production of canned salmon. Rather, they were keenly attuned to the dynamic and 
unstable market conditions of the product, and, if the demand was weak compared to the supply, 
they sought to restrain the production of salmon cans to keep the product’s price as high as possible. 
The inherently competitive and speculative nature of the salmon canning business made it difficult 
for cannery managers to accurately observe and predict fluctuating market trends. Ultimately, the 
cannery managers’ desire to maximize their economic benefits was a primary driving force that 
shaped the marine ecology of southwest Alaska. 
   Anglo-American cannery owners adopted the division of labor according to class, race, and 
nationality to maximize the efficiency of their business without disruption. They assigned the work 
of fishing to whites and hired mostly Italians, Scandinavians, and Finns. Canners preferred the 
Europeans because they believed that the white fishermen could catch salmon effectively in 
southwest Alaska given that sailing boats in southern Italy and northern Europe were similar to 
those in the Bristol Bay region.49 To motivate the fishermen to work hard, moreover, cannery 
businessmen offered various incentives to them. One incentive was the commission-based 
compensation system. For example, gillnetters and boat pullers received 2 cents for each sockeye 
salmon and 10 cents for each king salmon per boat of two men. This wage system worked too well, 
and a pair of industrious fishermen caught and provided 2,400 sockeye salmon and earned $24 
 
49 Tim Troll, Sailing for Salmon: The Early Years of Commercial Fishing in Alaska’s Bristol Bay, 
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each a day despite the canner’s request that the daily catch should be no more than 1,000 per boat.50 
This anecdote suggests that Anglo-American cannery owners had to rely on these European 
fishermen, who were not necessarily obedient and compliant, and negotiate their authority with 
them. In fact, when a large number of fishermen went on strike demanding higher pay in the midst 
of a fishing season, it was very difficult for cannery managers to refuse to accept their demand.51 
In addition to this material wage, cannery managers offered European fishermen a “psychological 
wage,” or white privilege, by restricting the work of fishing to only whites. Further, cannery 
businessmen divided the fishermen along national lines and stimulated their nationalism. Cannery 
officials, for instance, kept track of which nationality made the best catches and took advantage of 
national pride as an incentive for the European fishermen to fish hard and refrain from uniting with 
other white fishermen across national boundaries.52  
Also, danger accompanied by fishing operations in Bristol Bay connected the best catches to 
the degree of fishermen’s masculinity. Bristol Bay had harsh environmental conditions, and the 
tide rushed in and out of the head of the bay with great velocity and bores were formed in the 
estuaries. Calm waters quickly turned stormy and turbulent with little warning. The waters of the 
bay hid dangerous underwater shoals and bars and made navigation difficult for those new to or 
unfamiliar with the area. These tough environmental conditions frequently caused the loss of a 
number of lives.53  Moreover, fishing in Bristol Bay was extremely hard and arduous work. 
Fishermen set and pulled nets by hand and the nets, made of water absorbent linen and wax coated 
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wooden floats, were heavy even without fish in them.54  Therefore, white fishermen tried to 
achieve the best catches and prove their masculinity through competing with their colleagues. This 
managerial technique of “divide and rule” helped Anglo-American canners efficiently exploit their 
European fishers’ labor forces and prevent them from uniting with other cannery workers across 
class, racial, and national boundaries. 
However, the division of labor in the Bristol Bay region was not always divided according to 
the lines of class and race. Instead, these lines were fuzzy and unstable, and the division of labor 
changed every day according to ascending salmon runs. At a cannery in Bristol Bay in 1900, for 
instance, it was necessary to take some men out of boats to help Chinese cannery hands by cleaning 
fish because the number of Chinese cannery hands was often insufficient to keep up the supply for 
a machinery.55 However, it is notable that the cannery tried to maintain the class barrier between 
European fishermen and Chinese cannery hands by adopting different wage systems even for the 
same work. In fact, each of these fishermen who helped Chinese laborers inside the cannery 
received $10 per day for cleaning the fish even though the average daily wage of these Chinese 
was just about $1.56 The dynamism of the social boundary between fishers and cannery hands was 
contingent upon the daily amount of available salmon to be processed. 
   The labor management system was exploitative and abusive inside the cannery to maximize 
production. Cannery officials adopted various other measures to increase the productivity of 
Chinese laborers. To lengthen working hours, which were from 6 in the morning to 8 or 9 at night, 
cannery superintendents moved ahead the hands of the clock in the morning, righted at the noon, 
and moved back in the evening.57 Because the fishing season was limited to the summer and 
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cannery officials had no time and capital to waste, they even tolerated violence, if necessary, to 
make Chinese workers obedient and diligent in canneries to achieve and maintain the maximum 
production capability. For example, H. C. Jensen, a superintendent of the Arctic Packing Company, 
revealed the degree of labor troubles by Chinese workers and reported that an “iron hand” was a 
very effective solution to them. Jensen stated, “In the beginning of their [Chinese] sojourn in 
Alaska a good many of them were unruly, but when they found their supply of food cut off and 
nothing but the stones on the beach to satisfy their hunger with they begged for forgiveness and 
were fed again on condition of good behavior.”58  Jensen also reported, “When the packing 
commenced the white foremen in the different canneries always had their pistols ready, and on 
many occasions had to draw them in cases of insubordination. When the Chinese found every 
indication of trouble readily met, and discovered after a few trials that they were to be ruled with 
an iron hand, they gave up all warlike demonstrations and settled down to peaceable work.”59  
   Jensen’s statement suggested that cannery officials possessed superior authority vis-à-vis 
Chinese workers and appealed to high-handed, draconian measures to exploit and tame their 
Chinese labor force. But the reality should be more nuanced, for Anglo-American cannery 
managers had to negotiate authority with Chinese workers and offered not only sticks but also 
carrots to conciliate them and avoid labor disputes. Indeed, cannery officials paid close attention 
to the welfare of Chinese laborers and prepared provisions and luxuries for them. For instance, one 
cannery paid almost $18,000 in total and brought from the West Coast to Alaska such as rice, 
Chinese tea, Chinese tobacco, Chinese wine, and even opium (figure 9).60  It seems that the 
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cannery sold these materials to Chinese workers as distractions to keep down complaints from 
them and relieve class tensions. Although cannery owners seemed concerned about the possibility 
that drug use or addiction might lessen their laborers’ productivity, opium was probably necessary 
for some Chinese who spent long days of working hard in damp conditions to ease their aches and 
pains.61 The fact that cannery managers prepared these Chinese materials and allowed Chinese 
workers to create their familiar socio-cultural space by consuming them in a far-away unfamiliar 
place suggests that the cannery officials did not possess hegemonic authority over Chinese workers. 
Instead, the cannery managers had to provide an effective “carrot” to conciliate and motivate 
Chinese wage earners to continue working diligently without causing sabotage and labor disputes 
in canneries. 
 




Figure 9: A List of Chinese Items Transported to Bristol Bay from the West Coast. Robert P. Porter, 
“Report on Population and Resources of Alaska at the Eleventh Census: 1890” (Washington, DC: 
Government Printing Office, 1893), 222. 
 
To motivate Chinese cannery hands to work diligently, Anglo-American canners also 
employed the commission-based compensation system for Chinese laborers too. Canners usually 
had dealings only with Chinese labor contractors called “China boss,” and the China boss hired 
cannery hands, mostly Chinese, and paid them according to their packing results. That cannery 
managers had to depend on the limited number of competent Chinese laborers offered the Chinese 
strong bargaining power. That the Chinese workers’ minimum compensation was guaranteed and 
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that they were free from the financial risk entailed by speculative characters of salmon fisheries 
were another symbol of the limited authority of cannery officials. In a cannery in Bristol Bay in 
around 1900, for example, cannery officials paid to the China boss 42 cents per case of 48 one-
pound cans in addition to his base salary of $50. In addition, the China boss could “always exact 
a guaranty that a stipulated number of thousand cases shall be packed” and the cannery agreed “to 
pay at the full rate for any deficiency” in a bad season.62 Thanks to this wage system, Chinese 
cannery hands could receive stable amounts of compensation, and indeed they earned on average 
$150 per season of about four months’ duration.63  
   To promote the efficiency of the packing process, wealthy cannery managers actively invested 
in advancing industrialization and mechanization. After 1900 the labor problem steadily grew, and 
Chinese workers took advantage of the fact that it was difficult for cannery owners to secure other 
competent cannery hands and organized strikes to demand higher compensation. When the “iron 
hand” approach to labor unrest did not work, cannery officials broke the strikes by replacing 
Chinese workers with “inferior,” less competent laborers consisting of many nationalities, 
particularly Japanese, Filipinos, and Mexicans. 64  Canners, who sought to maximize canned 
salmon production during the limited amount of seasonal time, also tried to reduce this managerial 
and manufactural unpredictability and instability in producing canned salmon by replacing 
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Chinese laborers with “iron Chinks,” automatic fish butchering machines (figure 10).65 Before the 
iron Chink was invented, the work of processing salmon was done mainly by Chinese hands. The 
introduction of iron Chinks dramatically increased the efficiency of canneries by quadrupling their 
capacity to process and pack salmon.66 Iron Chinks also allowed canneries to cut down the number 
of Chinese workers who handled salmon and improved the cleanliness of salmon cans.67  In 
addition, the adoption of the fish hopper, which resembled a container with a slide, allowed each 
salmon to be processed in the order of its arrival in the cannery. This helped to prevent the situation 
in which caught salmon may remain in the bottom of a bin or tank all day long in summer and go 
bad before being processed.68 Canners had to pay much attention to cleanliness and sanitary 
conditions of canneries and canned products because of prevailing racialized images of Chinese 
workers as filthy, unclean, and even diseased or contagious people.69 Moreover, Upton Sinclair’s 
publication of The Jungle in 1906 shocked and outraged the American public by revealing 
intolerant working conditions inside a Chicago meat-packing plant and terrible canned food quality. 
The American public became interested in the reality of not just meat-packing industry but also 
salmon-canning industry. As a consequence, salmon canners felt compelled to demonstrate that 
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their plants and their products were safe, clean, and sanitary.70  
 
 
Figure 10: Automatic Fish Butchering Machine called “Iron Chink.” Ernest Lester Jones, Report 
of Alaska Investigations in 1914 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1915), 23. 
 
   Securing competent and reliable cannery hands became growingly difficult for cannery 
businessmen after 1904, when Congress made Chinese exclusion permanent. Introducing iron 
Chinks was a solution for the labor question and this reflected a perceived necessity to find an 
alternative to Chinese workers, who could no longer enter the United States because of the 
exclusionist immigration act of 1882. 71  A Pacific Fisherman article stated in 1910, “The 
introduction of ‘Iron Chink’ resulted in the displacement of hundreds of chinamen [sic], each 
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machine doing the work of fifty-two Orientals. . . . Now comes the new sanitary process of canning, 
and with its rapid adoption, the chinese [sic] will become even less necessary than now.”72 
Although this article described the Chinese as undesirable laborers to be replaced by canning 
machines, Chinese workers were preferable for cannery managers to other laborers, particularly 
Filipinos, Hawaiians, and Puerto Ricans, who came from America’s new colonies and were more 
readily available but, according to canners, less competent, reliable, and manageable. For example, 
Chinese labor contractors traveled to Honolulu and recruited 145 Hawaiian workers for the APA 
with only verbal agreements. When the Hawaiian laborers saw a written contract at San Francisco, 
they declined to sign it because they were unhappy with the offered labor conditions. The Hawaiian 
workers refused to work under Chinese bosses in canneries, demanded that working hours be 
specified in the contract, and wanted higher wages. These colonial workers were tough and capable 
negotiators, neither powerless nor passive actors, and the Chinese labor contractors had to give up 
hiring them as cannery hands, though this decision cost the APA $40,000.73  
   Anglo-American canners also exploited indigenous peoples’ labor forces as a supplement to 
Chinese workers and processing machines. Although cannery managers relied mainly on Chinese 
workers and processing machines to handle salmon, native labor power still mattered particularly 
when the salmon rush was on.74  Hiring local natives as cannery hands had some economic 
advantages for cannery managers, such as that no transportation costs were incurred because the 
indigenous peoples travelled from nearby villages, not from San Francisco. At the same time, 
 
72 “The Passing of Chinese Labor,” Pacific Fisherman 8, no. 11 (1910): 15. It is significant to 
reiterate that this article reflected a desire of mainstream white Americans rather than the reality of 
salmon canning industry given that this article was written in the context of xenophobic, anti-Chinese 
racism. It, for instance, said, “[W]hen you speak of a cannery you think of yellow faces and ‘pig tails,’ or 
when you enter a plant you look for ‘Chinks.’” Idem., 15. 
73 “Laborers Leave Canners in Lurch: Hawaiians and Filipinos Land in San Francisco Ignoring 
Agreement,” Morning Oregonian, April 19, 1911. 
74 Moser, “The Salmon and Salmon Fisheries of Alaska in 1900 and 1901,” 185-186. 
 
 72 
however, given the very short fishing season in Bristol Bay, local natives were the only labor forces 
Anglo-American canners could readily exploit. Thus, natives possessed bargaining power vis-à-
vis white cannery officials and it was apparent when, for example, the canners needed to raise the 
daily wage of indigenous adult male workers from $1.50 to $2 in 1900.75 
In fact, native peoples employed by packing companies in Bristol Bay effectively handled the 
possibility of being exploited by working with indigenous overseers. These native overseers 
carefully protected interests of their fellow laborers by seeing that they did not work too hard, that 
they were fed well, and that they were not cheated in their pay.76 Also, cannery officials had to 
provide what local natives desired in order to induce them to work for their canning factories: food 
and luxuries. Canneries supplied hungry indigenous workers with “abundant” food of “excellent 
quality” and “large variety.” Cannery managers also sold natives clocks, watches, jewelry, perfume, 
and silk dresses, but these luxuries were “gewgaws” and the items allowed white canners to exploit 
native labor power.77 It is notable that, although canneries sought to secure indigenous workers, 
cannery managers carefully avoided employing many natives for long time. The primary reason 
was that the canners deemed indigenous peoples unreliable and untrustworthy wage earners. A 
cannery’s complaint was that “It [work] is given him [a native], his hunger is appeased from the 
overflowing cannery table, his daily wages soon supply the few luxuries he desires, and then he 
no longer cares for work.”78 To lessen the possibility of their financial loss, cannery managers 
used native laborers selectively as a supplement to more reliable and trustworthy Chinese workers 
and processing machines, as statistics showed that from 25 to 30 natives were employed in a 
cannery for a short period and that the number fluctuated roughly between 10 and 40 on a daily 
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The limited fishing season, usually lasting for only five to six weeks, prompted cannery 
officials to adopt exploitative and wasteful fishing measures in the Bristol Bay region to maximize 
the production of canned salmon. One controversial fishing method was the use of traps in rivers. 
Cannery managers in southwest Alaska mainly used gillnets and employed traps as auxiliary 
fishing gear even after the 1889 fisheries law had restricted the use of traps. Traps were 
supplemental because they did not work effectively in Bristol Bay and were vulnerable to powerful 
oceanic currents in the region and often torn from their fastenings and swept away.80 But traps 
had a big advantage for canners: keeping caught salmon alive as surplus for some days for future 
canning. For cannery managers, who sought to maximize the production of canned salmon, the 
worst situation they tried to avoid was idled canning factories due to a lack of available salmon 
during the short season. Because cannery officials could not tell how ascending salmon runs would 
fluctuate or how weather patterns would change in the future, the most efficient and secure way to 
alleviate possible adverse effects caused by small salmon runs and bad weather was to catch 
whenever possible more salmon than their canneries could process as surplus and keep them alive 
by traps for future canning until the canneries had some spare capacity to process the surplus fish.81 
Thus, although this cannery officials’ capitalistic rational mindset customarily led to the excessive 
extraction of ascending salmon in southwest Alaska, they believed that such act of always keeping 
surplus salmon served their interests best. 
Moreover, cannery managers often wasted the surplus salmon caught with traps if they were 
unnecessary thanks to the continuation of heavy salmon runs. When Kutchin was investigating 
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salmon fisheries in southwest Alaska, for example, he heard a reported “boast” that “one of the 
principal packers of the Bristol Bay region . . . caught and killed 750,000 fish that he could not 
make use of.” According to the hearsay, the packer did it so that “his competitors should not have 
them” or “they would find it more difficult to secure their catch.”82 We need to read this report 
closely because the use of traps in Alaska reflected class politics. Because only large and wealthy 
canneries could possess, maintain, and employ traps, which were expensive and costly, smaller 
and less wealthy canneries had strongly opposed to the use of traps in southwest Alaska and 
requested the federal government to prohibit the employment of traps as a destructive and wasteful 
fishing gear.83 However, given that a cannery owner frankly said to a field investigator that he 
believed that traps should be abolished but that he did not view traps as injurious to salmon 
fisheries,84 the claim that the federal government should ban traps in Alaska because of their 
harmful effects on salmon runs was apparently rhetorical and even hypocritical. Thus, smaller and 
less wealthy cannery managers had a sufficient incentive to make a false story for their benefits. 
That said, Jefferson F. Moser, a special federal agent, suggested in 1902 that the hearsay was true, 
though the actual amount of destroyed salmon was unverifiable. 
Indeed, complaints about the use of traps were not rare in the Bristol Bay region. It is notable 
that such complaints were made from the perspective of indigenous subsistence too. In a petition 
for requesting the federal government’s prohibition of traps, J. H. Schoechert, superintendent of 
the Moravian mission on the Nushagak River, insisted, “The fish traps . . . kill all the small fish, 
and must result eventually in the destruction of the food supply. It was stated that even now many 
natives die of starvation each winter, impliedly as a result of the operations of the canning 
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companies.”85 Cannery officials, who treated salmon as just an object of commodification and 
sought to maximize their economic gains, ignored the fair possibility that their extractive activities 
might dispossess indigenous Alaskans of their access to salmon. The point is that the cannery 
officials’ view that salmon were common-pool resources, that the fish were greatly resilient and 
inexhaustible, that access to the fish was competed with other rival canneries, and that the 
competition was in nature a zero-sum game motivated canners to overexploit the fish and 
consequently caused the “tragedy of the commons,” a situation that had taken place in the 
Columbia River basin in the late 19th century. 
In order to efficiently maximize the manufacture of canned salmon, cannery officials also 
created networks of high mobility and transported surplus salmon and fishermen between their 
canning factories to make all canneries across the Bristol Bay area run as fully as possible. For 
instance, the APA’s cannery on Naknek sent 45,000 sockeye salmon to the association’s cannery 
on the Ugashik River to help out the latter’s pack because the Ugashik River found very poor 
salmon runs and the Naknek River was flooded with the fish. Moreover, the association’s cannery 
on the Ugashik River sent fifty fishermen to the Naknek River. The fifty fishermen operated off 
the mouth of the Naknek River and in Kvichak Bay and brought their catch back to the cannery on 
the Ugashik River.86 To promote this transportation system, the APA had invested in technological 
innovation and completed more than 100 miles of wire telephone connections between its several 
canneries at Ugashik, Naknek, Igagik, Koggiung, and Nushagak in 1904. 87  These 
telecommunication networks made technically possible for APA canners to effectively react to 
dynamic and daily changing salmon runs, oceanic conditions, and weather patterns in Bristol Bay. 
 
85 Kutchin, “Report on the Salmon Fisheries of Alaska, 1899,” 48. 
86 George M. Bowers, “The Fisheries of Alaska in 1906” (Washington, DC: Government Printing 
Office, 1907), 40. 
87 Kutchin, “Report on the Salmon Fisheries of Alaska, 1904,” 8. 
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In short, establishing close cooperative mechanisms between canneries of the same packer helped 
cannery officials prepare for unpredictable and uncertain ascending sockeye salmon situations and 
securely maximize the production of canned salmon. 
Market trends, more specifically demand and supply, played crucial roles in determining the 
degree of a cannery’s extractive activities. At the initial stage of the salmon canning industry in 
southwest Alaska, particularly in the late 1880s through the early 1900s, few limitations on 
production, rapid industrialization and mechanization, and free entry into the industry birthed a 
condition of intense competition between canners. This competition led to a dramatic increase in 
canned salmon production and canners tried to maintain their economic benefits by cooperatively 
restricting supplies. For example, 17 canneries manufactured 412,000 cases of Alaskan salmon—
more than double the output of the year before—in 1888. A year later, 37 canneries operated in 
Alaska and packed 714,000 cases. The market could not absorb this level of output at profitable 
prices by the end of the 1880s, and canners operating in Alaska finally pursued trustification and 
formed a cartel of the Alaska Packers’ Association in 1893 to lessen competition, control the 
amount of manufactured salmon cans, and maintain profitable prices.88 This example showed that 
rationality did not always mean maximizing production for cannery officials; instead, their 
capitalistic rationality was contingent on unstable and shifting market trends, and they tried to 
maximize their economic gains by limiting output in a cooperative way especially when the market 
demand was relatively low compared to the supply.  
It should be noted that cannery managers could not always control the amount of produced 
salmon cans as they wanted because of accidents and natural disasters. Fire deeply concerned 
cannery owners by damaging necessary equipment and facilities. According to a report by an 
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official Alaska field agent, for example, a fire broke out in a cannery of the Alaska-Portland 
Packers’ Association in Nushagak Bay in August 1910. The fire “completely destroyed” the 
canning factory and also burned down the “warehouse alongside, with much of the gill-netting and 
all of the trap web, together with part of the season’s pack.” The total loss was about $200,000, 
though it was partly covered by insurance.89 In addition to fire, violent waves wreaked havoc on 
the property of cannery owners. In October 1902, for instance, a tidal wave hit the Bristol Bay 
region and had devastating effects on canning factories. A newspaper article read, “[F]ive large 
and important plants [in Bristol Bay] have been literally swept away out of existence,” which 
resulted in higher prices of canned sockeye salmon.90 Further, high winds troubled transport ships. 
Bristol Bay was infamous for stormy winds and transport ships often ran aground. A newspaper 
correspondent reported in June 1915, “The American ship Centaur was wrecked at Naknek, Bristol 
bay [sic] . . . The Centaur piled up on the rocks when she dragged her anchors during a gale. 
Twenty-five other cannery ships anchored in Bristol bay [sic] narrowly escaped destruction at the 
same time.”91 These unpredictable disasters crucially impacted the worldwide canned salmon 
market by preventing stable production and supply of the product. 
Meanwhile, high demand for canned salmon in the market easily accelerated production and 
inter-corporate competition. Most Alaskan sockeye salmon cans were marketed abroad, and major 
consumers of Alaskan sockeye salmon were poor Britons.92 The market demand was conditional 
not only on economic conditions but also on the geopolitical situation in Europe. The impact of 
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the First World War on the canned salmon market was enormous, and Bower wrote in 1920, 
“[D]uring the later years, and especially since the beginning of the Great War, with unlimited 
demand for canned salmon and unheard-of prices prevailing for all the grades, there has been an 
unexampled expansion of the business.”93 To take advantage of the business opportunity created 
by the war, Anglo-American canners operating in southwest Alaska considerably increased 
financial investments in facilities, vessels, fishing gear, and labor forces to manufacture more 
salmon cans. The total production of sockeye salmon in southwest Alaska grew from 1,510,977 
cases ($8,316,910) in 1914 to 1,677,513 cases ($15,591,793) in 1918.94 It is noteworthy that the 
amount of produced sockeye salmon cans in southwest Alaska grew by only 10 percent from 1914 
to 1918, though the price of canned sockeye salmon continued going up, canners increased 
financial investments by even more than 10 percent, and they indeed manufactured canned salmon 
without any self-restraint. The fact that heavy investment did not lead to proportionate growth of 
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Table 1: Statistical Data about Salmon Fisheries in Southwest Alaska in 1914 
Items Number Value 
Canneries operated 23 $3,131,447 
Wages paid  $2,498,961 
Boats, sail and row 1,035 $222,357 
Apparatus, gillnets (fathoms) 1,679 (229,771) $160,597 
 
Ward T. Bower, “Alaska Fisheries and Fur Industries in 1914” (Washington, DC: Government 
Printing Office, 1915), 35 
 
 
Table 2: Statistical Data about Salmon Fisheries in Southwest Alaska in 1918 
Items Number Value 
Canneries operated 30 $4,687,956 
Wages paid  $5,280,985 
Boats, sail and row 1,513 $269,066 
Apparatus, gillnets (fathoms) 2,656 (339,032) $516,556 
 
Ward T. Bower, “Alaska Fisheries and Fur Industries in 1918” (Washington, DC: Government 
Printing Office, 1919), 47. 
 
 
Table 3: Average Annual Price per Case of 48 One-Pound Cans of Salmon, 1914 to 1918 
 
Product 1914 1915 1916 1917 1918 
Sockeye Salmon $5.58 $5.82 $6.04 $9.48 $9.44 
 
Ward T. Bower, “Alaska Fisheries and Fur Industries in 1918” (Washington, DC: Government 
Printing Office, 1919), 49. 
 
   The 1919 season turned out to be a watershed moment in the history of sockeye salmon 
fisheries in southwest Alaska because the salmon catch declined dramatically in the entire Bristol 
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Bay region. Although canners in southwest Alaska operated 29 canneries with almost same amount 
of financial investments in sockeye salmon fisheries as the previous year, the production of the 
fish dropped by approximately 66 percent, decreasing from 1,677,513 cases in 1918 to 571,486 
cases in 1919.95 Upon having completed his annual investigation of fishing grounds in southwest 
Alaska, Bower reported, “The season of 1919 has proved the most complete failure in the history 
of Bristol Bay.”96  What surprised cannery managers and Fisheries Bureau officials was that 
sockeye salmon catches decreased in all streams of Bristol Bay. This fact was shocking for both 
canners and federal agents because it was unprecedented in the history of Bristol Bay salmon 
fisheries, and, as stated earlier, they had commonly hypothesized that bad catches in a river were 
accompanied with good catches in another river in Bristol Bay and that the total amount of 
ascending sockeye salmon did not change annually there.97 In the face of the unprecedentedly low 
catches of sockeye salmon in all of southwest Alaska in 1919, Fisheries Bureau officials focused 
on human agency, or more specifically the theory of overexploitation, and emphasized that the 
depletion of sockeye salmon in Bristol Bay was no longer a future possibility but a hard reality. 
The point is that even ichthyologists of the Bureau of Fisheries still could not assert confidently 
what had caused the dramatic fall in sockeye salmon catches across Bristol Bay in 1919. Instead, 
they reasonably hypothesized that overfishing was the primary cause. Bower concluded, “The 
cause of this sudden and serious falling off in the salmon runs of western Alaska, and especially 
Bristol Bay, is not known, but in the absence of a better reason it may be attributed to overfishing 
in recent years.”98  
 
 
95 Bower, “Alaska Fisheries and Fur Industries in 1919,” 45-46. 
96 Ibid., 148. 
97 Ibid., 148. 




Anglo-American cannery businessmen created “modern” sockeye salmon fisheries in Bristol 
Bay from 1883, when the initial cannery was built in the region, to 1919, when the canners first 
paid attention to the serious possibility of overexploitation of the fish. The canners pursued 
capitalistic rationality and sought to maximize their economic benefits by efficiently extracting 
sockeye salmon and processing them into canned products. They achieved this objective by 
employing several techniques. First, canners introduced the Anglo-American legal principle of 
open access to marine resources and used the concept of common property rhetorically and 
selectively to exercise exclusive proprietary rights to fishing grounds and access to sockeye salmon. 
Second, cannery owners actively invested their capital in hiring experienced fishers and cannery 
hands and industrializing and mechanizing their fishing and canning facilities. Third, canners 
founded their practice of salmon fisheries on their unique view about the environment and ecology 
of Bristol Bay. They believed prevailing myths that sockeye salmon were inexhaustible and that 
the ocean was resilient to humans’ extractive activities. These mythical beliefs allowed cannery 
officials to undervalue their operation’s impacts on the oceanic ecology and wrongly assume that 
the marine ecology of Bristol Bay was seasonally and historically static and changeless. Also, that 
cannery officials treated sockeye salmon as just an object of commodification without attaching 
any special cultural meaning to the fish helped the canners pay scant attention to the necessity to 
preserve the fish. 
The U.S. federal government conflicted with canners in practicing sockeye salmon fisheries in 
Bristol Bay. The most notable difference between Anglo-American cannery businessmen and 
federal investigators in approaching salmon fisheries was their clashing views on the marine 
ecology. Contrary to cannery owners, federal investigators hypothesized that the marine ecology 
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was vulnerable to human intervention and worried about the possibility that sockeye salmon might 
be overexploited and finally depleted. Thus, the Commission of Fish and Fisheries (later the 
Bureau of Fisheries) emphasized the importance of sustainability and this approach contrasted well 
with the canners’ mindset of capitalistic rationality, which allowed cannery owners to catch more 
sockeye salmon than they could process and waste the surplus if unnecessary in order to reduce 
uncertainty and instability in catches caused by unpredictable weather patterns and oceanic 
conditions. The federal government tried to restrict salmon fishing operations in Bristol Bay by 
enacting fisheries laws after 1889. 
Despite the federal government’s effort to project its authority and impose its vision, federal 
investigators could not exercise their regulatory power effectively and salmon fisheries in Bristol 
Bay were practically laissez-faire. Federal investigators were not always competent, and some of 
them lacked scientific expertise on salmon’s habits or naively trusted cannery businessmen’s self-
reports about their operations without any critiques. But the biggest problem was that federal 
investigators chronically possessed insufficient material resources, especially personnel and patrol 
vessels, to effectively enforce the salmon fisheries laws in Bristol Bay. This situation had continued 
until 1919, and the sudden and dramatic decline in sockeye salmon catches in the whole Bristol 
Bay region that year soon expanded the federal government’s capability to project its authority in 










CHAPTER 3: THE RISE OF AN AMERICAN ICHTHYOLOGICAL EMPIRE: 
FISHERIES LAWS, BIOLOGICAL RESEARCH, AND SALMON-CENTERED 
ECOLOGISM, 1919-1930s 
 
   1919 marked a watershed moment in the history of salmon fisheries in Bristol Bay. That the 
catch of the fish suddenly declined by approximately 66 percent in the entire region presented an 
unprecedented situation for both Anglo-American canners and federal government officials. Until 
then sockeye salmon catches had been abundant on some rivers and poor on others in Bristol Bay. 
As discussed in the earlier chapter, the dominant theory for explaining it was that the total amount 
of ascending sockeye salmon did not change every season and that some uncontrollable non-
human factors, such as oceanic conditions and weather patterns, determined where the fish would 
finally ascend. This meant that access to sockeye salmon in Bristol Bay was to considerable degree 
up to pure luck and that only God knew who in which district of southwest Alaska would be most 
fortunate every season. But the very small sockeye salmon catches in 1919 demonstrated the 
possibility that the fish might be vulnerable to human intervention, that the total amount of 
ascending salmon might fluctuate from season to season, and that the canners might have 
overexploited sockeye salmon runs by then. This new situation drove the canners and Washington 
officials to take a conservationist approach to salmon fisheries in Bristol Bay. 
   The most fundamental change in Bristol Bay after 1919 was the termination of the laissez-faire 
structure of sockeye salmon fisheries and the imposition of the federal government’s vision for 
and practice of salmon fisheries on Anglo-American canners. The Bureau of Fisheries put most 
emphasis on the importance of promoting “sustainability” in salmon fisheries in Bristol Bay. 
Contrary to Anglo-American cannery businessmen, who pursued the short-term and instant 





term and continuous development of sockeye salmon fisheries in southwest Alaska. Despite this 
difference in approach between the canners and the federal government, it is noted that they shared 
a mostly identical objective. The Bureau of Fisheries sought to create sustainable extractive 
colonialism in Bristol Bay where Anglo-American canners could continue to monopolize access 
to sockeye salmon and maximize their economic gains in a persistent and efficient manner. In fact, 
Willis H. Rich of the Division of Scientific Inquiry of the Bureau of Fisheries wrote: 
To conserve means rather to guard and protect the resources so that depletion may not occur 
and that they may continue indefinitely to provide food for man. It may be said that the 
conservation of a fishery resource involves as much its utilization to the fullest possible 
extent compatible with its perpetuation as it does the preserving of the resource against undue 
exploitation.1 
 
The federal government’s primary policy toward salmon fisheries in Bristol Bay was 
conservation of the fish. This conservation approach consisted of three major pillars: restrictive 
fisheries laws; biological research in sockeye salmon; and environmental and ecological 
engineering. Significantly, these policy pillars were founded on science, more specifically 
ichthyology. Ichthyological knowledge about sockeye salmon’s habits and characteristics was 
essential to implementing effective and rational fisheries regulations that were adaptable to the 
fish’s dynamic ecology and to efficiently increasing the number of ascending sockeye salmon 
every season by transforming the local environment and ecosystem into a more salmon-friendly 
one. Indeed, Rich stated, “If the fisheries are to be utilized to the fullest extent compatible with 
their maintenance, it is especially important to understand fully the biology of the fishes [sic], since 
only in the light of such knowledge can they be given scientific care.”2 This chapter argues that 
ichthyologists of the Bureau of Fisheries played key roles in creating the colonial structure of 
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Anglo-Americans’ continuous domination and exploitation of sockeye salmon in Bristol Bay. 
 
 
Figure 11: Officers and Scientific Staff of the U.S. Bureau of Fisheries. Elmer Higgins, “Progress 
in Biological Inquiries, 1926” (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1928), 560. 
 
 
The White Act of 1924 and the Birth of a Conservation Regime in Bristol Bay 
 
   The federal government’s effort to conserve Alaskan salmon reflected the rise of nation-wide 
environmentalism at the turn of the twentieth century. After the Civil War, the United States 
experienced dramatic social and political changes, particularly mass urbanization, immigration, 
and industrialization. When these social and political phenomena created problems associated with 
industrial and urban growth, a broad reform movement called progressivism emerged and 
progressive reformers, most of whom were wealthy or middle-class urbanites, tried to solve the 
problems by expanding the power of government at all levels—federal, state, and local.3 These 
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problems included environmental and ecological degradation. Dwindling forests, diminishing 
game species, threatened water supplies, polluted smoky air, and the perceived disappearance of 
the American frontier, “free” and “vacant” land on the West, in 1890 urged activists, middle-class 
urbanites, and Washington politicians and bureaucrats to handle these grave environmental and 
ecological deterioration. Addressing this national environmental and ecological degradation 
mattered for them to keep America’s growth and development and maintain American traditional 
values of self-reliance, masculinity, and democracy. 4  American progressive reformers talked 
about flourishing salmon fisheries in Alaska in this context of the growing necessity and 
importance of conservation. A Chicago newspaper article, for example, warned, “Each year brings 
new proof that the salmon is in danger of joining the fur seal and the buffalo through man’s 
commercial greed. . . . [I]ts [salmon’s] practical extermination is only a matter of time if the present 
methods of the packers are maintained.”5  
   Conservation during the Progressive Era was essentially an elitist movement driven by the 
philosophy of professional idealism based on scientific expertise and technological innovation. 
The conservation movement’s leaders sprang from such fields as hydrology, forestry, agrostology, 
geology, and, as will be discussed, biology or ichthyology. They were vigorously active in 
professional circles at Washington and they played a key role in making the federal resource policy. 
Core values of the conservation movement were rationality, efficiency, order, and, most of all, 
sustainability or continuity. In fact, the experts rationally applied science to natural resource 
exploitation and sought to promote continued production, development, and use of natural 
resources through ever-increasing efficiency. We must note that the progressive conservationists 
were neither associated with the grass-roots public nor worked for the rights of American people; 
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rather, they offered an overwhelmingly eastern, wealthy, and white perspective on environmental 
and ecological issues. The conservation movement did not pay sufficient attention to the rights and 
privileges of Native Americans, and conservation efforts were simply another aspect of ongoing 
imperialist projects of dispossessing them of their access to traditional lands and resources.6 
   It was not until at least 1919 when the federal government began devoting careful attention to 
thoroughly investigating the Bristol Bay district. The federal government conducted the first 
detailed survey of the Bristol Bay region during the summer of 1890 and 1891.7 After having 
worked south of the Alaska Peninsula during the summers of 1888 and 1889, the U.S. Fish 
Commission Steamer Albatross proceeded to Bristol Bay to develop its offshore fishing grounds, 
particularly cod banks, there. As an “essential” preliminary investigation, the Albatross completed 
a “reconnoissance” of the coastlines of the bay. Commander Zera L. Tanner reported, “In 
prosecuting the work the region was thoroughly sounded, the currents, wind, and weather observed, 
and other information obtained of such direct value to the fisherman and mariner . . .”8 Since 
Tanner concentrated his research work on Bristol Bay itself, he failed to survey major rivers, 
streams, and lakes in the area. In the summer of 1907, members of the U.S. Bureau of Fisheries 
visited the Bristol Bay region in connection with studies related to salmon spawning. In that year 
a preliminary exploration was made of the Wood River and Lake Aleknagik for the goal of 
counting the number of salmon escaping up the Wood River. During the summers of 1908 and 
1909, an agent of the Bureau of Fisheries investigated every stream tributary to the lake. Despite 
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their expected holistic investigations of the Bristol Bay region, the field agents still could not carry 
out a comparable exploration on the Nushagak River.9 
Charles H. Gilbert and Henry O’Malley, agents of the Bureau of Fisheries, travelled to Bristol 
Bay in the late 1919. Their travel’s purpose was to observe sockeye salmon fisheries and analyze 
why the entire region experienced the dramatic fall in sockeye salmon catches that year. Upon the 
completion of their investigation, Gilbert and O’Malley wrote a report to Hugh M. Smith, 
Commissioner of the bureau, and strongly emphasized the urgent necessity for the federal 
government to restrict the “evil” laissez-faire salmon fisheries in the Bristol Bay area. They 
claimed: 
[T]he industry has now reached a critical period, in which the salmon supply of Alaska is 
threatened with virtual extinction, unless a radically new administrative policy be 
substituted for the one now in force. . . . Unless effective governmental control can be 
secured to prevent further invasion of a district which already suffers the evil results of 
unrestricted competition, certain disaster will befall the salmon fisheries of Alaska.10  
 
   For the Bureau of Fisheries, maintaining vibrant salmon industry in Alaska mattered for not 
only economic but also nutritional reasons. The salmon industry was an economic engine of Alaska 
Territory. In 1918, the salmon industry offered employment to 26,502 people, more than half of 
whom were whites, and produced almost 6.6 million cases valued at about $51 million 
(approximately $871 million in 2020).11 More notably, salmon gained new significance in terms 
of improving America’s food security during and following the First World War. By November 
1918, commodity prices had reached a level more than twice that of 1913 and meat prices rose 
likewise in the United States due to increased domestic consumption and burgeoning demand from 
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its allies across the Atlantic.12 The conflict forced the federal government to reevaluate salmon 
and other seafood as crucial, cheap and nutritious products for the American public, especially 
poor consumers, that would supplement agricultural produce perceived insufficient to feed 
growing urban population in the United States. Indeed, for instance, the U.S. Food Administration 
tried to reform the American dietary culture and issued a number of educational posters during the 
First World War to encourage Americans to consume less meat and more fish and raise the 
American public’s consciousness of the ocean as a promising, cost-free reservoir of nutritious 
food.13 Officials of the Bureau of Fisheries continued sharing this position after the conflict and 
highlighted the importance of utilizing seafood from the standpoint of not only economic 
prosperity but also food security. Ward T. Bower, an Alaska Service agent of the Bureau of 
Fisheries, wrote:  
The preservation of the salmon supply to the rivers of Alaska concerns most vitally the body 
of consumers which constitute the general public. It is contrary to their interests that the 
fisheries be ruthlessly exploited and an important source of highly valuable food be placed 
in jeopardy, greatly diminished, and in time totally destroyed. The importance of sea foods 
will increase with the years as grazing lands grow more and more restricted and flocks and 
herds continue to diminish. Yet now, in a period of comparative abundance, through sheer 
heedlessness and childish improvidence, this country is in danger of permitting the virtual 
destruction of the most important sea food it possesses—one which the ocean provides 
without cost and brings to its very doors.14 
 
Out of various seafood, Barton W. Evermann, former chief of the Alaska Division of the Bureau 
of Fisheries, stressed that salmon in the North Pacific were one of the most important resources to 
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be preserved in economic and nutritious terms. He said in the Pan-Pacific Food Conservation 
Conference of 1924: 
I wish to call attention to the marvelous richness of the Pacific and certain connecting waters 
in aquatic natural resources of food or other value . . . The salmon of the coasts of the North 
Pacific are one of our greatest vanishing natural resources. . . . There never was a greater 
natural resource in any country than the Pacific salmon; and none was ever more recklessly 
destroyed.15 
 
   Salmon canning industry leaders on the Pacific Coast worked with the federal government, 
specifically the Bureau of Fisheries, complicit in promoting the “Eat More Fish” campaign. For 
instance, William I. Crawford, a former secretary of the Puget Sound Salmon Canners 
Association and Association of Alaska Salmon Packers, published a book titled “Eat More Fish” 
in 1920. The book’s primary objective was pedagogical: sharing information about nutritional 
values of canned salmon and listing various recipes of canned salmon dishes, such as salmon 
salad, scalloped salmon, salmon croquette, and salmon pudding. It is apparent that Crawford as 
well as Fisheries Bureau officials held that the American public did not eat many salmon mainly 
because they had little knowledge about the fish. In fact, a poster made by the Bureau of 
Fisheries and contained in the cookery monograph wrote, “You [fish markets] must show the 
clean shop, sell the perfectly fresh fish, and give your customers the benefit of your knowledge 
and experience.” Another poster in the book, too, stated succinctly, “PREJUDICE IS AN 
EXPENSIVE LUXURY.”16 In sum, salmon canning industry leaders on the West Coast and 
Fisheries Bureau officials considered salmon fisheries questions in Alaska in the context of both 
advancing economic values of the salmon canning industry through efficient harvest of the fish 
and improving food security of the United States through changes in its dietary cultures. 
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The federal government strengthened its legal institutions about salmon fisheries in southwest 
Alaska after 1919. Two main fisheries laws had operated in Bristol Bay until that year. One was 
“an act to provide for the protection of the salmon fisheries of Alaska,” enacted on March 2, 1889. 
This legal measure consisted of only three articles and had two major objectives. First, it prohibited 
“the erection of dams, barricades, or other obstructions in any of the rivers of Alaska, with the 
purpose or result of preventing or impeding the ascent of salmon or other anadromous species to 
their spawning grounds.” Second, the law empowered the Secretary of Treasury (later the Secretary 
of Commerce) to adopt necessary measures to prevent the overexploitation and depletion of 
salmon in Alaska.17 1889 was only five years after the first cannery began operating in Bristol 
Bay and sockeye salmon fisheries there were still at the initial developmental stage. Thus, it was 
difficult for the federal government to establish a comprehensive legal institution that would 
effectively address diverse fisheries problems in 1889 that would happen in the future.  
   Congress passed a much stricter fisheries law, “an act for the protection and regulation of the 
fisheries of Alaska,” and it was enacted on June 26, 1906. Lawmakers deemed this harsher fisheries 
law necessary because the 1889 fisheries act was “ineffective” to prevent possible overfishing and 
achieve the sustainable development of salmon fisheries in Alaska.18  The 1906 fisheries act 
consisted of 16 articles and aimed to deal with enormous changes that had taken place in salmon 
fisheries since 1889. First, the act introduced the license tax and required cannery businessmen to 
pay four cents per case (48 one-pound cans). Second, it made it unlawful to “erect or maintain any 
dam, barricade, fence, trap, fish wheel, or other fixed or stationary obstruction . . . in any of the 
waters of Alaska at any point where the distance from shore to shore is less than five hundred feet, 
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or within five hundred yards of the mouth of any red-salmon stream where the same is less than 
five hundred feet in width, with the purpose or result of capturing salmon or preventing or 
impeding their ascent to their spawning grounds.” Third, it was illegal to “lay or set any drift net, 
seine, set net, pound net, trap, or any other fishing appliance for any purpose . . . across or above 
the tide waters of any creek, stream, river, estuary, or lagoon, for a distance greater than one-third 
the width of such creek, stream, river, estuary, or lagoon, or within one hundred yards outside of 
the mouth of any red-salmon stream where the same is less than five hundred feet in width.” Fourth, 
the act prohibited “lay[ing] or set[ting] any seine or net of any kind within one hundred yards of 
any other seine, net, or other fishing appliance which is being or which has been laid or set in any 
of the waters of Alaska,” or “driv[ing] or construct[ing] any trap or any other fixed fishing 
appliance within six hundred yards laterally or within one hundred yards endwise of any other trap 
or fixed fishing appliance.” Finally, the law made it unlawful for canners to use salmon more than 
48 hours after they were killed and wantonly waste or destroy salmon caught in Alaskan waters.19 
The drastic decline in the catch of sockeye salmon in whole Bristol Bay in 1919 clearly 
demonstrated that overfishing was the most plausible explanation for the unprecedented situation. 
At the same time, the overfishing theory showed that the 1906 fisheries law had been insufficient 
and ineffective to prevent the overexploitation and exhaustion of sockeye salmon in Bristol Bay. 
To address this new development, President Warren G. Harding signed an Executive Order on 
November 3, 1922 and established the Southwestern Alaska Fisheries Reservation, including 
Bristol Bay, where salmon fisheries should be subject to regulations and restrictions issued by the 
Secretary of Commerce in addition to other valid relevant fisheries laws (figure 12).20  
 
19 Ibid., 66-69. 
20 Ward T. Bower, “Alaska Fishery and Fur-Seal Industries in 1922” (Washington, DC: Government 







Figure 12: The Southwestern Alaska Fisheries Reservation. Ward T. Bower, “Alaska Fishery and 
Fur-Seal Industries in 1922” (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1923), 12-13. 
 
Empowered by the Executive Order, Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover issued on 
December 16, 1922 much tougher regulations for the Southwestern Alaska Fisheries Reservation 
than the 1906 fisheries law. First, the novel regulations prohibited the use of purse seines, traps, 
and motor-propelled boats for salmon fisheries. Second, Hoover’s directive also banned the 
transportation of fresh salmon for canning or preserving across the boundary of each district. Third, 
the regulations limited legal fishing apparatus only to drift gill nets and provided that each fishing 
boat use gill nets that should not exceed in length 200 fathoms hung measure. The mesh of the nets 
for sockeye salmon should be more than 5.75 inches stretched measure between knots. Finally, 





that sockeye salmon fisheries should not begin prior to midnight of June 25 and should close at or 
before midnight of July 25 of each year.21 Hoover’s directives aimed to stop wasteful customary 
fishing practices conducted by Anglo-American cannery managers to maximize their economic 
gains. 
   Besides these regulations, the most controversial point of Hoover’s directive was the 
introduction of a permit system. Its second section stated, “No individual shall engage in the 
business of catching, canning, or preparing salmon . . . within the above-stated districts without 
first securing a permit from the Secretary of Commerce.”22 The section also required all applicants 
to offer the Department of Commerce detailed information about their fishing and canning 
capabilities, such as the number and types of fishing gear and canning machines, the locations of 
fisheries, and the planned amounts of canned salmon products. The directive provided that the 
Secretary of Commerce refer to this reported information and determine the “character, extent, and 
locality of fishing operations to be conducted” as well as the “amount of pack allowed.”23  
   This micromanagement approach to salmon fisheries in Bristol Bay by the Department of 
Commerce encountered strong opposition and complaints from canners because it meant a 
rejection of the preferred principle of laissez-faire, free competition in their production activities. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, canners operated salmon fisheries in Bristol Bay based on 
the idea of common-pool resources and open access, even if it was rhetorical, selective, and 
inconsistent, according to which sockeye salmon should be open to exploitation by all who desired 
to do so. The permit system practically meant the nationalization of sockeye salmon and it was the 
last thing canneries, particularly wealthy and big, wanted in the Bristol Bay district because capital 
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had become a less effective means with which they could secure and maximize access to sockeye 
salmon there. 
To reformulate the federal government’s fisheries policy, President Harding made a one-month 
tour of Alaska Territory with his major cabinet members, including Hoover, in June 1923 (figure 
13). To discover and discuss “any real troubles that might exist” about salmon fisheries, they 
conducted public hearings in major Alaskan cities of Juneau, Anchorage, Fairbanks, and Cordova. 
Upon his return to Seattle in July 1923, Harding made an address to the public and stressed the 
necessity for the federal government to take further measures to preserve salmon in the territory. 
He urged lawmakers to act immediately to prevent the possible exhaustion of sockeye salmon in 
southwest Alaska, and otherwise he suggested that the White House would play a leading role in 
imposing new restrictive legal regimes on salmon fisheries there without Congressional approval. 
Harding stated, “More restriction is necessary and urgent. The conservation must be effected. If 
Congress can not agree upon a program of helpful legislation, the reservations and their regulations 
will be further extended by Executive order.”24  
 
24 Ward T. Bower, “Alaska Fishery and Fur Seal Industries in 1923” (Washington, DC: Government 







Figure 13: Presentation of Salmon to President and Mrs. Harding. Available at 
https://www.archives.gov/historical-docs/todays-doc/index.html?dod-date=708 (accessed April 
10, 2021).  
 
Pressured by Harding, Congress passed an “act for the protection of the fisheries of Alaska,” 
known as the White Act, and the president approved and enacted it on June 6, 1924. The White 
Act inherited several main regulations from the 1906 fisheries law with some revisions and added 
to it two new restrictions. One was the imposition of closing periods on salmon fisheries from 6 
pm on Saturday to 6 am on Monday every week. The other was the introduction of escapement of 





not be caught.25 In addition to the restrictions set by the White Act, Hoover issued a renewed order 
on June 21, 1924 and integrated all regulations specified in the 1922 directive, except the fisheries 
permit system, into the White Act.26 That the White Act did not contain the controversial fisheries 
permit system demonstrated that the federal government’s pragmatic compromise with cannery 
businessmen on the West Coast. 
Contrary to the salmon fisheries laws of 1889 and 1906, the conservation system created by 
the White Act was dynamic and flexible. The former two fisheries acts showed federal 
government’s efforts to manage the shifting oceanic ecosystem with static legal institutions. In 
contrast, regulations on sockeye salmon fisheries imposed by the White Act were subject to change 
according to variable conditions of the local environment and ecology in southwest Alaska. This 
approach was based on the federal government officials’ conviction that lakes, streams, and the 
ocean were not only travelling spaces for salmon but also everyday unstable systems that affected 
the fish. For the federal government to efficiently manage and sustain the maximum production of 
salmon, officials needed to answer to what extent canners’ fishing operations impacted salmon, 
how non-human environmental and ecological factors influenced the fish’s habits and survival, 
and what kind of local environmental and ecological landscape humans should create in southwest 
Alaska. Thus, developing scientific knowledge about the sockeye salmon’s ecology as well as the 
environment surrounding the fish from the birth to the death became a matter of utmost importance 
for federal government officials. This scientific approach constituted a foundation of the federal 
government’s conservation policy toward sustainable sockeye salmon fisheries in Bristol Bay. 
Indeed, Gilbert and O’Malley asserted in the 1919 report, “Unfortunately, no such statistics [about 
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salmon runs and employed fishing gears in each stream] are published and available, yet they 
would form the essential foundation for any well-considered scheme of conservation. Without such 
a body of statistics, legislation to protect and maintain the fisheries must be a groping in the 
dark.”27 In other words, the necessity of scientifically understanding and controlling the lifecycle 
of sockeye salmon laid a structural foundation for sustainable maximum production of the fish in 
Bristol Bay. 
 
Nascent Scientific Research in the Sockeye Salmon’s Ecology in Bristol Bay in the 1920s 
 
   In addition to restricting fishing activities by enacting the White Act, the federal government’s 
conservationist approach to salmon fisheries in Bristol Bay aimed to make the sockeye salmon’s 
ecology more scientifically legible. Although the federal government imposed tough regulations 
on salmon fisheries in the Bristol Bay district, it did not seek to sacrifice the vested interests of 
Anglo-American canners on the Pacific Coast. Instead, the federal government’s conservationist 
approach was ambitious, and it intended to achieve the maximum sustainable yield (hereafter 
MSY) of sockeye salmon, which meant to maximize the exploitation of the fish without disrupting 
the salmon industry itself. Since officials of the Bureau of Fisheries were convinced that the 
fluctuation in ascending salmon runs was a result of human fishing operations and the work of 
non-human factors, especially oceanic winds, temperature, and currents, the officials tried to 
understand the non-human forces more deeply to better manage the conservationist project.28 
Robert Irvin Coker, Chief of the Division of Scientific Inquiry of the Bureau of Fisheries, stated 
in 1920: 
The Division of Scientific Inquiry . . . concerns itself with the problems of ultimate sources, 
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of judicious exploitation, and of the means and conditions of maintenance or possible 
increase of supplies. . . . The Bureau is therefore urged to investigate the conditions of success 
in maintaining the desired runs by artificial propagation, and to furnish that knowledge of 
the life history and migrations of salmon without which they can not [sic] be successfully 
protected and conserved.29  
 
Making sockeye salmon’s lifecycle, migration patterns, and other habits scientifically visible was 
the key to the successful conservation of the fish and ultimately to the achievement of perpetual 
exploitation of them on an MSY basis. 
   That officials of the Bureau of Fisheries emphasized the significance of scientific research in 
the ecology of salmon reflected their triumphalist belief in the possibility of science as a panacea 
for the difficult question: how to maximize the production of sockeye salmon in a continuous and 
stable way by minimizing the available surplus of the fish without exhausting them. Henry 
O’Malley, Commissioner of Fisheries, confidently insisted in 1927, “Science in industry has 
worked wonders. Science is introduced into business, into government, into every phase of daily 
life; and it is natural and, indeed, proper to expect science to maintain the fisheries for all time.”30 
For officials of the Bureau of Fisheries, the natural environment and ecology were no longer 
uncontrollable and untamable; rather, they should and could be controlled and tamed by the 
application of science to make salmon fisheries more efficient, rational, and sustainable. 
   The importance of preserving sockeye salmon by studying, understanding, and managing the 
fish was shared by the American public and Congressmen. This was clear from a rapid increase in 
the budget allocated to conducting scientific research for fisheries. Indeed, Congress offered for 
the scientific work $91,000 in 1924, $118,000 in 1925, $129,000 in 1926, $144,000 in 1927, 
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$175,000 in 1928, $198,000 in 1929, and $198,000 in 1930.31 Moreover, Wallace H. White (R-
ME), Chairman of the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, introduced a bill in the 1928 
Congress that would expand the budget for the scientific inquiry of fisheries to up to $250,000 for 
the next five years.32 Although both the House of Representatives and Senate passed this bill with 
wide support, it was finally dead when President Calvin Coolidge exercised a pocket veto for this 
bill.33 Congress overrode the veto and the federal government finally enacted the bill known as 
the five-year construction and maintenance program for the Bureau of Fisheries on May 21, 1930. 
As a result, the Bureau of Fisheries spent $262,000 in 1931 and $322,500 in 1932 on advancing 
its scientific work.34 The point is that, as the appropriations for the scientific research for fisheries 
more than tripled through the latter half of the 1920s and the early 1930s, the perceived 
significance of studying fish and managing them with newly acquired scientific information grew 
notably among not only officials of the Bureau of Fisheries but also the American public and 
lawmakers at Washington. 
   The American ichthyologists’ scientific approach to fisheries was based on what George B. 
Goode, Assistant Director of the U.S. National Museum, once called the “systematic investigation 
of waters.” The ichthyologists believed that, because the ecosystem was a dynamic and unstable 
product of complex interactions between animals and their environment, it was possible to make 
the salmon’s ecology scientifically visible only when studying not merely the fish themselves but 
 
31 Elmer Higgins, “Progress in Biological Inquiries, 1928” (Washington, DC: Government Printing 
Office, 1930), 684; Elmer Higgins, “Progress in Biological Inquiries 1930” (Washington, DC: 
Government Printing Office, 1931), 626. 
32 Higgins, “Progress in Biological Inquiries, 1928,” 685. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Elmer Higgins, “Progress in Biological Inquiries 1931” (Washington, DC: Government Printing 
Office, 1932), 529; Elmer Higgins, “Progress in Biological Inquiries 1932” (Washington, DC: 
Government Printing Office, 1933), 147. However, the budget for the bureau’s scientific research 





also the environment in which they lived from their hatching to spawning. Goode wrote in 1886: 
The life history of species of economic value should be understood from beginning to end, 
but no less requisite is it to know the histories of the animals and plants upon which they 
feed or upon which their food is nourished; the histories of their enemies and friends and 
the friends and foes of their enemies and friends, as well as the currents, temperatures, and 
other physical phenomena of the waters in relation to migration, reproduction, and growth.35 
 
Ichthyologists applied this holistic approach to scientifically understanding sockeye salmon in 
Bristol Bay. As Elmer Higgins later admitted, ichthyologists considered most important to 
investigate “birth rate, age distribution, and migration” among many factors affecting populations 
of fish.36 
   Studying sockeye salmon was also essential to implement more efficient and effective fisheries 
regulations in Bristol Bay. Although officials of the Bureau of Fisheries were convinced of the 
necessity of restricting fishing activities in the bay, they believed that imposing fisheries 
regulations on cannery managers by law had limits in establishing a functioning conservation 
regime of sockeye salmon. Rather, the bureau’s officials thought that the key was obtaining the 
cannery managers’ voluntary cooperation for the federal government’s conservationist approach. 
According to the bureau’s staff, the main obstacle to achieving the goal was the unpredictability 
of future sockeye salmon runs. In fact, the bureau’s scientists assumed that cannery officials were 
cooperative in nature but that they often violated salmon fisheries restrictions due to their 
incapability to predict future salmon runs with accuracy and certainty. This structure of 
unpredictability and uncertainty was a main reason for an undesirable situation of the “tragedy of 
the commons.” Thus, it was crucial to study sockeye salmon and make it possible for cannery 
officials to foretell future salmon runs based on the expanded scientific information about the fish 
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in order to rationally conserve them. Indeed, Henry O’Malley claimed in 1927, “I think that if we 
can forecast with some accuracy what the next season’s run will be, the people in Bristol Bay will 
be willing to forego a season’s operations in order to take care of the run and give it an opportunity 
to rehabilitate itself. There is considerably more spirit of cooperation now than we had in the 
summer of 1924.”37  
   The sockeye salmon’s ecology was full of mysteries. A report about the fish completed by 
Tarleton H. Bean, an ichthyologist of the Commission of Fish and Fisheries, in 1892 suggested 
that even salmon experts possessed limited amount of scientific knowledge about sockeye salmon. 
Ichthyologists were more familiar with the fish’s habits in fresh water than in the ocean. For 
example, they knew that sockeye salmon approached the shores early in the spring and, if the 
spawning grounds were remote, the fish traveled up the stream very rapidly.38 The ichthyologists 
also believed that sockeye salmon spawned around the shores of deep, cool lakes, and in their 
tributaries, preferring waters whose highest temperature rarely exceeded 55 degrees. In addition, 
the nest was a shallow, circular pile of stones and the eggs were placed in crevices between the 
stones.39 Further, the ichthyologists held that it was very difficult for sockeye salmon to survive 
and reproduce because of a number of enemies in the fresh water and the sea. The fish faced 
sculpins, lake trout, gulls, terns, and loons in lakes and rivers for the first several years, experienced 
attacks from salmon sharks, seals, porpoises, sea lions, and even man-made nets in the ocean for 
the next several years, and confronted bears while they were ascending rivers for spawning.40 
However, even ichthyologists did not necessarily possess complete knowledge about salmon’s 
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lifecycle. In 1912 Barton Warren Evermann, Chief of the Alaska Fisheries Service in the Bureau 
of Fisheries, presented following four “most practical” questions that “remain to be definitely 
answered” for the purpose of comprehensive conservation. They were: 
 
1. Do all species of salmon regularly return to the home stream, i.e., the waters where hatched; 
or are they diverted at any time by adverse winds, food conditions, etc.? 
2. May the run in a stream be built up by closing the stream to fishing, and if so to what extent? 
3. What is the normal age of each species and what period is spent in fresh water? 
4. What percentage of fry under normal conditions is produced from eggs deposited naturally?41 
 
These questions were ultimately about the natural environment’s roles in conditioning salmon’s 
ecology and understanding how the environment impacted the fish was the key to advancing 
proper and effective conservation measures. But the problem was that ichthyologists did not have 
sufficient raw data to answer these questions in a logical and coherent way. Evermann critically 
reflected that their answers to the questions were “hypothetical, deduced from the general 
knowledge and beliefs as to the various species of salmon and their relatives rather than inductions 
from known facts.” 42  This meant that the process of generalization inevitably required 
ichthyologists to overestimate ecological similarities between different types of salmon despite the 
fair possibility that differences in geography and species might uniquely condition the salmon’s 
ecology. What ichthyologists needed to do first was to collect empirical data about the sockeye 
salmon’s ecology in Bristol Bay, and Evermann indeed suggested that conducting marking, or 
tagging, experiments was “the only positive solution.”43 
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   It should be noted that American ichthyologists imported general research techniques and 
methods from abroad and applied them to studying Pacific salmon in southwest Alaska. For 
instance, officials of the Bureau of Fisheries paid special attention to the idea of “science of vital 
statistics,” advanced by Johan Hjort, a Norwegian fisheries scientist.44 Hjort explained what the 
science of vital statistics meant in a lecture to the International Council for the Study of the Sea in 
1907. According to Hjort, three factors were most important for ichthyologists to scientifically 
visualize behavioral ways of fish. They were birth rate, age distribution, and migration patterns of 
fish. To accurately clarify these three elements, Hjort argued, statistical approach was useful and 
ichthyologists should select a certain number of fish and investigate the average of their birth rate, 
age distribution, and migration patterns.45 This teaching laid a methodological basis for American 
ichthyologists’ efforts to make Pacific salmon’s habits scientifically visible and the American 
scholars took advantage of transnational intellectual networks for studying the fish. 
Ichthyologists felt the immediate necessity to carry out tagging experiments because the 
miserable result of sockeye salmon fisheries in Bristol Bay in 1919 changed the scientists’ 
prevailing assumption about the ecosystem in the region. For example, having observed in 1903 
that the principal streams in the Bristol Bay district, the Kvichak and the Nushagak, had not seen 
heavy runs the same year, Gilbert presented a theory that “all the Bristol Bay streams draw from a 
single school of salmon which may chance to run most heavily in one or the other river in any 
given year.”46 However, the whole Bristol Bay region had only light sockeye salmon runs in 1919, 
which allowed ichthyologists to doubt their “single school theory.” Instead, they began embracing 
 
44 Higgins, “Progress in Biological Inquiries 1926,” 593. 
45 A. C. Hardy, “Johan Hjort, 1869-1948,” Obituary Notices of Fellows of the Royal Society 7, no. 19 
(1950): 168-169. 
46 Barton Warren Evermann, “Alaska Fisheries and Fur Industries in 1912” (Washington, DC: 





the “independent school theory,” according to which “each stream in this vast area [western 
Alaska] has its own wholly independent run of fish and has had its individual history.” Based on 
this new assumption, Gilbert and O’Malley insisted, “The Bureau of Fisheries should at once 
proceed to gather annually, under a skilled statistician, a well-planned body of data, referring where 
possible to individual streams.”47  
Ichthyologists’ scientific knowledge about sockeye salmon’s ecology in the ocean was far more 
limited. In fact, Gilbert stated in 1903: 
Nothing is known concerning the life of the adult salmon in the sea, nor do we know the 
direction from which they approach Bristol Bay. They appear suddenly off the mouths of 
the rivers. During some seasons they appear in quantity first in the Nushagak, in other 
seasons they run heavily in the Kvichak a few days before they run in the other streams. It 
is frequently, if not universally, noted that the stream having the heaviest run in any year has 
also the earliest run. We are ignorant of the factors which determine the variations in run 
from year to year.48 
 
The lack of scientific information about the sockeye salmon’s ecology in the ocean as well as in 
fresh water was problematic for the federal government because promoting the government’s 
salmon conservation efforts in Bristol Bay necessitated ichthyological knowledge of the total 
ecology of sockeye salmon, particularly how long the fish stayed in the ocean, where their feeding 
grounds were, and what routes they travelled before entering rivers and streams for spawning. 
Gilbert claimed: 
To insure the adequate protection of a salmon run a spawning escapement that will bear a 
definite ratio to the total size of the run must be provided for. To make such provision we 
must first know the total number captured for commercial purposes and then the number 
that escape up the river to the spawning grounds. Obviously these facts can not [sic] be 
known unless the migration routes are established and the points at which salmon bound for 
the different streams are forced to contribute to the commercial fisheries. The more 
numerous the points of attack the greater the restrictions that will be necessary to save the 
runs from extinction.49 
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To make the sockeye salmon’s ecology scientifically legible, Gilbert started the first consistent 
tagging experiment in southwest Alaska in the summer of 1922 and tried to reveal the fish’s 
migration routes (figures 14 and 15). He attached consecutively numbered tags to the tails of 4,000 
sockeye salmon, released them at Unga Island, and in Morzhovoi Bay, in Ikatan Bay, and at Port 
Moller, and recorded the time and place of recapture. Of the tagged 4,000 sockeye salmon, 709, or 
18 percent, were reported as recaptured, and Gilbert analyzed these results. He made a “plain and 
unquestionable” inference and hypothesized as follows:  
In 1922 a stream of migrants was traversing Isanotski Strait (False Pass) from the Pacific 
into Bering Sea, from early June to the middle of July at least, and that these distributed 
themselves to the red-salmon rivers along the entire northern shore of the Alaska Peninsula 
and throughout Bering Sea, from Nelson Lagoon to the Nushagak, and even to the 
Kuskoguim. The red salmon bound in 1922 for Bristol Bay assuredly did not school close 
inshore until after they had passed the Sandy River and were perhaps approaching the mouth 
of the Ugashik.50 
 
Gilbert also found that “a large body of Bering Sea red salmon use as feeding grounds the district 
south of the Alaska Peninsula and on attaining maturity return to Bering Sea and distribute 
themselves to the red-salmon streams of the peninsula and Bristol Bay and pass as far north even 
as the Kuskokwim River.”51 
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Figure 14: Salmon Tagging Experiments. Charles H. Gilbert and Willis H. Rich, “Second 
Experiment in Tagging Salmon in the Alaska Peninsula Fisheries Reservation, Summer of 1923” 














Figure 15: Salmon Tagging Experiments. Charles H. Gilbert and Willis H. Rich, “Second 
Experiment in Tagging Salmon in the Alaska Peninsula Fisheries Reservation, Summer of 1923” 
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1925). 
 
   In the summer of 1923, Gilbert and Willis H. Rich carried out the second tagging experiments 
with the same method but on a larger scale than the previous year (figure 16). The experiment 
“completely verified the results of 1922” and offered two new insights about sockeye salmon’s 
habits. The first discovery was about the fish’s migrating speed. Gilbert and Rich observed that 
sockeye salmon increased their travelling speed during the season. The travel rate was 





the end of the season (figure 17).52 The other finding was about the “homing theory.” Those 
engaged in commercial fisheries had believed that “the salmon constituting the runs to Bristol Bay 
form an undifferentiated lot and pass into one or the other stream in accordance with the direction 
of the wind or other external circumstance.” But Gilbert and Rich found this theory “to be wholly 
without foundation” and instead claimed that “the fish [sockeye salmon] were returning to streams 




Figure 16: Distribution of Sockeye Salmon Tagged in the Sea. Unga Island, Alaska, 1923. Bradley 
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Figure 17: Results of a Salmon Tagging Experiment. Charles H. Gilbert and Willis H. Rich, 
“Second Experiment in Tagging Salmon in the Alaska Peninsula Fisheries Reservation, Summer 
of 1923” (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1925), 65. 
 





crucially challenged other plausible theories. For example, the salmon’s homing instinct was one 
of the most controversial themes among ichthyologists. David Starr Jordan, a prestigious 
ichthyologist and adviser of Gilbert at Stanford, had considered the homing theory “unsound.” 
This was because Jordan believed that topography and salmon’s mobility, rather than the fish’s 
inherent instinct, determined their spawning grounds. Jordan insisted: 
[T]he Pacific salmon, for the most part, do not go to a great distance from the stream in 
which they are hatched, that most of them return to the streams of the same region, a majority 
to the parent stream, but that there is no evidence that they choose the parental spawning 
grounds in preference to any other, and none that they will prefer an undesirable stream to 
a favorable one for the reason that they happen to have been hatched in the former.54 
 
In addition to his underestimation of salmon’s great mobility and his overemphasis on the 
environment’s role in deciding the fish’s migration patterns, Jordan suggested that salmon runs in 
each river and lake were not necessarily ecologically independent but they were interdependent 
across rivers and lakes in a region. 
   The initiation of tagging experiences marked the beginning of a scientific approach to sockeye 
salmon fisheries in Bristol Bay. Until 1919 Anglo-American cannery businessmen and 
ichthyologists of the federal government had viewed the sockeye salmon’s ecology as a “black 
box,” a mechanism too complicated to be explained. Thus, until then, they had treated the natural 
environmental and ecological system as given and uncontrollable. But, after 1919, ichthyologists 
tried to make sockeye salmon’s biological habits scientifically legible and sought to reduce the 
natural environment’s agency in conditioning the fish’s ecology. This was essential and 
foundational for the federal government’s conservationist approach to sockeye salmon fisheries in 
the Bristol Bay district. However, ichthyologists had a more ambitious plan to promote their 
conservationist policy than studying and taming sockeye salmon. It was a project of transforming 
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the local ecosystem of Bristol Bay into a salmon-friendly and salmon-centered one based on the 
ideology of scientific triumphalism and the mindset of capitalistic rationality. 
 
“Stream Improvement” and Capitalistic Sockeye Salmon-Centered Ecologism 
   The federal government’s approach to sockeye salmon fisheries in Bristol Bay focused on 
sustainability. It aimed to restrict not only Anglo-American canners’ fishing activities but also non-
human agency in shaping the local ecosystem of the region. More specifically, the Bureau of 
Fisheries promoted environmental and ecological engineering and tried to artificially create 
conditions that would advance the survival of sockeye salmon in Bristol Bay. The bureau’s officials 
took this approach because of their assumption that the ecosystem should significantly impact the 
number of ascending sockeye salmon. In fact, Bower wrote, “The number of spawning fish which 
would be adequate in favorable years, it must be recognized, would fail utterly to produce a run 
when the eggs, the fingerlings, and the growing fish in the sea had been exposed to unusually 
severe conditions and to more formidable attacks from their innumerable enemies.”55 Bower also 
suggested that it was “necessary” for the federal government to remake the environment and 
ecosystem of the Bristol Bay district to advance sockeye salmon fisheries. He claimed, “This is 
not unsupported theory. It is a necessary deduction from all the observations and all the experiences 
of those who have studied the sequence of the seasons in the fisheries.”56 
The Bureau of Fisheries began a new project called the “stream improvement” in 1920 (figure 
18). It aimed to “improve” the environmental and ecological landscape of every river, stream, 
creek, and lake in the Bristol Bay district not for all wild animals but primarily for sockeye salmon. 
The perceived necessity to preserve and conserve the fish reconfigured the Fisheries Bureau 
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officials’ environmental and ecological worldview and renewed their understanding of the natural 
ecosystem of southwest Alaska. After 1919, sockeye salmon suddenly turned into an object of 
protection and preservation, and other animals, particularly trout, birds, and fur-bearing animals, 
immediately became “enemies of the salmon,” targets of removal and extermination.57 A short 
report made by the Alaska Territorial Fish Commission, for example, stated: “The constant and 
serious depletion of the salmon runs has been caused chiefly by intensive and careless fishing. But 
there is another important element which has taken a prominent part in the havoc. . . . When it is 
understood that the feeding and digestive process is constantly going on it can easily be imagined 
the great destruction to the salmon which is being caused by these fishes [predatory fish].”58 It is 
notable that this transformative approach to the wild environment and ecology of Bristol Bay 
contrasted with the approach of Anglo-American canners and local indigenous peoples, both of 
whom had accepted the natural ecosystem’s work as given and uncontrollable. The “stream 
improvement” project was a rejection of maintaining given biodiversity and biocomplexity and an 
initiative for promoting capitalistic ecologism centering on the protection and preservation of 
sockeye salmon at the sacrifice of other “undesirable” animals.  
 
57 “Report of Alaska Fish Commission,” Pacific Fisherman 19, no. 7 (1921): 17. 







Figure 18: Trap Used in Destruction of Predatory Fish in Bristol Bay, 1921. Ward T. Bower, 
“Alaska Fishery and Fur-Seal Industries in 1921” (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 
1922).  
 
   It is important to point out that this stream improvement project had existed even before 1920, 
though white fishermen, not officials of the Bureau of Fisheries, had customarily conducted it. 
White fishermen viewed salmon’s ecology from a holistic perspective and contended that the fish 
were part of an entire ecosystem and that natural agencies played a crucial role in determining the 
fish’s lifecycle. Indeed, Anglo-American fishermen blamed natural enemies of salmon, 
particularly bears, wolves, eagles, gulls, terns, mergansers, hair seals, trout, and sculpins, for 
diminishing catches of the fish in Alaska. They also hunted these wild animals in the name of 
protecting salmon.59 But what should be emphasized is that officials of the Bureau of Fisheries 
did not necessarily buy into this position of white fishermen and instead treated the Anglo-
American fishermen’s claim as rhetoric for underestimating the impacts of their fishing activities 
on salmon runs. Officers of the Bureau of Fisheries held that excessive salmon fisheries were a 
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chief problem and that the predators’ agency was still negligible compared to prevailing fishing 
activities. In fact, Ernest Lester Jones, Deputy Commissioner of Fisheries, investigated salmon 
fisheries in Alaska in 1914 and reported: 
These enemies [bears, wolves, eagles, gulls, terns, mergansers, hair seals, trout, and sculpins] 
undoubtedly destroy enormous numbers of salmon and their eggs. But this condition has 
gone on for years, and would continue without serious detriment to the supply if it were not 
for the added drain resulting from heavy fishing now carried on in Alaskan waters.60 
 
The year of 1919 was a turning point in salmon fisheries in the Bristol Bay district in that the 
federal government institutionalized the white fishermen’s custom of hunting predators of salmon, 
that officials of the Bureau of Fisheries paid more attention to the wild animals’ agency as an object 
of control and management, and that the Bureau of Fisheries established a collaborative 
relationship with Anglo-American canners to exterminate the enemies of salmon in Bristol Bay.61 
   During the season of 1920, the Bureau of Fisheries cooperated with Anglo-American cannery 
owners and the government of Alaska Territory to establish an organization for the destruction of 
predatory fish in the Bristol Bay region. Dennis Winn of the bureau’s fish cultural service headed 
the operation team and it consisted of J. W. Gardner, another fish culturist of the bureau, A. T. 
Looff of the College of Fisheries at the University of Washington, and Harry Savage, a “practical” 
fisherman. Winn assigned a district to each member and Gardner was responsible for Iliamna, 
Looff Naknek, and Savage Aleknagik. Each party investigated lakes and streams, observed the 
relationship between sockeye salmon and other animals, found dead young salmon in predatory 
fish’s stomachs, and exterminated as many “harmful” fish as possible.62 For example, about 
16,600 pounds of predatory fish, mostly lake trout, were destroyed in the Naknek district and from 
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35,000 to 40,000 pounds of trout in the Wood River section during the season of 1920.63 Anglo-
American canners and officials of the Bureau of Fisheries reconfigured their understanding of the 
natural ecosystem in the Bristol Bay region and tried to engineer the ecosystem based on the 
capitalistic necessity to help sockeye salmon’s survival and spawning. 
After his team’s work in Bristol Bay had ended, Winn suggested that this extermination 
operation should be continued and expanded in a consistent way. He reported: 
We are thoroughly convinced that the predatory fishes, together with the terms mentioned 
heretofore, constitute one of the most serious menaces facing the salmon industry. In small 
years, such as 1919 and 1920, they will practically eliminate the cycle runs by their 
depredations, first on the eggs on the spawning beds, next on the young fish in the first year 
or two spent in the lakes, and last, but not least, on the migrating fish descending to the 
ocean. The only hope of curtailing this loss is by waging a constant, aggressive and extensive 
campaign against these marauders.64 
 
Winn’s emphasis on a more “extensive” campaign meant to expand the target as well as the scale 
of extermination to not only all perceived predatory fish but also other non-fish wild animals, such 
as birds. This suggestion was founded on Winn’s ambitious, self-righteous, and triumphalist belief 
that ichthyologists should and could make the entire local ecosystem more friendly to sockeye 
salmon and it would efficiently advance the preservation of the fish. Winn wrote, “the number of 
trout destroyed would mean a saving of more yearling salmon than could be handled in any of our 
hatcheries during a season, not to mention the expense of feeding, etc., and this without taking into 
consideration the serious depredations of the terns.”65 Winn also highlighted the significance of 
keeping statistical data about sockeye salmon’s escapement and spawning grounds for the 
conservation purpose. He claimed: 
In the performance of this work a close tally can be kept on the escapement and spawning 
grounds, which is the only method by which the industry can be advised with any degree of 
assurance and safety. Our work of extermination this year will surely be of invaluable aid to 
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the future, and its continuance with an enlarged scope will show its value within the next 
cycle. We also feel at this time that it is one of the greatest hopes for the industrial future of 
the salmon industry.66 
 
   Although the stream improvement projects had devastating impacts on Bristol Bay natives, 
who relied on lake trout for their biological and socio-cultural subsistence, they were also complicit 
in this Anglo-American ecological imperialism.67 Because most lake trout were migratory and a 
continuous plan of destruction was necessary, the Bureau of Fisheries and the Territorial 
government of Alaska introduced the bounty system and institutionalized the extermination 
campaign. A reward of five cents was offered for every dolly varden, lake trout, or pike caught in 
the Bristol Bay district. In the 1930 season, about 251,000 predatory trout were destroyed and the 
bounty paid amounted to more than $12,500. It is noteworthy that many indigenous peoples in 
Bristol Bay participated in this extermination project and received most of the total bounty paid.68 
This suggests that indigenous peoples in the region tried to maintain their way of life by adapting 
themselves to the shifting local environmental and ecological landscape created by both 
uncontrollable non-human forces, such as weather patterns, and the American ichthyologists’ effort 
to impose their capitalistic, sockeye salmon-centered vision on the environment and ecology of 
the Bristol Bay region. 
For the Fisheries Bureau officials, predatory fish were not the only “enemies” of sockeye 
salmon to be eliminated. As Winn had suggested in his 1920 report, Bower wrote in 1923, “It is 
felt that the extermination of the predatory enemies of salmon is the most important work that can 
be accomplished toward salmon conservation and that the results much more than warrant the 
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expenditures made.”69 The field agents of the Bureau of Fisheries began destroying other animals 
in addition to lake trout. They sought to exterminate predatory birds with guns and were satisfied 
with the result. Bower happily reported: 
Experiments were made with small-caliber shotguns (36 gauge) in making war on terns. 
Excellent execution was possible from the stern of the boat, as there are usually several birds 
following in the wake of each boat, picking up small fish that are worked to the water’s edge 
by action of the propeller. The cost of the gun and ammunition is nominal, and the guns can 
be profitably utilized on all boats.”70 
 
In addition to terns, federal agents treated more gulls and ducks as “predatory enemies of salmon.” 
Bower wrote, “During September many ducks were killed for food, all of which had been feeding 
on salmon eggs. The mergansers take many salmon fingerlings. Large flocks of American golden 
eyes were seen feeding on salmon eggs in Anvil Bay.”71 
Besides predatory birds, ducks, and gulls, beaver fell into the category of the enemy of salmon 
in the ichthyologists’ ecological consciousness. What concerned field agents was the beaver’s habit 
of making a natural dam on a stream and they worried that the wild dam might obstruct the 
salmon’s ascent. The federal investigators did not try to coexist with beavers in southwest Alaska 
by adapting themselves to the local ecosystem’s working; instead, they encouraged hunting 
beavers for fur. Bower insisted in 1927, “It is believed that the opening of the beaver season in the 
spring will remove this menace to the ascent of salmon, but all streams where beaver are reported 
should be inspected each year.”72 Indeed, the agents aggressively destroyed beaver dams, which 
they believed would prevent sockeye salmon from passing upstream, when they encountered the 
natural obstruction.73  Since the field agents viewed beaver as a “menace” to advancing the 
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conservation of sockeye salmon, they also opposed farming the fur-bearing animal. Bower wrote, 
“A rumor was investigated that some local white men contemplated beaver farming, using salmon 
streams for the purpose. Those interested were advised that the idea should not be encouraged, as 
such operations will not be permitted.”74  
   While many wild animals in Bristol Bay were categorized as “enemies” of salmon to be 
annihilated, there emerged an “ally” of the fish and it was otter. Bower stated, “They [otter] feed, 
no doubt, on all kinds of fish, but from the many heads and bodies left at the scene of their kills it 
is known that they prefer trout . . . It is confidently believed that an otter will destroy more than 
1,000 trout each year. What this means in the way of young salmon saved is well known. The 
number of mature salmon that are killed by otter on the lakes is negligible.” Taking these otter’s 
habits into account, federal investigators called the animal “the best protectors” of salmon.75 
   Officials of the Bureau of Fisheries did not take the natural environmental landscape of the 
Bristol Bay region as given and uncontrollable. To promote sockeye salmon’s survival and 
preservation, the bureau’s agents transformed the environmental as well as ecological landscape 
of Bristol Bay to create favorable conditions in which more sockeye salmon would be able to 
ascend streams and reach spawning grounds. This was the other side of the “stream improvement” 
project. Constructing an artificial fishway for ascending sockeye salmon was most common in the 
campaign. For example, the field party led by Winn investigated Kidawik Creek (current Brooks 
River) in 1921 and found a natural dam obstructing the stream. According to Winn, the dam 
consisted of “a ledge of conglomerate rock extending across the entire stream, forming a 
perpendicular fall from 6 to 8 feet in height.” The problem for Winn was that the dam was 
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“practically impassable to ascending salmon, except in high-water periods.” To solve the problem, 
his party “blasted over the left edge of the falls, over which the fish can now pass without difficulty” 
(figure 19). The party members were convinced that “This opens about a mile and a half of ideal 
spawning ground in the creek and permits free passage to Toms Lake at its head, a wonderful body 
of water 15 miles long by 3 miles wide.”76 Field agents of the Bureau of Fisheries imposed their 
salmon-centered environmental vision on the Bristol Bay district, and redesigning streams for 
advancing the fish’s lifecycle with science and technology was necessary, ideal, and justifiable 
because it was considered as “improvement,” not “deterioration.” 
 
 
Figure 19: Kokhonak Falls, Bristol Bay Region, Where a Passage for Ascent of Salmon Was 
Blasted Out. Ward T. Bower, “Alaska Fishery and Fur-Seal Industries in 1921” (Washington, DC: 
Government Printing Office, 1922). 
 
   Field agents of the Bureau of Fisheries were not able to reform the environmental and 
ecological landscape of Bristol Bay as they preferred. Rather, it was a dynamic and negotiated 
product of human and non-human interactions. For example, rough weather patterns troubled the 
federal field agents by making their engineering efforts come to naught. A severe storm and the 
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following devastating flood in Kokhonak in the fall of 1923 washed out the fishway the field 
investigators had built two years earlier at Kokhonak falls. The flood also made many changes in 
Kokhonak River and its by-passes for a distance of about one mile. As a consequence, nearly all 
the sloughs were completely filled with gravel and severe losses of salmon eggs resulted from 
this.77  But, floods also helped federal agents “improve” streams by destroying beaver dams. 
Bower reported, “About 3 miles upstream [on Kokokotna Creek] a beaver dam was encountered, 
a section of which had been washed out by floods, making it possible for the salmon to ascend. . . . 
No signs of fresh beaver workings in the vicinity were observed, and it is believed the animals 
were all trapped during the spring and that no further trouble will occur here.”78 
   Despite the federal government’s efforts to reproduce more sockeye salmon in Bristol Bay, it 
did not promote hatcheries there because doing so was perceived technically impractical and 
economically unpopular. To be sure, field agents of the Bureau of Fisheries had felt “urgent need” 
to establish at least two hatcheries in Bristol Bay even before 1919 due to heavy production of 
sockeye salmon in the region.79 But cannery companies refused to construct hatcheries in Bristol 
Bay, insisting that doing so was technically impractical given severe climatic conditions in winter 
there.80 They added, “we would also be willing to undertake the establishment of a hatchery in 
the Bristol Bay district, provided we could devise a practical plan for artificial propagation.”81 
That said, canning companies, whether big or small, were unwilling to operate hatcheries in Bristol 
Bay and in other regions of Alaska, even if artificial propagation was technically practical, because 
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it would disproportionately cost. In fact, operating hatching plants necessitated not just finding 
suitable locations and building hatcheries there but also maintaining them by hiring fish-culture 
experts, who were not available widely, and procuring essential materials.82 Canning company 
officials doubted that hatcheries were a cost-effective operation and federal agents had to agree 
that destroying predatory trout and birds was economically more efficient.  
   In addition to natural obstructions and wild undesirable animals, pollution was another crucial 
problem in terms of conserving sockeye salmon in Bristol Bay. In 1938 the association of the 
Standard, Union, and Associated Oil Companies conducted experimental oil drilling operations at 
the headwaters of Salmon Creek, tributary to Becharof Lake of the Egegik River system. During 
the progress of drilling, the oil companies encountered saltwater, not crude petroleum, at a depth 
of 500 feet. To prevent the saltwater from leaking into and polluting Salmon Creek, the companies 
capped the well, built sump pools, cemented the well casing to a point below the water stratum to 
cut off further flow, and later gradually released the saltwater into the local stream at the period of 
high water run-off under the direction of the Bureau of Fisheries.83 It is notable that Fisheries 
Bureau officials were not necessarily concerned about pollution of water itself; rather, preventing 
harming sockeye salmon runs mattered most for them and they paid much less attention to the 
possibility of damaging other marine animals with wastes from oil wells. Fisheries Bureau officials 
were satisfied when the three oil companies installed more than a mile of six-inch pipe to carry 
any wastes from the well to a point of the Pacific side of the Alaska Peninsula in order to assure 
full protection to salmon populations in the event that further similar deposits should be 
encountered. Indeed, Bower wrote, “they [any wastes from the oil well] may be disposed of [in 
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the Pacific] without danger to salmon runs.”84 It is important to reiterate that the approach of 
Bureau of Fisheries to sockeye salmon fisheries in Bristol Bay after 1919 was founded on the 
bureau’s capitalistic, salmon-centered environmental and ecological worldview. 
 
Conclusion 
   The dramatic fall in sockeye salmon catches in whole Bristol Bay in 1919 brought three major 
changes to salmon fisheries in the district during the 1920s. First, the federal government 
strengthened legal restrictions for salmon fisheries in Bristol Bay to prevent overexploitation and 
exhaustion of sockeye salmon. The federal government also expanded human and financial 
resources to implement the new conservation measures, though they were not necessarily sufficient. 
Second, the Bureau of Fisheries initiated intensive scientific research in sockeye salmon’s ecology 
to make the new conservation policies more efficient and effective by founding them on the power 
of science. Ichthyologists of the bureau sought to reveal sockeye salmon’s migration patterns most 
and carried out tagging experiments in southwest Alaska during the 1920s. Third, Fisheries Bureau 
officials tried to create an environmental and ecological landscape friendly and favorable to 
sockeye salmon in the Bristol Bay region based on their reconfigured salmon-centered worldview 
of the environment and ecosystem. Categorizing local animals in a binary way into either enemies 
or allies of sockeye salmon according to their vision centering on the preservation of the fish, 
Fisheries Bureau agents destroyed as many enemies and protected as many allies as possible to 
efficiently and effectively preserve sockeye salmon in Bristol Bay. 
   After 1919 the federal government began building an ichthyological empire in Bristol Bay by 
promoting sustainable salmon fisheries, making salmon’s mysterious habits scientifically legible, 
 





and creating a salmon-centered environment and ecosystem with the expanded scientific 
knowledge about the fish. The project of preserving sockeye salmon was imperial in nature 
because the ultimate purpose was to perpetually and efficiently exploit the fish based on capitalistic 
calculations and also because the project was crucially supported by violence against the natural 
environment and ecosystem with scant attention paid to local indigenous peoples. Tightening legal 
regulations for salmon fisheries and strengthening the federal authority in southwest Alaska 
constituted one side of this ichthyological empire. More significantly, the efforts to make the 
sockeye salmon’s ecology scientifically visible and transform the environmental and ecological 
landscape with the help of newly acquired scientific information formed the other side of the 
ichthyological empire. 
   The ichthyological empire, founded on the perceived necessity and desire to comprehensively 
understand the sockeye salmon’s ecology and totally control the fish’s lifecycle, was still 
rudimentary and incomplete. This was because American ichthyologists as well as all other salmon 
experts in the world were wholly ignorant of salmon’s habits after their descent to the ocean. To 
complete an ichthyological empire in Bristol Bay, American ichthyologists needed to address this 
tough question and make the sockeye salmon’s ecology in the sea scientifically visible. The 
American ichthyologists did not have to wait long; instead, they were to tackle the difficult 
question soon when Japanese deep-sea fishermen appeared in Bristol Bay in the 1930s. The 
appearance of Japanese pelagic fishermen structurally transformed Bristol Bay into an inter-
imperial space, and the development of salmon fisheries in the bay became contingent crucially 







CHAPTER 4: THE MAKING OF A FORECASTING EMPIRE: 
JAPAN’S NORTHERN SEA (HOKUYŌ) FISHERIES AND SCIENTIFIC 




Figure 20: Northeast Asia and the Russian Far East. Available at 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Northeast_Asia#/media/File:Sea_of_Okhotsk_map_with_state_lab
els.png (accessed March 28, 2021). 
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fleet near Bristol Bay. The fishing fleet consisted of Taihoku-Maru, a factory ship of 7,834 tons 
and 500 feet long carrying a crew of 300 men, a three-masted sailing schooner, a trawler named 
Myōgi-Maru, and a number of power boats. The magazine article speculatively argued that 
Japanese pelagic fishing activities in Alaska would fail soon given bad weather and logistical 
difficulties. At the same time, however, the article stressed a grave concern about the possibility 
that Japanese expeditionary fishing operations with a factory ship might be able to freely intercept 
Bristol Bay salmon on the high seas of Alaska, resulting in massive profits for the Japanese fishers 
and depleted stocks for Alaskans. 1  This concern was a key to the formation of a U.S. 
ichthyological empire in Bristol Bay which advanced through excluding foreign pelagic fishermen, 
particularly Japanese ones. This chapter narrates how and why Japanese deep-sea fishermen 
appeared in Alaskan waters in the 1930s. 
   This chapter analyzes how Japan’s salmon fisheries in the northern sea (Hokuyō)—referring at 
the time mainly to the Sea of Okhotsk and the Bering Sea—developed during the interwar period. 
Historians have commonly described a “rise and fall” narrative of Japan’s salmon fisheries in the 
northern sea before the outbreak of the Pacific War in December 1941. The narrative explains that 
the Japanese salmon fisheries in the northern sea emerged following Japan’s victory against Russia 
in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05, prospered during and after the First World War by exporting 
canned salmon mostly to European markets, and finally declined after the mid-1930s primarily 
due to growing geopolitical and economic confrontation with the Soviet Union.2 
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   This “rise and fall” story of Japanese salmon fisheries in the northern sea before the Pacific 
War is problematic and oversimplified in two ways. First, the earlier scholarship has defined the 
northern sea as a static and fixed geographical space consisting of Russian territorial waters in the 
Sea of Okhotsk and the western Bering Sea. However, historians have recently revealed that the 
northern sea was spatially unstable and dynamic according to Japanese cultural conceptions of the 
waters and that Japanese northern sea fisheries had expansive characteristics in the 1930s.3 This 
chapter draws on this revised understanding of the northern sea. Second, historians have taken 
advantage of hindsight and neglected historical contingency seen in prewar Japanese salmon 
fisheries in the northern sea.4 Hindsight has allowed historians to know that Japanese pelagic 
fishermen did not operate salmon fisheries in Alaskan waters because of the outbreak of the Pacific 
War in December 1941. The work of removing this lens of hindsight from our eyes and seriously 
taking historical contingency into account is essential to accurately understand how prewar 
Japanese salmon fisheries developed in the northern sea. Also, acknowledging the expansion of 
prewar Japan’s salmon fisheries into Alaskan waters is crucial for a logical explanation of the 
formation of an American ichthyological empire in Bristol Bay. 
   This chapter also stresses roles played by oceanographers in expanding Japanese salmon 
fisheries in the northern sea by producing scientific knowledge about salmon and the ocean. 
Scholars have looked at various factors to narrate how Japanese salmon fisheries in the northern 
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sea emerged and prospered before the mid-1930s. Economic and business historians have looked 
at major fishing company managers, usually Seiroku Tsutsumi, a founder of the Nichiro Gyogyo 
Co. (Nichiro Gyogyō Kaisha), and highlighted their managerial entrepreneurship, their 
introduction of foreign capital, and their promotion of industrialization and mechanization in the 
canning process.5 Labor historians have turned the economic and business historians’ approach 
upside down and paid attention to seasonal workers rather than fishing company managers. Labor 
historians have revealed imperialistic characters inherent in prewar Japan’s salmon fisheries in the 
northern sea, claiming that exploitative labor contracts and harsh working conditions underlaid 
prosperous prewar Japanese salmon fisheries in the northern sea.6 Political and military historians 
have understood prewar Japan’s salmon fisheries in the northern sea as a state-led rather than 
private-led project and focused on institutional frameworks within which prewar Japan’s salmon 
fisheries operated in the northern sea. Political and military historians share the assumption with 
labor historians that Japan was an imperialistic fishing power in the northern sea before the Pacific 
War. They spotlight decisions about salmon fisheries in the northern sea made by elite figures, 
particularly politicians, diplomats, and military officers. They insist that the Japanese 
government’s financial subsidy, gunboat diplomacy, and armed interventions allowed Japan to 
become a dominant fishing power in the northern sea.7 Cultural and literary scholars likewise have 
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recently interpreted prewar Japan’s salmon fisheries in the northern sea as essentially imperialistic. 
But they have critiqued overemphasis on these structural analyses and highlighted the importance 
of cultural ideas and knowledge. They have contended that images and discourse founded on 
ethnocentric and exceptionalist beliefs advanced the expansion of Japanese salmon fisheries in the 
northern sea by offering ideological justification for the expansionist project.8 
Although these studies have approached the development of prewar Japan’s salmon fisheries 
in the northern sea from multiple perspectives, they have overlooked the importance of scientific 
knowledge for advancing salmon fisheries. This is because, as mentioned above, the earlier 
scholarship has viewed the northern sea as a geographically rigid and static space and analyzed 
Japanese salmon fisheries in Russian territorial waters within a framework of Russo-Japanese 
relations. Contrary to this conventional wisdom, I demonstrate that Japanese salmon fisheries in 
the northern sea experienced structural transformation after 1929 due to the invention of the factory 
ship. The pattern of Japanese salmon fisheries in the northern sea gradually shifted throughout the 
1930s from “passive” fisheries with set nets in Russian territorial waters to “active” fisheries with 
drifting nets and factory ships on offshore high seas of the Sea of Okhotsk and the Bering Sea. 
Moreover, although neglected by the previous studies, Japanese salmon fisheries operations 
extended into Alaskan waters after the mid-1930s, creating inter-imperial entanglements with 
American salmon fisheries in Bristol Bay. It is necessary to see the Sea of Okhotsk and the Bering 
Sea as a seamless spatial unit and consider the development of prewar Japan’s salmon fisheries in 
the northern sea within a trilateral framework of Russo-Japanese-American relations. The work of 
making the ocean and salmon’s habits scientifically visible became more important than ever in 
this structural transition of Japanese salmon fisheries in the northern sea in the 1930s. As Kjell D. 
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Ericson argues, “Japanese fisheries expansion was not simply a centrifugal scattering into the 
farthest seas. Instead, expansion became an ongoing problem of spatial knowledge, near and far 
from shore.”9 It is necessary to discuss the advancement of prewar Japan’s salmon fisheries in the 
northern sea in relation to oceanographers’ efforts to scientifically visualize the ocean and salmon’s 
ecology.10 
   Recovering the historical agency of oceanographers in promoting prewar Japanese salmon 
fisheries in the northern sea also offers a more nuanced comprehension of Russo-Japanese relations 
on the eve of the Pacific War. Earlier scholarship has described the relationship between Japan and 
the Soviet Union with emphasis on geopolitical and economic rivalries and confrontation during 
the interwar period.11 However, spotlighting oceanographers reveals an overlooked socio-political 
development in the northern sea before the Pacific War. Because of salmon’s cross-border mobility, 
Japanese and Russian oceanographers relied on each other in completing tagging experiments and 
 
9 Kjell David Ericson, “Water Before Fish: Japan’s Fundamental Fisheries Survey and the Currents of 
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31. Historians of Japanese northern sea fisheries have described economically conflictive aspects of 
Russo-Japanese relations during the interwar years. For works focusing on geopolitically confrontational 
characters of Russo-Japanese relations before the Second World War include, for example, Ariunsaikhan 
Mandakh, “Nomonhan Jiken Hassei Gen’in to ‘Kokkyōsen Fumeiron,’” Hitotsubashi Ronsō 135, no. 2 
(2006): 139-163; Kazuhisa Matsumoto, “Shoki Manso Kokkyō Funsō no Hassei to Tenkai (1935-1937): 
Kokkyō Iinkai Secchi Kōshō kara Buryoku Shori Shisō e,” Kyōkai Kenkyū 8 (2018): 33-53; Narmandakh 
Tumurbaatar, “Nomonhan Jiken (Haruhagawa Sensō) no Rekishiteki Kenkyū: Kyōdō Kenkyū no Keii,” 
Ritsumeikan Bungaku, no. 622 (July 2011): 40-54; Wakio Fujimoto, “Tōhoku Ajia ni okeru Nisso Kankei: 





established a relationship of vigilant mutual cooperation to try to systematically uncover salmon’s 
migration patterns in the 1930s. The development of Japanese salmon fisheries in the northern sea 
during the interwar years was a product of tension between disrupting and integrating forces 
represented by inter-imperial confrontation and collaboration between Japan and the Soviet Union 
over controlling salmon in the Sea of Okhotsk and the Bering Sea.12 
This chapter builds on William Tsutsui’s concept of “pelagic empire” and emphasizes the 
imperial structure of prewar Japanese salmon fisheries in the northern sea. This approach makes it 
possible to challenge a terrestrial and tropical bias seen in voluminous studies on the Japanese 
imperialism by focusing on the northern ocean, a less territorialized and bordered space.13 In fact, 
viewing Japanese northern sea fisheries through an imperial lens significantly reveals that Japan’s 
empire-building projects on the Asian Continent and in the northern sea structurally went hand in 
hand. According to Tsutsui, pelagic empire is “incremental,” or more straightforwardly 
expansionist, and seeks “domination and exploitation of offshore fisheries” primarily for getting 
foreign currency through exports.14 Contrary to Tsutsui, I do not view the pelagic empire as a 
monolithic and stable fisheries structure; rather, this chapter contends that the pelagic empire 
consisted of multilayered and dynamic fisheries structure of passive and active salmon fisheries. 
 
12 This study builds on recent scholarship that challenges a geopolitical and economic conflict-
centered approach to studying prewar Russo-Japanese relations. See, for example, Takeshi Tomita, 
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Peattie, eds., The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895-1945 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984); 
William. G. Beasley, Japanese Imperialism, 1894-1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987); Mark 
R. Peattie, Nan’yō: The Rise and Fall of the Japanese in Micronesia, 1885-1945 (Honolulu: University of 
Hawai’i Press, 1988); Louise Young, Japan’s Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime 
Imperialism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998); Jun Uchida, Brokers of Empire: Japanese 
Settler Colonialism in Korea, 1876-1945 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011). 
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This chapter examines how Japan developed the multilayered and dynamic pelagic empire in the 
northern sea during the interwar period not only by the factors the earlier scholarship has 
discussed—managerial entrepreneurship, capital investment, technological innovation, labor 
exploitation, gunboat diplomacy, armed interventions, and cultural knowledge production—but 
also, more crucially, by scientifically studying the ocean and salmon’s ecology. 
   I argue that Japanese oceanographers’ production of scientific knowledge about salmon’s 
habits, particularly the fish’s migration patterns, was critical to promoting Japan’s salmon fisheries 
in the northern sea during the interwar years because of the structural shift in salmon fisheries. 
Before the Pacific War, Japanese nationals engaged in salmon fisheries possessed very limited 
scientific information about the fish’s habits in the ocean. Japanese ichthyologists as well as their 
Euro-American counterparts had little idea where salmon lived and migrated in the North Pacific 
after descending to the ocean, how long they spent in the sea, what factors determined the timing 
and amounts of ascending salmon, and even whether the fish really returned to their natal river for 
spawning. The importance of addressing and solving these questions was marginal before 1929 as 
far as Japanese salmon fisheries were geographically restricted mainly to Russian territorial waters. 
Japanese fishermen on the Russian coast passively waited for migrating salmon with their nets set 
in the water, and the amount of salmon production was considerably a product of pure luck, or 
more generally uncertainty and unpredictability. But the invention and operation of factory ship 
offered the possibility to reduce the speculative character of salmon fishing by allowing Japanese 
fishermen to actively go offshore and search for traveling salmon to catch. Due to the introduction 
of factory ship, salmon’s migration routes meant possible fishing grounds for Japanese fishermen 
and those who knew salmon’s habits most comprehensively could have biggest and most secure 





offshore on the high seas en route to Russian coastal waters. Thus, a growing number of fishermen 
turned to active fisheries and went offshore to preempt swimming salmon. Scientific knowledge 
about salmon’s habits was essential to locating offshore salmon fishing grounds according to 
dynamic oceanic conditions, lessening the uncertainty and unpredictability of fisheries, and 
stabilizing and maximizing salmon catches without rough seasonal fluctuations. In short, the 
development of Japan’s salmon fisheries in the northern sea after 1929 relied greatly on the extent 
to which Japanese oceanographers could make salmon’s ecology scientifically legible and 
visualize the fish’s migration patterns. 
 
The Rise of Japan’s Passive Pelagic Empire in the Russian Far East, 1907-1929 
   Japanese modern industrial salmon fisheries in the northern sea commenced as a consequence 
of the depletion of the fish in Hokkaido. Salmon traditionally constituted a crucial way of 
subsistence for Ainu, indigenous peoples inhabiting the northern island. During the Edo period 
(1603–1867), however, Ainu participated in market economy and caught salmon to receive goods, 
such as rice, sake, tobacco, fabrics, and iron products, from Japanese warriors and merchants at 
trading stations. 15  As Ainu growingly depended on the Japanese-manufactured goods, they 
overfished salmon in Hokkaido during the Edo period.16 But that only Ainu extracted salmon until 
the Meiji Restoration of 1868 helped prevent the situation of total depletion of the fish in Hokkaido. 
In 1876, the Development Commission (Kaitakushi) dismantled the theretofore dominant contract-
fishery system, merchants’ monopolistic management of fishing grounds and trade with Ainu on 
behalf of high-ranking warriors, and opened fisheries in Hokkaido to any fisher who desired to 
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participate in order to fully “utilize” vast marine resources of the northern island.17 As a result, 
the fishing population steadily increased and marine resources in the northern island were 
exploited much more intensively.18 In addition, fishing became more efficient and labor-saving 
after 1885 when a growing number of fishermen switched from the conventional free-running trap 
(yukinariami) to the larger and more efficient square trap (kakuami). when fishermen fully 
exploited marine resources in Hokkaido, they turned to more distant fishing grounds and found 
promising locations for fisheries in the Russian Far East.19 
   Russian fisheries regimes were in the way of Japanese fishermen’s expansion into Russian 
waters. Creating a prosperous fishing industry in the Far East was an important issue for the 
Priamur governor-generalship, which was in charge of controlling the Russian Far East, to develop 
the region. The Priamur governor-generalship understood the merit of attracting Japanese 
fishermen because of Russia’s lack of fisheries knowledge and techniques, labor forces, and capital 
investment.20  In fact, despite local Russian businessmen’s objections, the Priamur governor-
generalship even encouraged the active involvement of Japanese fishers in Russian fisheries as far 
as the number of the Japanese fishermen was small.21 When the Japanese fishers rushed to the 
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Russian Far East in the late 1890s,22 however, the Priamur governor-generalship began imposing 
restrictions on foreign fishing to protect interests of local Russian businessmen. In 1899, the 
Priamur governor-generalship prohibited not only all foreign fishing operations but also the 
employment of foreign laborers engaged in all fishing activities in the Lower Amur region. The 
Priamur governor-generalship extended this fisheries regulation to the entire Russian Far East 
except southern Sakhalin in 1901.23 These fisheries regulations hit Japanese fishing operations 
hard in the Russian Far East, and Japanese seasonal workers engaged in fisheries on the Kamchatka 
Peninsula dropped from 1,468 in 1900 to 347 in 1901.24 To be sure, some Japanese fishers resisted 
these regulatory measures and continued fishing activities in the Russian Far East by paying and 
borrowing a permit from their Russian counterparts and even committing to poaching.25 Still, 
Russian protectionist fisheries regimes blocked the expansion of Japanese northern sea fisheries 
before the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. 
   Japan’s victory over Russia in the Russo-Japanese War in 1905 was a watershed moment in 
the history of prewar Japan’s salmon fisheries in the northern sea. The eleventh article of the Treaty 
of Portsmouth, which ended the inter-imperial warfare, obliged Russia to grant Japanese nationals 
fishing privileges in the Russian Far East.26 The following Russo-Japanese fisheries convention 
of 1907 allowed Japanese nationals without any discriminatory restrictions to lease fishing tracts 
from the Russian government, employ laborers, and catch and process any marine animal except 
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fur seals and sea otters off the Russian Pacific coast.27 The fisheries agreement also promised not 
to levy duties on fisheries products exported from Russia to Japan.28 Concluding the fisheries 
convention effectively nullified the Priamur Governor-General’s tough fisheries regulations, which 
had excluded Japanese nationals from Russian fishing grounds in the Far East.29 With the new 
legal framework for fisheries set, Japanese nationals could engage in fisheries in Russia’s territorial 
waters under the same conditions as Russian subjects in principle, and many Japanese fishers 
advanced into littoral waters off the Kamchatka Peninsula for exploiting abundant salmon after 
1907.  
   As pointed out above, fishing company managers’ managerial entrepreneurship, active 
introduction of foreign capital, technological innovation of canning processes, exploitation of 
migrant labor forces, and ethnocentric cultural ideas together contributed to the growth of Japanese 
salmon fisheries in the northern sea after the Russo-Japanese War. However, profound geopolitical 
transformation during the First World War and Japan’s imperialistic policies most effectively 
advanced Japanese salmon fisheries in the Far Eastern Russian territory. World War I brought an 
economic boom to Japan and accelerated demand for canned salmon in European markets.30 More 
significantly, the Russian Revolution of 1917 and following bloody civil wars led to massive 
destruction and confiscation of private property, including fishing gear and the contractual rights, 
of Russian capitalists, causing a drastic decline of Russia’s fishing industry.31 
The Japanese government took advantage of this chaotic situation, dispatched military forces 
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to the Far Eastern Russia, occupied the northern part of Sakhalin Island and the Amur delta region 
across Sakhalin in July 1920, and tried to lease the Russian territory for the next 99 years.32 The 
Japanese government had high stakes in advancing salmon fisheries in the northern sea because, 
as discussed below, the industry brought growing amounts of foreign currency indispensable for 
empire-building projects on the Asian Continent and also because the industry was closely related 
to Japan’s food and national security conditions. Japanese fishermen relied on the protection 
offered by Japanese warships, ignored the authority of local Russian governments, and engaged in 
fisheries in Russian waters without Russian competitors and Russian governmental interference in 
1921 and 1922. The Japanese fishermen self-righteously viewed themselves as “victims” of the 
chaotic situation in Russia by calling their fishing operations “self-defense fisheries” (Jiei 
Shutsuryō), insisted that they had legitimate rights to take necessary measures for catching salmon, 
and rhetorically justified their imperialistic resource extraction activities in the Russian territory.33 
As a result, the Japanese northern sea fisheries’ total output enormously increased from 60,000 
tons worth 6 million yen in 1915 to 100,000 tons worth 31 million yen in 1922.34 Japanese 
nationals continued dominating salmon fisheries in Russian waters by controlling almost 90 
percent of the Soviet Union’s salmon fishing grounds until 1928.35 
   Japanese government officials sought to advance northern sea fisheries for three reasons: 
foreign currency, food security, and national defense. The earlier scholarship has argued that 
developing northern sea fisheries mattered for the Japanese government because of foreign 
currency offered by exporting canned salmon and crabs to Britain and the United States, 
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respectively.36 Although neglected by the previous accounts, promoting northern sea fisheries had 
enormous implications for Japan’s food security and national security questions too. Japanese 
leaders and the pubic became concerned about the possibility of overpopulation and food shortages 
after the First World War.37 These Malthusian worries were because of inflation of rice prices and 
following rice riots in 1918, perceived incapacity to produce more rice in Japan, and the passage 
of the Johnson-Reed Act of 1924, which prohibited Japanese emigration to the United States.38 
Addressing the Malthusian concerns was critically important for Japanese government officials in 
the context of building a vibrant Japanese empire. Sukezo Ujihara, a physician and technician of 
the Home Ministry, for example, stressed a historical correlation between demographic 
fluctuations and the rise and fall of civilizations, arguing that growing population was essential to 
civilizational prosperity and that demographic decrement often accompanied civilizational 
declines.39 The Japanese government established a committee for investigating demographic and 
nutritional questions in July 1927. In a report completed the following year, the committee 
suggested that Japan should expand the output of marine products and solve food scarcity problems 
by maintaining Japanese nationals’ fishing rights in the Russian Far East and “wholly” conducting 
a fundamental research in oceanic fisheries as the “urgent need of the moment.”40 The Japanese 
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government accepted the committee’s recommendations about developing offshore fisheries as 
“vital” in October 1928.41 The Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, which was responsible for 
addressing fisheries problems, started a consistent fundamental research program on the habits of 
salmon in the northern sea in 1929.42  
   Advancing Japanese northern sea fisheries also mattered for Japanese government officials, 
particularly naval officers, to improve Japan’s national defense against the United States. The 
Japanese navy had designated the United States as its chief hypothetical enemy since the high 
command formulated and sanctioned the Imperial National Defense Policy in 1907, two years after 
Japan had defeated Russia.43 Among leading advocates of the connections between northern sea 
fisheries and national defense was Rear Admiral Tamisaburo Miyaji. He assumed that Japan’s 
future would be in the ocean (maritime empire), not on the Asian Continent (terrestrial empire), 
and focused on the Pacific Ocean. Miyaji viewed the Pacific as a “God-given reserve depository” 
(Tenyo no Yobiko) and concurred that developing fisheries in the ocean would bring more foreign 
currency to Japan and solve questions of overpopulation and food shortages.44 At the same time, 
Miyaji also believed that fisheries facilities and equipment were useful in a military conflict against, 
most likely, the United States.45 Further, he looked at the ocean as possible future oil fields. Given 
that it was generally accepted that oil reserves in the world would be depleted within next several 
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decades, Miyaji argued, fish oil should and could become main alternative petroleum in the 
future.46 This was not necessarily an empty dream story. Indeed, by the mid-1920s, Japanese 
authoritative biochemists, such as Kyuhei Kobayashi of Waseda University, Kensuke Kobayashi 
of the Imperial University of Tokyo, and Kokichi Oshima of Hokkaido Imperial University, had 
been committed to producing artificial petroleum from fish oil and acid clay, from fish oil and 
cokes, and from fish oil and peat, respectively.47 The strategic significance of producing artificial 
petroleum enormously increased in the late 1930s, particularly following the outbreak of the 
Second Sino-Japanese War in July 1937, to the extent that the Japanese government subsidized 
artificial petroleum production projects in pursuit of achieving an autarkic economic system.48 
Miyaji believed that, since Japan-U.S. confrontation over marine resources and national defense 
in the Pacific would be “inevitable,”49 advancing Japan’s northern sea fisheries in a timely manner 
was essential for the Japanese empire’s future welfare.50 
   In the early 1920s Japan secured dominant access to salmon and established a passive pelagic 
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empire in the Russian Far East.51 Since the Japanese passive pelagic empire was a product of the 
post-revolutionary socio-political chaos in Russia, it was essentially unstable. The Soviets rolled 
back Japanese fisheries after the mid-1920s when the Soviet Union established its authority in the 
Far East and overcame its domestic chaos. The Soviets’ attitude toward Japanese northern sea 
fisheries reflected two factors: the belief that Japanese fishermen in the Russian Far East were the 
northern vanguard of the Japanese empire; and the intention to establish an autarkic and centrally 
planned economy free from foreign capitalist influences.52 In order to oust Japanese nationals and 
their capital from their waters, Soviet leaders sought to make their fisheries more efficient and 
competitive vis-à-vis the Japanese. Soviet fisheries officials consolidated fisheries into large, state-
run fishing firms, considerably increased state investments in the fishing industry, and expanded 
labor forces and industrialized plant facilities for fisheries.53  To make Japanese northern sea 
fisheries less competitive, moreover, Moscow intentionally altered the terms by which Japanese 
fishing company managers could lease fishing tracts in auctions by manipulating the yen-ruble 
exchange rate and making Japanese nationals pay far more than before to lease Russian fishing 
plots.54 Further, Soviet authorities forcibly sabotaged Japanese fishermen’s activities in leased 
Russian fishing tracts. According to official reports of a Japanese government’s patrol boat, for 
instance, the Soviet authorities frequently accused Japanese lessees of having operated outside 
leased fishing plots and seized their catches, gear, and boats. Then the Soviets demanded that the 
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Japanese lessees pay a large sum of money as a fine to recover the confiscated materials. If the 
accused Japanese fishermen rejected the demand, the Soviet authorities sold the seized items to 
Russians by auction.55 Fisheries in Russian territory had strong speculative characters because of 
unpredictable fluctuating catches and uncontrollable Soviet intervention, and this made it difficult 
for Japanese fishing companies to continue investing in the enterprise. As a consequence, Russians 
occupied only 14 percent of auctioned fishing tracts in 1927 but the Russian ratio increased almost 
to 50 percent in 1930.56 This showed that Russian state-controlled firms led by Tsentrosoyuz (All-
Union Central Union of Consumer Cooperative Societies) seriously challenged the supremacy of 
Japan’s passive pelagic empire in the Russian Far East by the end of the 1920s with the 
mobilization of Soviet authorities’ various violent measures. 
 
Inventing Factory Ships and Changing Structure of Japanese Northern Sea Fisheries, 1929-
1935 
 
Japanese fishing industry leaders reacted to the increasingly disadvantageous situation in 
Russian territorial waters through corporate mergers and acquisitions with welcome assistance of 
the Japanese government’s political pressure. They absorbed small- and medium-sized Japanese 
fishing companies to lessen competitions between Japanese fishing companies and compete with 
Russian counterparts more effectively. Nichiro Gyogyo Co. (Nichiro Gyogyō Kaisha), led by 
Seiroku Tsutsumi, was at the center of this process. In October 1924, Nichiro Gyogyo Co. acquired 
Hokuyo Gyogyo Co. Ltd (Hokuyō Gyogyō Kabushiki Kaisha), a major rival financially supported 
by Mitsubishi Corporation (Mitsubishi Shōji). Consequently, Nichiro Gyogyo Co. almost 
monopolized Japanese salmon fisheries in the Russian territory, producing 74 percent of total 
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sockeye salmon production and 89 percent of entire canned salmon products.57 To completely 
exclude competition among Japanese nationals engaged in salmon fisheries in the Russian Far East, 
moreover, Nichiro Gyogyo Co. absorbed Hokuyo Godo Gyogyo Co. (Hokuyō Gōdō Gyogyō 
Kaisha), a collection of small- and medium-sized fishing companies and independent fishermen, 
in August 1932. Nichiro Gyogyo Co. finally emerged as a literally monopolistic enterprise in 
Japan’s northern sea fisheries.58  
   Small- and medium-sized Japanese fishing companies that had sold their privilege to lease 
fishing tracts and catch salmon in the Russian territory to Nichiro Gyogyo Co. turned to catching 
salmon just outside the Russian territory. This was institutionally possible because of the Law of 
the Sea and technologically practicable due to the invention of the factory ship. Since the 
international society did not codify the Law of the Sea until well after the Second World War, 
prevailing legal discourse about oceanic sovereignty functioned as the customary Law of the Sea 
before the war.59 Leading maritime powers, represented by Great Britain, the United States, and 
Japan, sought to restrict each country’s maritime sovereign space as much as possible to legally 
maximize the space of extraterritorial waters where they were more competent than other countries 
to dominate access to marine resources. Thus, great maritime powers’ position was that each 
country’s oceanic sovereignty reached up to only three miles from its shore.60 Indeed, since the 
imperial powers with the biggest naval fleets supported the idea of three-mile territorial waters, 
this principle was powerful legal discourse about oceanic sovereignty in the pre-World War II 
world. In contrast, other countries with smaller naval forces and underdeveloped fishing industries, 
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such as Spain, Portugal, Chile, and the Soviet Union, insisted that each country’s oceanic sovereign 
space should cover more than three miles, twelve miles in the case of the Soviet Union, from its 
coast to improve the coastal defense and enclose maritime resources.61 Thus, Russian waters were 
oceanic legal borderlands contested between Japan and the Soviet Union over jurisdiction over 
marine animals and the humans who pursued them. But the prevailing legal principle of three-mile 
territorial waters institutionally enabled the small- and medium-sized Japanese fishing companies 
to continue salmon fisheries just outside the Soviet’s territorial waters without paying increasing 
fishing tract leasing fees to the Soviet authorities. The legal principle of three-mile territorial 
waters also theoretically made it possible for Japanese nationals to operate salmon fisheries in 
Russian extraterritorial waters without experiencing violent Soviet intervention represented by 
seizing and confiscating their fishing gear and catches.62 In short, offshore salmon fisheries with 
factory ships in Russian extraterritorial waters reduced speculative risks and were safer financial 
investments for small- and medium-sized fishing company managers in Japan. 
Offshore salmon fisheries became technically possible with the innovation of factory ships and 
financially practical with improvements of fishing equipment after a series of experiments in the 
sea. The research vessel Kintei-Maru belonging to the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry 
conducted experiments of offshore salmon fisheries with drifting nets in waters off western 
Kamchatka and got good results in 1926.63 In addition to drifting nets, offshore salmon fisheries 
employed some small motorboats called Kawasakibune for extracting the fish and a gigantic 
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factory ship that processed and canned the catches on the sea. Offshore fisheries could theoretically 
become a very efficient way of fishing if fishermen were capable of forecasting and locating 
salmon’s migration routes on high seas by making the relationship between the fish’s habits and 
oceanic conditions scientifically legible. For example, Satoru Watanuki, a fishing company 
manager and pioneer of offshore salmon fisheries, wrote that the fishing season in coastal fisheries 
was heavily subject to the timing of fish’s migration to the shore and that the timing was 
conditioned by factors fishermen were unable to control, such as weather patterns and oceanic 
geography.64 Watanuki also said that, contrary to coastal fisheries, offshore fisheries would allow 
fishermen to engage in fishing operations for a longer season and produce more fish. Watanuki 
argued, “it is most significant to know fish’s migration conditions and habits” for offshore fisheries 




Figure 21: A Salmon Factory Ship Named Shimbu-Maru. Available at http://yagishoten-
honten.jp/yagishoten/kiroku.html (accessed February 15, 2021). 
 
 






Japanese offshore salmon fisheries in the Russian Far East showed a dramatic growth 
throughout the first half of the 1930s. This meant that the structural center of Japanese salmon 
fisheries in the northern sea was shifting from passive fisheries in Russian territorial waters to 
active fisheries on high seas outside the Russian territory. Six salmon factory ships (totaling 12,517 
tons) operated and produced 0.7 million salmon (1.1 million tons) worth more than 500,000 yen 
in 1930. The number of operating salmon factory ships almost tripled to 16 (totaling 32,655 tons) 
and they caught 8.9 million salmon (16.1 million tons) worth about 10.2 million yen in 1934.66 
Meanwhile, Japanese catches of salmon in Russian territorial waters fluctuated widely, from 74.7 
million in 1930 to 31.2 million in 1931, 70.7 million in 1932, 36.9 million in 1933, 101 million in 
1934, and 71.8 million in 1935.67 These statistical data about salmon catches demonstrates that 
the Russian territory fisheries produced over ten times more salmon than offshore fisheries in 1934. 
This means that the offshore salmon fisheries production constituted less than 10 percent of what 
the Russian territory fisheries produced that year. But focusing on the statistical data about the 
production of sockeye salmon, which Japanese fishermen pursued most as a pricey commodity, 
shows that offshore fisheries were far more developed and threatening to the Russian territory 
fisheries than they seemed. Offshore fisheries caught 0.3 million sockeye salmon (0.6 million tons) 
in 1930 and the catches of the fish dramatically increased to 4.9 million (9.2 million tons) in 1934. 
Meanwhile, the Russian territory fisheries produced 8.0 million sockeye salmon (15.1 million tons) 
in 1930, 6.2 million sockeye salmon (11.7 million tons) in 1931, 6.2 million sockeye salmon (11.5 
million tons) in 1932, 4.3 million sockeye salmon (8.1 million tons) in 1933, 8.4 million sockeye 
salmon (15.8 million tons) in 1934, and 3.4 million sockeye salmon (6.4 million tons) in 1935. 
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This means that offshore fisheries caught more than half of sockeye salmon produced by the 
Russian territory fisheries. Moreover, although the entire salmon production of the Russian 
territory fisheries was not that low in 1935, the sockeye salmon production of the Russian territory 
fisheries hit a record low that year. 
In the face of rising offshore salmon fisheries, Nichiro Gyogyo Co., which had monopolized 
Japanese northern sea fisheries, complained that emerging offshore fisheries would lead to 
overexploitation of salmon in the Russian Far East because offshore fisheries caught the fish just 
outside Russian territorial waters, most commonly waters between three to twelve miles away from 
the Russian coast, theoretically without any political and legal restriction. Tsunejiro Hiratsuka, 
managing director of Nichiro Gyogyo Co., insisted that such laissez-faire offshore salmon fisheries 
outside Russian territorial waters must not be tolerated, and he demanded that the Japanese 
government should make an intervention to limit the scale of offshore fisheries to conserve 
salmon.68 Nichiro Gyogyo Co. successfully used this conservation rhetoric to prevent excessive 
competition with less wealthy offshore fishing companies. Meanwhile, offshore fisheries 
companies argued against Nichiro Gyogyo Co., saying that fur-bearing sea mammals, especially 
fur seals, were far more responsible for the decline of salmon in the Sea of Okhotsk and the Bering 
Sea. They claimed that fur-bearing marine animals consumed almost 70 million salmon, including 
10 million sockeye salmon, according to a marine scientist, and that offshore fisheries’ production 
of 9 million salmon was not a serious problem. Thus, offshore fisheries companies insisted that 
the Japanese government, which had participated in the conservation regime protecting fur seals 
in the North Pacific since 1911, should be blamed for the concern over depletion of salmon in the 
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Sea of Okhotsk and the Bering Sea.69 The conflictive discourse about marine ecology in the 
northern sea clearly reflected class politics between monopolistic Nichiro Gyogyo Co. and smaller 
offshore fishing companies over access to salmon. The Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry 
understood the necessity to reduce competition among Japanese fishing companies in order to 
counter the rise and rollback of Russian fisheries, maintain Japan’s fishing interests, control 
catches and keep prices of canned salmon high, and maximize fisheries production in a sustainable 
manner. Thus, the ministry took sides with Nichiro Gyogyo Co. and decided to promote the 
consolidation of offshore fisheries companies in December 1934. As a result, Nichiro Gyogyo Co. 
absorbed all of the offshore fishing firms in February 1935, and small- and mid-sized fishing 
companies lost salmon fishing grounds both in Russian territorial waters and on high seas just 
outside them.70 
 
Fisheries Oceanography and Japan’s Active Pelagic Empire in the North, 1935-1941 
   It is notable that historians have generally agreed that the history of prewar Japanese northern 
sea fisheries ended when Nichiro Gyogyo Co. completed its monopolization of coastal and 
offshore salmon fisheries in February 1935. It is also common that their narratives chronologically 
jump from February 1935 to September 1945, when Japan lost the Asia-Pacific War and the U.S. 
occupation of Japan started, totally skipping the decade from 1935 to 1945.71 But the decade was 
not a historical vacuum for Japanese salmon fisheries in the northern sea. Looking at what 
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happened to Japanese salmon fisheries in the northern sea after the mid-1930s is a key to 
understanding why American salmon fisheries in Bristol Bay and Japanese salmon fisheries in the 
northern sea developed as they actually did after the Second World War. 
   The year 1935 was a monumental moment in the history of prewar Japan’s northern sea 
fisheries in three ways. First, as already discussed, Nichiro Gyogyo Co. completed the 
monopolization of salmon fisheries by excluding less wealthy fishing companies from salmon 
fishing grounds inside and outside Russian territorial waters. Second, as a consequence, the ousted 
small- and mid-sized fishing companies began demanding that the Japanese government should 
allow them to go to Alaskan waters and catch salmon there. 72  Lastly, but not least, as the 
significance of promoting active fisheries with drifting nets and factory ships on the high seas 
increased and the necessity to operate salmon fisheries in Alaskan waters grew, so did the 
importance of oceanographers’ study of oceanic conditions and salmon’s habits in the northern sea. 
This was because the advent of the factory ship offered greater mobility to fishermen, transformed 
salmon’s migration routes into possible fishing grounds, and access to salmon became dependent 
on to what extent fishermen could make the fish’s habits scientifically legible and forecast 
promising salmon fishing grounds. Significantly, post-1935 Japanese northern sea fisheries 
consisted not just of exploring new promising salmon fishing grounds but also of understanding 
the relationship between oceanic conditions and salmon’s habits. These two wheels drove the post-
1935 Japanese northern sea fisheries, which were active, dynamic, and science-oriented in nature. 
   That said, researching in the northern sea and salmon’s habits was not necessarily 
unprecedented before 1935. Research vessels belonging to the Imperial Fisheries Experimental 
Station (Suisan Shikenjō) of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry at Tokyo had regularly, but 
 





not intensively, investigated the northern sea and salmon’s habits to find promising fishing grounds 
and increase fisheries production since 1929. Moreover, the survey of the northern sea and 
salmon’s habits was not necessarily an independent project; rather, a governmental research team 
led by Michitaka Uda, a leading oceanographer of the Imperial Fisheries Experimental Station, 
carried out an ambitious survey of oceanic conditions and major fish’s distribution in the North 
Pacific within 1,000 miles from the Japanese mainland in 1933 (figure 22).73 Thus, the importance 
of applying science to entire fisheries rapidly grew after 1929, which meant that researching 
salmon in the northern sea was a reflection and product of this trend, not an exceptional case. 
Moreover, fisheries experimental stations in Hokkaido, particularly the one at Chitose, had studied 
salmon ascending their natal river to improve salmon farming. What was unprecedented in 1935 
was the intensity of oceanographers’ efforts to make salmon’s habits in the ocean, especially the 
fish’s migration patterns, scientifically visible. 
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Figure 22: Oceanographical Stations and Sectional Lines. Michitaka Uda, “Shōwa Hachinen Seika 
ni okeru Kitataiheiyō no Kaikyō,” Suisan Shikenjō Hōkoku 6 (1930): 4. 
 
   Salmon were biologically mysterious fish in prewar Japan. Although researchers at fisheries 
experimental stations in Hokkaido and the Tohoku region, in the northern part of Japan, carried 
out tagging experiments to track and reveal salmon’s migration routes, they could only know where 
salmon spawned and how long it took for them to travel from the place of release to the location 
of recapture.74 Thus, it was almost impossible for the scientists to tell which routes tagged salmon 
travelled in the ocean. In his essay of 1930, Yoshio Handa, researcher at a fisheries experimental 
station at Chitose, straightforwardly admitted, “salmon’s habitats [in the ocean] are a still 
 





mystery.”75 In addition, Handa also treated the “homing” theory, according to which salmon return 
to their natal river for spawning, as a questionable hypothesis. He cited results of the tagging 
experiments in which some salmon returned not to their natal river but to other rivers even across 
a national boundary. Handa concluded that it was too early to say that salmon returned to their 
natal river for spawning.76 
   When Japanese oceanographers of the Imperial Fisheries Experimental Station began an 
intensive study of the relationship between salmon’s habits and oceanic conditions in 1935, they 
followed Tasaku Kitahara’s method. Indeed, Uda called Kitahara a “great pioneer” of Japan’s 
modern oceanic survey and stated that Kitahara had played a central role in it.77 Kitahara inherited 
his scientific approach to fisheries from his predecessors, particularly Kakichi Mitsukuri, 
Kitahara’s advisor at the Imperial University of Tokyo. Mitsukuri received two Ph.D. degrees in 
zoology from Yale University in 1879 and Johns Hopkins University in 1883. He was one of early 
Japanese students who possessed “affectionate feelings” to the United States and its education and 
appreciated the patriarchal relationship between the United States as an “elder brother” and Japan 
as a “younger sister.”78 Mitsukuri saw the rise of progressive reform movements in the United 
States and became convinced that civilization needed a resource extraction method founded on a 
“rational basis.”79 Mitsukuri introduced the thought into Japanese fisheries and stressed in 1892 
that Japanese fisheries must leave the “savage age,” as Europe and the United States had done, by 
promoting oceanographic research with the help of “science” (gakujyutsu).80 Like Mitsukuri, 
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Kitahara tried to model Japanese fisheries after Euro-American ones. Kitahara praised Euro-
American efforts to make the ocean scientifically legible, especially the establishment of the 
International Council for the Exploration of the Sea in Europe in 1902, and insisted that Japan 
should pursue an oceanographic research project more actively to catch up with Euro-American 
powers in the field of marine science.81 For Kitahara as well as Mitsukuri, the mobilization of 
oceanographic knowledge for efficiently advancing fisheries should be the foundation of future 
Japanese fisheries. 
Kitahara’s point was to found Japanese fisheries on a “rational basis” that would minimize the 
subjectivity of and maximize the objectivity of fishing practices. Kitahara repeatedly claimed that 
Japanese fisheries must rely on science, more specifically objective data collected from 
comprehensive studies on oceanic conditions and marine fish’s habits. To be sure, Kitahara praised 
Japanese fishermen as keen observers of the ocean who had accumulated and inherited valuable 
experimental knowledge about the sea and fish. But Kitahara complained that Japanese fishermen 
had not made serious efforts to tame the ocean and fish. Kitahara wrote: 
Many fishermen usually go to same fishing grounds every day every year. If they encounter 
fish schools, they catch them. If they do not, they go back to the port with poor catches. They 
do not study why fish schools were there and, instead, they insist that the fish were there 
because of oceanic currents. Fishermen also do not try to find new fishing grounds. They 
would only follow their colleagues who have adventurously and blindly looked for fish 
schools and accidentally achieved good catches.82 
 
Contrary to Japanese fishermen, who believed that their catches were a product of pure luck and 
accepted speculative characters of fisheries due to the agency of the ocean and fish, Kitahara was 
convinced that fishermen could and should tame the ocean and fish with scientific knowledge, 
forecast the location of promising fishing grounds, and stabilize their fluctuating catches. He 
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hypothesized that oceanic conditions—currents, winds, temperature, salinity, transparency, and 
plankton—had a close relationship with fish’s habits and argued that the key to forecasting 
lucrative fishing grounds was to make the ocean and fish scientifically legible.83 Kitahara insisted, 
“if we investigate how this different [salt]water is distributed and how the [salt]water works and 
changes and if we also study each important fish’s migration patterns, I believe that we will first 
be able to explore fishing grounds.”84  
   For Kitahara, the significance of a comprehensive and intensive investigation of the ocean and 
fish was not exclusively limited to developing offshore fisheries. Rather, Kitahara believed that 
holistic scientific information about the ocean and fish was useful for and even essential to 
achieving sustainable fisheries. Indeed, Kitahara’s emphasis on the necessity of developing 
offshore fisheries by studying the ocean and fish originally emerged from his perceived concern 
about overdevelopment of coastal fisheries and overexploitation of fish near the shore. In the 
Fourth International Fishery Congress of 1908 at Washington, Kitahara said, “the comparatively 
narrow shore fishing grounds [in Japan] . . . are so actively fished over that the important shore 
fishes have been greatly decreased. I believe the shore fisheries of Japan are in the climax of 
development, and there seems to be very little room for further increase. The only hope for future 
progress rests upon the growth of the pelagic fisheries on the deep high seas.” 85  In short, 
conserving fish in coastal waters and encouraging offshore fisheries were two sides of the same 
coin for Kitahara, and this was why he paired the following two questions to be addressed seriously 
and simultaneously: “How to repopulate the depleted shore fishing grounds” and “How to 
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encourage the pelagic fisheries in general.”86 
Uda and other Japanese leading oceanographers of fisheries experimental stations shared 
Kitahara’s teachings in studying the relationship between oceanic conditions and salmon’s habits 
in the 1930s. As mentioned earlier, the sockeye salmon production by Japanese in the Russian 
territory hit a record low in 1935 and there had already been a perceived worry about 
overexploitation in 1934. Uda conducted research in the Sea of Okhotsk and the western Bering 
Sea in summer 1935 and regarded the record low catches of sockeye salmon as “anomaly.” He 
assumed that oceanic conditions played a key role in determining behaviors of marine fish and 
analyzed oceanic currents of the Okhotsk Sea and the Bering Sea. Based on his survey results, Uda 
concluded that stronger cold oceanic currents prevailed near the Kamchatka Peninsula and that the 
cold currents delayed sockeye salmon’s migration to the peninsula and shortened the period during 
which the fish stayed in Kamchatkan waters. However, Uda paid close attention to the fact that the 
poor catches of sockeye salmon happened in wider waters in the Sea of Okhotsk and the western 
Bering Sea, and argued that human agency exercised through excessive fishing activities played a 
leading part in causing the record low catches of sockeye salmon in 1935.87 The significance of 
this oceanic survey was that Uda scientifically confirmed that Japan’s salmon fisheries in the 
northern sea developed too much and that they needed to be regulated to avoid depleting salmon, 
as monopolistic Nichiro Gyogyo Co. had desired. 
Uda made five major suggestions to address the perceived overexploitation of salmon without 
hindering the advance of Japan’s northern sea fisheries. First, oceanographers should analyze 
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salmon catches according to the fish’s age based on the body length, determine the age of abundant 
salmon, and forecast the probable amount of salmon catches next year with natural fluctuations 
taken into account. Second, oceanographers should clarify salmon’s migration patterns by 
intensively carrying out tagging experiments and conducting other biological studies, including 
the investigation of stuff contained in salmon’s stomachs. Third, to know natural, or non-human, 
factors that would impact salmon catches and their migration routes, oceanographers should survey 
dynamic oceanic conditions—particularly temperature, salinity, currents, and plankton. For this 
purpose, Uda suggested oceanographers should rely on fishermen and request them to check at 
least everyday oceanic temperature and report the data, which had not been available, to the 
Imperial Fisheries Experimental Station at Tokyo. Fourth, some measure must be taken to restrict 
human-triggered causes of fluctuating salmon catches and to promote active propagation and 
protection of salmon, such as hatching and releasing. Fifth, to know the impacts fishing operations 
had on salmon reserves, researchers should examine the efficiency of nets, the intensity of fisheries, 
and the density of fish schools.88  
It is erroneous and simplistic to label Uda as a mere conservationist marine scientist; it is more 
precise to view him an advocate of efficient maximum sustainable yield (MSY).89 To be sure, Uda 
emphasized the importance of conserving marine fish, insisting, “we need to take special 
protection measures not to deplete fish stock, especially the one vulnerable to destruction.”90 
However, conservation and fisheries development were not necessarily mutually exclusive for Uda 
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like Kitahara. Instead, Uda tried to promote a situation in which the two efforts could coexist and 
advance as peacefully as possible with scientific methods. Indeed, Uda wrote that by studying the 
ocean and fish’s habits “could we first achieve the grand goal of protecting marine resources and 
making the profits of fisheries eternal.”91 Uda’s position was not wholly unique or exceptional 
given that he inherited Kitahara’s intellectual genealogy and that the concept of MSY was 
formulated in the 1930s when mathematical models were introduced in population ecology.92 But 
what made Uda as well as Kitahara different from other Euro-American MSY advocates was that 
the Japanese oceanographers cared not only about the maximum quantity of marine fish fishermen 
could extract but also, more significantly, about the efficiency to do so. As Uda frequently asked 
“why fish are caught in some place and not in other places” and “why many fish are caught in 
some year and not in other years,” he, like Kitahara, was most interested in trying to stabilize 
roughly fluctuating catches and remove speculative characters of fisheries.93 Uda believed that 
the scientific approach was the “only key” to answering such questions about unpredictable and 
uncertain catches.94  In short, for Japanese oceanographers led by Uda, the utility of making 
oceanic conditions and fish’s habits scientifically visible was not necessarily restricted to 
preserving fish stocks; rather, the work was crucial for developing fisheries in a sustainable and 
efficient manner. 
Other Japanese marine scientists advanced their understanding of Pacific salmon during the 
interwar years. For example, like Uda, Rokuji Sato, a notable researcher of the Imperial Fisheries 
Institute, was interested in revealing MSY of salmon stocks. He used sockeye salmon tagging 
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experiments of 1936 and calculated the fish’s stocks based on the ratio of released and caught 
salmon. His calculation suggested that sockeye salmon stock should be around 94 million in the 
Sea of Okhotsk and the western Bering Sea combined.95 Moreover, Sato drew on Harlan B. 
Holmes’s classic study on MSY, which had revealed that humans could catch up to 50 percent of 
ascending salmon for sustainable fisheries. Following Holmes’s theory, Sato calculated that 
fishermen could catch up to around 47 million sockeye salmon for sustainable fisheries in the 
northern sea. Since Japanese caught only 12.3 million sockeye salmon and Soviets 3.7 million (as 
many as 30 percent of Japan’s) sockeye salmon, Sato suggested, fishermen in Japan and the Soviet 
Union could catch 31 million more sockeye salmon in the Sea of Okhotsk and the western Bering 
Sea.96 Although Sato admitted that this hypothesis was based on a rough assumption on the 
sockeye salmon stock, his findings meant that, contrary to Uda’s conclusion about his 1935 oceanic 
research, fishermen had not yet depleted sockeye salmon in the Sea of Okhotsk and the western 
Bering Sea and that fluctuating catches of sockeye salmon were a result of changes in oceanic 
conditions rather than fishermen’s overexploitation of the fish.97  
   Moreover, Sato was also interested in answering the question of to what degree Japanese 
offshore fisheries had caught immature sockeye salmon with their drift nets of 14 cm (5.5 in) 
meshes. He used as samples around 600 sockeye salmon caught in 1938 experiments carried out 
in eastern and western Kamchatkan waters. Sato found that almost all the sample sockeye salmon 
were either four years old or five years old. He focused on the change in the weight of sexual 
organs of the sockeye salmon during their 40- to 60-day voyage from eastern Kamchatka to 
southwestern Kamchatka. Sato found that the sample sockeye salmon’s gonad increased its weight 
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twice for ovary and three times for testis. Based on this finding, Sato argued that almost all sockeye 
salmon that were caught with drift nets of 14 cm meshes were mature enough to ascend their natal 
river on the Kamchatka Peninsula within the season. This result suggested that the critique that 
offshore salmon fisheries overexploited immature sockeye salmon near the Kamchatka Peninsula 
was doubtful. 98  To be sure, these consequences of Sato’s experiments conflicted with the 
conclusions of Uda’s 1935 oceanic research, which had emphasized the concern of 
overexploitation of salmon. But, significantly, Sato and Uda shared many assumptions, especially 
the necessity of studying oceanic conditions and fish’s habits for achieving a sustainable 
development of salmon fisheries. 
Following Uda’s 1935 survey, Japanese oceanographers at the Imperial Fisheries Institute 
intensified their efforts to make the northern sea and salmon’s habits scientifically legible. Three 
Japanese oceanographers at the Imperial Fisheries Institute at Tokyo—Susumu Sugano, Chihiro 
Miyazaki, and, most significantly, Sato—played a central role in this process. Looking at their 
work matters here not only because, as already stated, access to salmon in the northern sea 
growingly depended on the amount of scientific knowledge about the ocean and salmon’s habits. 
But paying attention to the Japanese oceanographers’ work also matters because, as will be 
discussed in the next chapter, their production and accumulation of scientific information about 
the ocean and salmon’s habits through various experiments would crucially impact the American 
approach to salmon fisheries in Bristol Bay after the late 1930s. 
In 1936, Sugano conducted research in migration routes of salmon off the western Kamchatka 
Peninsula. The purpose was to study how deep from the oceanic surface and how far from the 
coast salmon migrated. The figure 23 shows the result and reveals that salmon’s migration routes 
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off the western Kamchatka Peninsula were different according to the fish’s type and migration 
period. Despite these differences, Sugano found some general principles about salmon’s migration 
patterns. He concluded that (1) more salmon swam northward in the initial and last stages of the 
season and more salmon traveled southward in the height of the season; that (2) salmon migrated 
near the oceanic surface (less than 20 meters) in the initial stage, traveled more widely in depth 
(mostly in 1-40 meters but some were found in 61-80 meters) at the height of the season, and swam 
in 21-40 meters at the end of the season; and that (3) salmon migrated in waters distant from the 
coast (more than 200 meters away from the shore) at the beginning of the season, moved to waters 
close to the coast in the middle of the season (no more than 400 meters away), and traveled in 
waters away from the shore (more than 200 meters away from the shore) again at the end of the 
season.99  
 








Figure 23: Distribution of Pink, Chum, and Sockeye Salmon, according to Water Depth and 
Distance from the Coast, Caught near the Kamchatka Peninsula at Different Moments of a Fishing 
Season. Susumu Sugano, “Sake Masu Yūei no Suishin to Kyogan Kyori,” Nihon Suisan Gakkaishi 
4, no. 5 (1936): 319. 
 
   In the same year, Sugano also carried out another experiment off the western Kamchatka 
Peninsula and examined the relationship between salmon catches and oceanic conditions. 
Following the theory developed by Kitahara and Uda that oceanic conditions had a close 
relationship with fish’s habits, Sugano investigated the temperature, salinity, and transparency of 
the saltwater at every mile on a line extending five miles from the shore every day during the 
summer. As the figure 24 demonstrates, he found that salmon migrated most abundantly to the 
fishing ground when the oceanic temperature was 10℃ to 13℃, salinity was less than 29.8ppt 





the shore but great (clear) in the offing.100  
 
 
Figure 24: Relationship between Salmon Catches and Oceanic Conditions. Susumu Sugano, 
“Kamusatsuka Nishi Kaigan ni okeru Sake Masu Raiyū to Kaikyō no Kankei,” Nihon Suisan 
Gakkaishi 4, no. 6 (1936): 408.101 
 
100 Susumu Sugano, “Kamusatsuka Nishi Kaigan ni okeru Sake Masu Raiyū to Kaikyō no Kankei,” 
Nihon Suisan Gakkaishi 4, no. 6 (1936): 407-408. 
101 From top to bottom: “the number of salmon caught per hour each day from June to August”; 
“daily changes in water temperature offshore and near the shore” “daily fluctuations in salinity offshore 





   The following year (1937) Sato developed Sugano’s study on the relationship between oceanic 
conditions and sockeye salmon catches in western Kamchatkan waters. As Sugano did, Sato 
analyzed everyday temperature, color, transparency, and salinity during a salmon fisheries season. 
To offer a more comprehensive, accurate, and useful theory, Sato expanded research locations into 
the Okhotsk region and the eastern Kamchatka Peninsula. He also divided the period of abundant 
salmon migration into two according to daily catches: “good fisheries period (kōryōki)” (more than, 
but less than twice, annual average daily catches) and “great fisheries period (seiryōki)” (more than 
twice the annual average daily catches). Sato computed detailed data collected in nine places in 
the Okhotsk region and on both sides of the Kamchatka Peninsula (figure 25). Although Sato 
admitted that there were regional differences in the data of temperature, color, transparency, and 
salinity that attracted sockeye salmon, he provided general data about the four elements that helped 
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Figure 25: Relationship between Salmon Catches and Oceanic Conditions. Rokuji Sato, “Sōjyutsu: 
Hokuyōsan Sake Masuzoku Gyorui no Bunpu oyobi Shūsei ni tsuite Daiippō Benimasu,” Nihon 





Figure 26: Relationship between Salmon Catches and Oceanic Conditions. Rokuji Sato, “Sōjyutsu: 
Hokuyōsan Sake Masuzoku Gyorui no Bunpu oyobi Shūsei ni tsuite Daiippō Benimasu,” Nihon 
Suisan Gakkaishi 7, no. 4 (1938): 243.104 
 
103 Top: water temperature, color, transparency, and salinity in the research locations during the “good 
fisheries period” (kōryōki). Down: water temperature, color, transparency, and salinity in the research 
locations during the “great fisheries period” (seiryōki). 
104 From left to right: fisheries season, water temperature, water color, water transparency, and water 





Japanese oceanographers undertook research not only off the western Kamchatka Peninsula 
but also in eastern Kamchatkan waters. During the summer of 1938, Miyazaki carried out 
experiments off the eastern Kamchatka Peninsula to uncover meteorological and oceanographic 
influences on daily catches of salmon. Miyazaki developed Sugano’s and Sato’s studies by adding 
some new variables, including directions of winds and oceanic currents, to explain fluctuations in 
daily salmon catches. Miyazaki found that winds from the northwest and oceanic currents toward 
the southwest caused low temperature and low salinity and led to good catches of sockeye salmon. 
He also revealed that northwesterly wind with slack water (no currents) at low temperature but at 
high salinity seems to be favorable for dog salmon, and that high salinity is seemingly unfavorable 
for silver salmon (figure 27).105  
 
period.” 
105 Chihiro Miyazaki, “Kamusatsuka Higashi Kaigan ni okeru Sake Masu Raiyū ni Oyobosu Kishō 







Figure 27: Relationship between Salmon Catches and Oceanic Conditions. Chihiro Miyazaki, 
“Kamusatsuka Higashi Kaigan ni okeru Sake Masu Raiyū ni Oyobosu Kishō Kaikyō no Eikyō,” 
Nihon Suisan Gakkaishi 7, no. 4 (1938): 208.106 
 
Sato’s research had crucial implications for Japanese salmon fisheries because he tried to reveal 
salmon’s migration patterns in the northern sea by continuous tagging experiments. In 1936, Sato 
with the help of Nichiro Gyogyo Co. released 1,124 sockeye salmon off the eastern coast of the 
Kamchatka Peninsula. He caught 140 out of the 1,124 sockeye salmon and focused on 18 sockeye 
salmon that had traveled more than 50 miles as sample cases. He hypothesized that sockeye salmon 
 
106 From top to bottom: everyday data about water color, water transparency, wind direction, wind 






migrated from the Commander Islands and they split into two groups off the Cape Kronotsky on 
the eastern Kamchatka. While one third of sockeye salmon swam northward and reached waters 
off the northeastern Kamchatka, two thirds of them traveled southward from the cape and were 
finally caught in waters off the southwestern Kamchatka (figure 28). Sato also found that this 
migration pattern of sockeye salmon (one third traveled from the Cape Kronotsky to the eastern 
Kamchatka and two thirds from the cape to the southwestern Kamchatka) almost corresponded to 
the ratio of annual total sockeye salmon catches off the Kamchatka Peninsula (the southwestern 
Kamchatka produced twice as many salmon as the eastern Kamchatka).107 
 
107 Rokuji Sato, “Shōwa 11-nendo Hokuyōsan Sake Masu Zoku Gyorui no Hyōshiki Hōryū Shiken ni 
oite Hanmei seru Shinkaiyūro ni tsuite: Daiippō: Benimasu (Oncorhynchus nerka (WALB.)),” Nihon 







Figure 28: A Result of Tagging Experiments on Sockeye Salmon near the Kamchatka Peninsula. 
Rokuji Sato, “Shōwa 11-nendo Hokuyōsan Sake Masu Zoku Gyorui no Hyōshiki Hōryū Shiken ni 
oite Hanmei seru Shinkaiyūro ni tsuite: Daiippō: Benimasu (Oncorhynchus nerka (WALB.)),” 
Nihon Suisan Gakkaishi 6, no. 4 (1937): 173. 
 





near the Commander Islands and in the south of the western Aleutian Islands, particularly Attu and 
Agattu Islands. Sato had been satisfied with the results of the 1936 tagging experiments conducted 
near the Kamchatka Peninsula and he sought to know where sockeye salmon came from before 
they arrived at waters near the peninsula. In fact, the major purpose of Sato’s 1937 and 1938 
experiments was to investigate the scientific validity of his theoretical hypothesis that sockeye 
salmon migrated westward from the Commander Islands until they reached off the Cape Kronotsky 
on the eastern Kamchatka. It is important to note that for the 1937 and 1938 surveys Sato covered 
the geographical space as far east as the longitude 175° East across the International Date Line, 
which functioned as a U.S.-Russian border in the Bering Sea.108 This showed Sato’s assumption 
that the biological boundary of sockeye salmon in the Bering Sea did not necessarily match with 
the political one between the United States and Russia. The consequence of the 1937 and 1938 
tagging experiments demonstrated the validity of Sato’s hypothesis. Indeed, Sato discovered that 
sockeye salmon released off the Commander Islands and Attu Island were captured off the eastern 
Kamchatka Peninsula and off Paramushir Island, easternmost island of the Kuril Islands (figure 
29).109 This meant that sockeye salmon migrated in the Bering Sea across the political boundary 
between the United States and Russia and, as discussed in chapter six, this finding played a crucial 
part in determining legal and physical access to Bristol Bay salmon after the Second World War. 
This conclusion also allowed Sato to consider that it was necessary to carry out more tagging 
experiments of sockeye salmon further eastward in waters near the middle of the Aleutian 
Islands.110  
 
108 Rokuji Sato, “Shōwa 12, 13 Ryōnendo ni okeru Hokuyō Sakemasuzoku Gyorui no Hyōshiki 
Hōryū Shiken ni tsuite,” Nihon Suisan Gakkaishi 8, no. 4 (1939): 178. 
109 Ibid., 182-184. 







Figure 29: Results of tagging experiments. Rokuji Sato, “Shōwa 12, 13 Ryōnendo ni okeru Hokuyō 
Sakemasuzoku Gyorui no Hyōshiki Hōryū Shiken ni tsuite,” Nihon Suisan Gakkaishi 8, no. 4 
(1939): 183.111 
 
111 The down left map shows migratory routes of sockeye salmon in the western Bering Sea. 
The top map describes migratory routes of chum salmon and the down right one does migratory 





   For Sato and other Japanese ichthyologists, understanding migratory paths of sockeye salmon 
was a necessary step to answering a bigger question: the environmental and ecological relationship 
between the Asian and the North American sides of the Bering Sea and the North Pacific. In 1935 
and 1936, Japanese fisheries researchers conducted intensive fishing surveys in the American side 
of the Bering Sea and the North Pacific, particularly near the western Aleutian Islands. The number 
in the parenthesis in the figure 30 shows the catch rate of sockeye salmon and it meant that the 
Japanese ichthyologists found that the fish inhabited widely and extensively the Bering Sea and 
the North Pacific, especially in waters south of the western Aleutian Islands.112 This new scientific 
discovery contradicted the prevailing belief of Japanese northern sea fishermen that sockeye 
salmon inhabited mainly the southern side of the central Aleutian Islands and they split into two 
schools, one group travelling to the Kamchatka Peninsula and the other Alaska, when matured.113 
This revealed that how limited the Japanese fishermen’s scientific knowledge about sockeye 
salmon’s habits was, though Kitahara had once praised Japanese fishers as keen observers of the 
ocean.114 The scientific finding that sockeye salmon migrated widely and extensively rather than 
staying in one specific area before maturity in the Bering Sea and the North Pacific presented 
another difficult question about biological identification of the fish and the possibility of their 
intermingling. The question was whether sockeye salmon spawning in the Bristol Bay area and in 
the Kamchatkan region should be differentiated in terms of biological typology or if they shared 
similar behavioral patterns and habitual characteristics enough to be examined within a single 
 
112 Nōrinshō, “Hokubei Gasshūkoku ni okeru Ggyogyō Kotoni Gaikoku Ryōdo Okiai ni okeru 
Gyogyō no Gaiyō,” undated (c. July 1937), JACAR, ref. B09042210300 (slide # 23), Honpō Gyogyō 
Beikoku, Daiyonkan, GGS. Sato carried out tagging experiments near Attu and Agattu Islands in 1938 
based on this finding. 
113 Sato, “Sōjyutsu: Hokuyōsan Sake Masuzoku Gyorui no Bunpu oyobi Shūsei ni tsuite Daiippō 
Benimasu (Oncorhynchus nerka (WALB.)),” 240. 





analytical framework. Japanese ichthyologists could not confidently answer this question and their 
conclusion was that they needed more research. 115  But the point was that the Japanese 
ichthyologists seriously accepted the possibility that the Bering Sea should not be divided 
according to the political boundary between the United States and Russia; instead, the ocean should 
be treated as an environmentally and ecologically interactive and seamless space. More specifically, 
this reminded Japanese ichthyologists of the importance of carefully considering the possibility 
that Asian and Alaskan sockeye salmon might intermingle in the Bering Sea and the North Pacific 
across the U.S.-Russian border in the waters. As will be explained in chapter six, this was a key to 
determining legal and physical access to Bristol Bay salmon after the Second World War. 
 
 
115 Nōrinshō, “Hokubei Gasshūkoku ni okeru Ggyogyō Kotoni Gaikoku Ryōdo Okiai ni okeru 







Figure 30: Kitataiheiyō ni okeru Sake Masu (c. July 1937). Nōrinshō, “Hokubei Gasshūkoku ni 
okeru Ggyogyō Kotoni Gaikoku Ryōdo Okiai ni okeru Gyogyō no Gaiyō,” undated (c. July 1937), 
JACAR, ref. B09042210300 (slide #23), Honpō Gyogyō Beikoku, Daiyonkan, GGS.116 
 
116 Although this map focuses on Japanese experimental fishing results on sockeye salmon in the 
Bering Sea in 1935 and 1936, it is notable that this map also includes the consequence of a tagging 
experiment conducted by Charles Gilbert and Willis Rich in 1923. Japanese ichthyologists paid special 
attention to one chum salmon released on Unga Island off the Alaska Peninsula on July 4, 1923 and 
captured in the Pankara River on the eastern shores of the Kamchatka Peninsula across the Bering Sea on 
August 18, 1923. This shows that the U.S. Bureau of Fisheries and the Soviet Far Eastern Fishery Board 
at Vladivostok, which reported the capture of the fish to the former, had some collaborative relationship in 
studying Pacific salmon’s migration patterns. But a more significant point is different approaches between 
American and Japanese ichthyologists to this result of one tagged chum salmon’s migration. Gilbert and 
Willis crucially suggested the possibility of intermingling of different stocks of salmon from Asia and 
North America in the Bering Sea, writing, “The record is important in that it indicates the possibility of a 
mingling, on the feeding grounds, of salmon from both the Asiatic and American shores of the north [sic.] 
Pacific.” Despite this observation by the two prestigious ichthyologists, their colleagues almost neglected 
it as a tiny anomaly. In contrast, Japanese ichthyologists paid much attention to the trans-Bering Sea 
mobility of one chum salmon and treated it as an exception too important to ignore for making sockeye 
salmon’s habits scientifically legible, though it was chum, not sockeye, salmon. See Charles H. Gilbert 
and Willis H. Rich, “Second Experiment in Tagging Salmon in the Alaska Peninsula Fisheries 





   Tagging experiments allowed Sato to investigate more than salmon’s migration routes. For 
example, he was convinced of a close relationship between salmon’s migration paths and their 
daily travelling speed. Sato tried to show salmon’s migrating velocity by focusing on when salmon 
were released and caught and assuming that salmon travelled the predicted migration routes during 
the period. Analyzing 293 salmon caught in tagging experiments of 1936 and 1937, Sato argued 
that salmon migrated 12.3 miles every day on average off the Kamchatka Peninsula. He claimed 
that this result was reliable given that the best salmon fisheries season came to the Cape Kronotsky 
on around June 10 and it reached Ozernovskiy, southwestern Kamchatka Peninsuka, on around 
July 20. This meant that salmon took about 40 days to travel around 500 miles from the Cape 
Kronotsky to Ozernovskiy and this showed that salmon migrated about 12.5 miles every day on 
average.117  
   In fact, Sato’s hypothesis about sockeye salmon’s migration speed helped him formulate 
another hypothesis about the fish’s migration patterns. In 1938, Sato undertook tagging 
experiments in western Aleutian Islands (south of the Attu and Agattu Islands). He found that 
sockeye salmon traveled only 55 miles for about 30 days and that the fish’s daily migration distance 
was only around two miles. From this observation, Sato theorized that sockeye salmon stayed in 
waters off the Cape Kronotsky for a while once they had reached there before starting swimming 
to their natal river.118 Sato also focused on the relationship between the timing of sockeye salmon’s 
arrival in waters off the Cape Kronotsky and the fish’s destination. Sato hypothesized that those 
sockeye salmon that came to the waters in the early period went to the eastern Kamchatka and 
other sockeye salmon that arrived in the waters in the late period traveled to the western 
 
117 Sato, “Hyōshiki Horyū Shiken yori Suitei seru Hokuyōsan Sake Masuzoku Gyogun no Kaiyū 
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   The latter half of the 1930s saw the intensification of studies on oceanic conditions and 
salmon’s habits in the Sea of Okhotsk and the western Bering Sea by Japanese oceanographers of 
the Imperial Fisheries Experimental Station and the Imperial Fisheries Institute. It is hard to tell 
the degree to which prewar Japan’s salmon fisheries in the northern sea mobilized growing 
scientific knowledge about the ocean and the fish to outdo Soviet fisheries in Russian waters and 
advance Japan’s offshore salmon fisheries on high seas. This was mainly because the scientific 
information about oceanic conditions and salmon’s habits was mostly a collection of hypotheses 
and needed further research and experiments. However, even if Japanese oceanographers’ efforts 
to make the ocean and salmon scientifically legible were primitive and rudimentary, this does not 
lessen the historical significance of their efforts. This was because such research projects were 
pioneering enterprises in the 1930s, when Euro-American ichthyologists failed to agree even on 
the scientific validity of the homing theory on salmon and the questions of where and how long 
salmon migrated in the ocean were a complete mystery for the Euro-American ichthyologists. 
What should be emphasized is that Japanese offshore salmon fisheries expanded in the northern 
sea in the 1930s and Japanese oceanographers’ scientific understanding of the ocean and the fish 
extended in the same decade in a correlated manner. As will be discussed in the next chapter, this 
Japanese science-oriented approach to salmon fisheries in the northern sea crucially affected the 
development of American salmon fisheries in Bristol Bay after the mid-1930s. In addition, the 
Japanese oceanographer’s efforts to make the ocean and the ecology of salmon scientifically 
legible influenced Russian salmon fisheries in the Far East too. It is necessary to look at the 







fully understand Japan’s approach to salmon fisheries in the northern sea after the mid-1930s. 
 
Contests and Cooperation between Japan and the Soviet Union over Research in Salmon’s 
Migration Patterns, 1935-1941 
 
   Japan was not the only country that tried to make the northern sea and salmon’s habits 
scientifically visible in the 1930s; instead, Japan saw a parallel development in the Soviet Union 
in the decade. In fact, the Bolshevik state turned to scientists during the interwar years and tried to 
predict, maximize, and maintain fisheries yields in order to make fishing a reliable part of an all-
encompassing economic plan.120 Starting in 1932, the Soviet government launched a Pacific 
expedition consisting of research teams from the State Hydrological Institute in Leningrad (current 
St. Petersburg) and the Pacific Scientific Research Fisheries Center (TINRO). The leader of this 
expedition was Konstantin Mikhailovich Deryugin (1878-1938), and he used three research 
vessels, “Dalnevostochnik,” (trawler) “Blyukher,” (trawler) and “Rossinant” (schooner).121 This 
Pacific expedition was a two-year effort and Russian researchers obtained systematic and valuable 
data to better understand the nature of the North Pacific and fisheries development. From these 
observations it was possible for them to determine the main features of water circulation and heat 
balance and to identify populations and migration routes of commercial fish.122 However, this 
multiple-year oceanic survey by Russian researchers was not sufficient to reveal salmon’s 
migration patterns in a comprehensive way. Like their Japanese counterparts, Russian marine 
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scientists conducted salmon tagging experiments in the latter half of the 1930s.123 
   Contrary to the conventional wisdom that focuses on Japan-Soviet confrontations in the 1930s, 
the relationship between the two powers when it came to studying salmon’s habits was neither 
exclusively conflictive nor competitive. Rather, there was a situation of vigilant interdependence 
between Japan and the Soviet Union in making salmon’s habits scientifically visible. The main 
reason was salmon’s cross-border mobility in the ocean. Japanese oceanographers used tagging 
experiments to get data about the location, date, type, length, weight, and degree of damage of 
tagged salmon when they were caught.124 Since the Japanese researchers did not take the homing 
theory for granted and assumed that salmon might finally reach Soviet coasts across a geographical 
and political border, they technically needed to rely on cooperation of Russian fishermen and 
Soviet authorities. Yuma Abe, a Nichiro Gyogyo Co.’s spokesman, for example, confirmed this 
point, insisting, “cooperation between Japanese and Soviet organizations and authorities is 
absolutely necessary” to investigate and study salmon.125 Moreover, Yasutada Toda, Chief of the 
Fisheries Bureau of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, concurred with Abe and claimed to 
the Chief of the Euro-American Bureau of the Foreign Ministry that the Ministry of Agriculture 
and Forestry desired to “complete” the research with the “cooperation” of the Soviet authorities, 
if Russian fishermen should catch Japanese tagged salmon.126 Thus, tags attached to salmon 
included the experiment year and a short Russian translation of “Japanese Bureau of Fisheries” to 
show Russians that the Japanese government was undertaking salmon tagging experiments and 
 
123 See, for example, Nōrinshō to Gaimushō, “‘So’ Gawa Hyōshiki Hōryūgyo no Saiho ni kansuru 
Ken,” October 6, 1937, “Sokoku Hyōshikigyo” JACAR Ref. B09042263300 (slide # 450), GGS. 
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needed their attention (figure 31).127 The Japanese Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry also asked 
the Foreign Ministry to request the Soviet authorities to instruct Russian fishermen to offer the 
necessary data if they should catch the Japanese tagged salmon in Russian waters.128  
 
 
Figure 31: How to Measure the Body Length and Where to Attach Tags. Koki Hirota to Consuls 
in Vladivostok, Alexandrovsk, and Petropavlovsk, “Hyōshiki Sake Masu Hōryū no Ken,” May 11, 
1934, “Honpō Hyōshikigyo,” JACAR Ref. B09042263200 (slide # 416), GGS. 
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   It is worth noting that Japanese researchers even suggested that they should work together not 
just with Russian marine scientists but also with American and Canadian ichthyologists to better 
understand Pacific salmon’s ecology. Sato, for example, agreed with other Japanese 
oceanographers that scientifically knowing salmon’s habits was a key to managing and controlling 
the fish.129 Moreover, as his colleagues did, Sato also doubted the validity of the homing theory 
and believed in salmon’s great cross-border mobility.130  What made Sato different from his 
colleagues in Japan was his idea that marine researchers must treat the entire North Pacific, 
including the Bering Sea, as a basic geographical unit for observing salmon rather than 
undervaluing the fish’s migration range and looking merely at the Sea of Okhotsk and the western 
Bering Sea. Thus, Sato even suggested that Japan, Russia, the United States, and Canada, the four 
powers that possessed the biggest vested interests in salmon fisheries in the North Pacific, should 
collaborate and investigate Pacific salmon’s lifecycle and habits together by establishing an inter-
governmental salmon research institution.131 Sato’s progressive and internationalist suggestion of 
founding a circum-Pacific scientific board for studying salmon materialized in the early 1950s, 
when the United States, not Japan, took the initiative and created the International North Pacific 
Fisheries Commission with the membership of Canada and Japan. 
   The Soviet Union, too, needed Japanese cooperation to scientifically understand salmon’s 
migration paths. While the Soviet authorities accepted the request of the Ministry of Agriculture 
and Forestry to report information about collected tags to Japan, Russian researchers of the TINRO 
demonstrated “great interests” in Japan’s tagging experiments and suggested that Japan and the 
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Soviet Union share information about the experiments in June 1935.132 More specifically, the 
Russian researchers asked their Japanese counterparts to add the released place to tags attached to 
released salmon so that Russian marine scientists could track salmon’s migration routes more 
comprehensively.133 The Fisheries Bureau of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry responded 
by saying that it had “little opposition” to the Soviet suggestion and promised to take “appropriate” 
measures.134 The Fisheries Bureau provided 10 copies of a tag catalog with location information 
to the Soviet authorities, but the bureau’s passive reply of “little opposition” implied that the bureau 
judged the Soviet proposition to be not ideal but necessary. 
   It should be noted that Japan and the Soviet Union actually collaborated to scientifically 
understand salmon’s habits. In the late 1936, for example, the Central Bureau for Bird Ringing in 
Moscow reported to the Japanese Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry four tags originally attached 
to salmon released by Japanese researchers for the last couple of years. Two tags were found in 
Yakutsk and Verkhoyansk, respectively, both in the inner Siberia far away from the Sea of Okhotsk 
and the Bering Sea. The location of the two tags suggested that migratory birds ate the two salmon 
and carried the tags to the inner Siberian cities.135 More crucially, the Central Bureau for Bird 
Ringing also reported that Russian fishermen caught two salmon with Japanese tags dated August 
1935 and passed to the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry information about the tag number, the 
Japanese research institution’s name, the salmon’s type, and the location where the two salmon 
were caught (two rivers in the Okhotsk region—the river In[ya?] and the river Okhota, 
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respectively).136 The Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry answered that, although the Soviet 
information about the tag collected from the river Okhota did not match that of the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Forestry, the ministry passed to the Soviet authorities information about the 
salmon caught in the river In[ya] (pink salmon whose length was 52.4 centimeters and that was 
released 20.5 miles east of the Paramushir Island, the eastern edge of the Kuril Islands, on July 4, 
1935).137  
   Japan’s dependence on the Soviet Union for getting accurate data about salmon’s migration 
routes was clear in Japanese researchers’ sharing the way of tagging experiments with Soviet 
counterparts by attaching Russian translation to a Japanese visual manual. This was because 
information from the Soviet Union was not as accurate as Japanese researchers had expected. For 
instance, Yuma Abe complained that the Soviet authorities reported to Japan only the tag number, 
type, and sex of caught salmon and that the Soviet information about the caught salmon’s type and 
sex did not match in many cases with Japanese information about those of released salmon.138 
Thus, in April 1937, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry considered that such inaccurate 
information was a product of linguistic barriers, and sent to the Soviet authorities a new visual 
manual with more detailed Russian translations than the old visual manual that had been used until 
the previous year (figure 32). The Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry also requested the Soviet 
authorities to return the collected tags as well as necessary information about caught salmon to 
Japan to avoid unmatching, or incorrect, information and improve the accuracy of tagging 
experiments.139 The Japanese government’s decision to give a visual manual with detailed Russian 
 
136 Ibid. 
137 Nōrinshō to Gaimushō, “Sake Masuzoku Gyorui Hyōshiki Hōryū ni kansuru Ken,” November 20, 
1936, “Honpō Hyōshikigyo” (slide # 439). 






translation showed that accurate information about tagged salmon from the Soviet Union was 
essential to Japan and that Japanese researchers had to depend on voluntary cooperation of Russian 
fishermen and the Soviet authorities. 
 
 
Figure 32: How to Measure the Body Length and Where to Attach Tags. Nōrinshō Suisankyokuchō 
to Gaimushō Ōakyokuchō, April 9, 1937, “Honpō Hyōshikigyo,” JACAR Ref. B09042263200 
(slide # 444), GGS.140 
 
 






However, it is probably simplistic to conclude that Japan and the Soviet Union removed all 
barriers to collaborative scientific research in salmon’s habits. Instead, it would be more precise to 
say that the Russo-Japanese collaboration should be located between scientific nationalism and 
scientific internationalism. Indeed, Japan and the Soviet Union did not necessarily share all 
information about tagged salmon, and the Soviet Union seemed more hesitant to open its tagging 
experimental data to Japanese researchers. This was probably because the amount of scientific 
knowledge about salmon determined the degree of access to the fish and the inter-imperial 
scientific collaboration was not the goal itself but a tool to achieve the domination of salmon in 
the Sea of Okhotsk and the western Bering Sea. For example, the Soviet authorities issued on a 
local Kamchatkan newspaper a proclamation to local Russian fishermen on the Kamchatka 
Peninsula in July 1938, when the TINRO’s branch office in Petropavlovsk was preparing for 
tagging experiments in Kamchatkan waters. The proclamation instructed Russian fishermen to 
report who caught what type of salmon when, where, and how to the TINRO’s branch office in 
Petropavlovsk if they got tagged salmon in Kamchatkan waters.141 Having read the instruction, 
Shigeto Yuhashi, the Japanese acting consul in Petropavlovsk, inquired of the Soviet authorities 
whether they had notified the Japanese authorities of the proclamation and whether the data was 
available to Japan about the location and number of salmon the TINRO would be releasing in 
Kamchatkan waters. 142  Although the Soviet proclamation had revealed that the tagging 
experiments would take place in Kamchatkan waters, the Soviet authorities in Petropavlovsk 
answered to Yuhashi that they had no idea about the tagging experiments because the TINRO’s 
branch office in Vladivostok, not in Petropavlovsk, would release tagged salmon in Vladivostok, 
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not in Petropavlovsk.143 This diplomatic “deception” was a symbolic case that demonstrated the 
limit in the inter-imperial scientific collaboration between Japan and the Soviet Union. It was also 
a representative example showing that the scientific internationalism was a mere tool to achieve 
the nationalistic goal of monopolizing scientific knowledge about salmon’s habits and dominating 
access to the fish. 
 
Conclusion 
   Historians have offered a dominant “rise and fall” narrative to explain the development of 
Japan’s northern sea fisheries before the outbreak of the Pacific War. According to this explanation, 
Japan’s salmon fisheries in the northern sea prospered until 1935 and they declined after the year. 
The “rise and fall” story is problematic and oversimplified in narrowly defining the northern sea 
as Russian territorial waters and neglecting the historical contingency seen in Japan’s post-1935 
salmon fisheries in the northern sea. 
   Japan’s northern sea fisheries experienced dynamic structural transformation, but not 
necessarily fall or shrinkage, during the 1930s. The development of the factory ship was the key 
to structurally remaking Japan’s northern sea fisheries in the 1930s. Factory ships made possible 
and even ideal for smaller fishing companies to stop leasing Russian fishing tracts and instead 
catch salmon on the high seas outside Russian territorial waters. Indeed, the structural center of 
Japan’s salmon fisheries in the northern sea was gradually shifting from “passive fisheries” in 
Russian territorial waters to “active fisheries” offshore with factory ship. To be sure, the year 1935 
was a watershed moment in the history of Japan’s northern sea fisheries, but it was not because 
they were industrially withering but because they were enlarging into Alaskan waters, relying more 
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than ever on oceanography and seeing the expansion of scientific knowledge about the northern 
sea and salmon’s habits. 
   In the latter half of the 1930s, leading Japanese oceanographers of the Ministry of Agriculture 
and Forestry actively sought to advance Japan’s salmon fisheries in the northern sea in a 
sustainable, efficient, and forecasting manner. With an ambitious assumption that the ocean and 
salmon were tamable and controllable, the oceanographers aimed to achieve the objective by 
mobilizing scientific knowledge about the ocean and salmon. To make the fish’s habits 
scientifically legible, the oceanographers conducted detailed research in oceanic conditions and 
tagging experiments in the Sea of Okhotsk and the western Bering Sea with collaboration, though 
to a limited extent, with Russian counterparts. It is notable that Japanese salmon fisheries in the 
northern sea during the interwar years were made and remade in a tension between competition 
over access to salmon and cooperation over scientific understanding of the fish between Japan and 
the Soviet Union. This relationship of tension became more complicated in the latter half of the 
1930s when the Japanese salmon fisheries expanded into Alaskan waters and got entangled with 













CHAPTER 5: CONTESTING ALASKAN SALMON: FISHING RIGHTS, 
SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE, AND A U.S.-JAPANESE FISHERY DISPUTE 
IN BRISTOL BAY IN THE 1930s 
 
   In 1938 the U.S. Bureau of Fisheries dispatched two ichthyologists, George B. Kelez and 
Joseph T. Barnaby, to Bristol Bay off southwest Alaska to conduct intensive research on salmon, 
specifically sockeye salmon. The purpose was to deepen understanding of the mysterious fish, as 
even ichthyologists had very limited scientific knowledge about sockeye salmon’s lifecycle, habits, 
and migration patterns.1 This five-year research project started in the aftermath of the Bristol Bay 
crisis, a dispute over sockeye salmon in the bay between the United States and Japan in the 1930s. 
The Bureau of Fisheries sent Kelez and Barnaby to the Bristol Bay region because the dispute 
made U.S. government officials realize that they knew little about sockeye salmon and that they 
needed to have more detailed scientific information about the fish if they were to protect them 
effectively from Japanese pelagic fishermen. 
   This chapter focuses on the Bristol Bay crisis and addresses how it impacted America’s 
approach to salmon fisheries in southwest Alaska. To answer this question, I examine how 
Washington officials found the nature of the fishery dispute in the process of settling it. Looking 
at the policymaking process at Washington, this chapter argues that the Bristol Bay crisis was 
fundamentally a U.S.-Japan contest for scientific understanding of sockeye salmon because U.S. 
government officials discovered that access to the fish in Bristol Bay hinged ultimately on the 
quality and quantity of available scientific information about them. I also suggest that the fishery 
dispute historically mattered because it drove the United States to initiate various measures to 
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advance an emerging ichthyological empire in Bristol Bay before and after the Second World War. 
Historians have heretofore viewed the fishery controversy as a question about clashing fishing 
rights and studied it in relation to the development of the Law of the Sea. At the time, Bristol Bay 
was defined by two structurally different legal regimes: U.S. national laws within its three-mile 
territorial waters and the customary Law of the Sea on the high seas outside the territorial waters. 
The freedom of the seas doctrine constituted the core of the customary Law of the Sea and allowed 
Japanese deep-sea fishermen to catch as many salmon as they wanted in the extraterritorial waters 
of Bristol Bay without observing America’s tough conservation standards. By spotlighting U.S. 
fishing industry leaders, the mass media, and members of Congress, earlier scholarship has 
emphasized that U.S. claims to proprietary rights to sockeye salmon in Bristol Bay was a 
revolutionary step to birthing the modern Law of the Sea, expanded after World War II, which is 
characterized by extended jurisdiction of coastal states and their enclosure of oceanic common-
pool resources in extraterritorial waters.2  
   A close investigation of America’s policymaking process, however, with focus on Washington 
officials reveals that the fishery problem was not just about who had legal authority to catch 
Alaskan salmon but also greatly rested on scientific understanding of the fish. By exploring the 
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U.S. policymaking process, I show that Washington officials’ discussions centered on their 
concerns about America’s poor marine research in Alaskan waters and that their limited scientific 
knowledge on sockeye salmon crucially determined the way they settled the fishery controversy 
and preserved the fish. The lack of scientific data about sockeye salmon made it technically 
impossible for the United States to solve the Bristol Bay crisis by projecting its jurisdiction over 
the fish into the high seas of Bristol Bay.  
   My work differs from the previous studies because it assumes that conservation has both a 
political and technical aspect. The Bristol Bay crisis transformed the waters into an inter-imperial 
space and presented the question of the need for the United States to preserve Alaskan salmon 
from Japanese deep-sea fishermen. U.S. fishing industry leaders, their media spokespersons, and 
members of Congress demanded that the United States assert exclusive possession of Alaskan 
salmon by unilaterally revising the customary Law of the Sea to extend U.S. jurisdiction over the 
fish in Bristol Bay. But U.S. government officials rejected this demand and tried to settle the Bristol 
Bay crisis without compromising the traditional Law of the Sea. The solution to the fishery 
controversy depended on negotiations among actors with clashing political intentions. Although 
overlooked in earlier scholarly research, Washington officials also had to deal with the technical 
question of how to physically protect sockeye salmon in Bristol Bay from Japanese pelagic 
fishermen. The lack of scientific data about the migration of salmon from Bristol Bay to local 
rivers for spawning was a main reason why it was technically impossible for the United States to 
preserve Alaskan salmon by expanding its jurisdiction over the fish. Washington officials had to 
maintain access to Alaskan salmon by making them de facto American fish through a gentleman’s 






An Emerging US-Japanese Fishery Dispute in Bristol Bay, 1930-1936 
 
   Earlier studies have often portrayed a Bristol Bay fishery dispute as the U.S. government not 
having taken measures to stop Japanese fisheries in the waters before 1936, when American fishing 
industry leaders began vocally demanding it. It is more accurate to say, however, that Washington 
officials failed at their preemptive attempts to avert fishery trouble in Bristol Bay. In June 1930, 
Henry O’Malley, commissioner of the Bureau of Fisheries, first reported to the Department of 
Commerce news of Japanese pelagic fishermen’s appearance and operations in Alaskan waters. 
He cautioned that an 8,000-ton Japanese factory ship, Taihoku-Maru, had been catching cod, 
halibut, and crabs at Port Moller at the southern entrance of Bristol Bay.3 Soon afterward, Acting 
Secretary of Commerce E. F. Morgan shared this information with the U.S. State Department and 
suggested that the government immediately formulate a policy regarding this development. 
Morgan warned: 
A situation has recently arisen in [the] Bering Sea that may easily become of serious import 
to the salmon fishery in Alaska waters, particularly in Bristol Bay . . . Even if the Japanese 
fishery operations are not extended to include salmon, it is entirely within the realm of 
possibility that present activities may intercept and deflect great numbers of red salmon while 
on their annual migratory movement from offshore or high-sea waters to the territorial waters 
of Bristol Bay.4 
 
   Bureaucratic politics made the government’s initial response to the fishery question ineffective. 
To protect Alaskan salmon from Japanese deep-sea fishermen, the Department of Commerce 
insisted that the United States preemptively conclude a fishery treaty with Japan that would restrain 
Japanese nationals’ fishing operations in Alaskan waters.5 The State Department concurred and 
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asked the Department of Commerce to “prepare an outline of (1) what measures are considered 
practical and necessary to protect the American fisheries, and (2) what we might be willing to offer 
in return for the concessions which the Japanese interests might be asked to make.”6 
However, the Bureau of Fisheries, whose scientific knowledge about Alaskan salmon the State 
Department needed for drafting a fishery agreement, was lukewarm about negotiating with Tokyo. 
This was because the bureau did not want to make any concessions to Japan over a situation that 
might not happen in the future. One possible concession was that the United States would allow 
Japan to dominate crab fisheries in Alaska in return for Japan’s abandonment of salmon fisheries 
there.7 But Commissioner O’Malley did not want to lose both salmon and crab fisheries in Alaska. 
O’Malley also felt “grave apprehension” that “there might develop, with the decrease in the catch 
of crab, danger to the salmon industry, as there would be nothing to prevent Japanese or American 
fishers from netting salmon on the high seas in their run to the rivers of Alaska.”8 He hoped that 
“some agreement might be reached with the Japanese to prevent interference with the salmon 
run.”9 But he was unwilling to make concessions to Japan for something that might not even 
happen. He believed that the salmon problem might not be lasting, while any U.S. concessions 
probably would be.10 Thus, he insisted that “no action [should be] contemplated at the present 
time” and that it was improbable that “any further action [would] be taken on this matter for some 
time to come unless there [is] some decided change in the situation.”11 The bureau’s careful but 
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opportunistic approach changed little until fishing industry leaders on the Pacific Coast became 
vocal about an emerging fishery dispute with Japan in Bristol Bay in late 1936. Facing the bureau’s 
continuous procrastination, the State Department finally concluded in June 1936 that “nothing 
further should be done in the matter for the time being and until there had been further 
developments.”12  
 
Shifting Japan’s Policy toward Salmon Fisheries in Alaska, 1935-1936 
 
   The Japanese Bureau of Fisheries was also not ready to discuss regulating Japanese salmon 
fisheries in Alaskan waters. Japan’s policy toward salmon fisheries in Alaska was an outcome of 
negotiations between the American Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Fisheries 
Bureau of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. The Foreign Ministry sought to maintain 
friendly relations with the United States and tried to avoid a “considerably subtle problem” that 
might result from promoting Japanese nationals’ fishing activities in Alaska.13  Since Teiichi 
Nagase, Fisheries Bureau Director, understood the Foreign Ministry’s concerns, the Fisheries 
Bureau consistently refused to allow Japanese fishing companies permission to catch salmon in 
Alaskan waters.14 The Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, nevertheless, had to handle growing 
pressure from the Japanese fishing industry, the public, and the Imperial Diet after the mid-1930s. 
Indeed, as discussed in the previous chapter, small- and mid-sized Japanese fishing companies 
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ousted from Russian waters by the monopolistic Nichiro Gyogyo Co. increasingly demanded that 
the Japanese government permit them to go to and fish salmon in Alaska, particularly in Bristol 
Bay.15 
In 1933 Hakuyōmaru, a training ship of the Imperial Fisheries Institute, had conducted 
preliminary survey of the bay with drift nets and revealed that Bristol Bay was a promising fishing 
ground for salmon fisheries. In fact, the research discovered that sockeye salmon there were larger 
than Kamchatkan ones and that the netting rate in Bristol Bay was as high as that off the Kamchatka 
Peninsula. 16  The number of applications for permits submitted by fishing companies to the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry to catch salmon in Alaskan waters rapidly increased from 21 
factory ships (131,000 tons) in 1933 to 36 (187,700 tons) in 1934 to 33 (212,223 tons) in 1935.17 
Politicians elected from Hokkaido, the base for the Japanese northern sea fisheries, played a 
leading part in promoting the salmon fishermen’s demand in the Imperial Diet. In May 1936, 
Kanau Konishi and Tokusaburo Takeda submitted to the Imperial Diet an identical “petition 
regarding the development of fisheries in the Northeastern Pacific” with the support of more than 
70 colleagues, claiming that, since salmon fisheries in Russian waters had been overdeveloped, 
the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry should allow fishing companies to operate salmon 
fisheries in the Northeastern Pacific, especially Alaskan waters.18  
Outside the Imperial Diet, spokespeople of the fishing industry, intellectuals, and mass media 
helped shape the public opinion that backed Japanese salmon fishermen’s expedition to Alaskan 
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waters. The spokespeople, intellectuals, and mass media offered what Eisuke Kaminaga calls 
“Hokuyō Ideorogī (northern sea ideology),” ideological reasoning founded on exceptionalism and 
ethnocentrism to justify the expansion of Japanese salmon fisheries into Alaska.19 For example, 
Shoichi Okamoto, a spokesperson for salmon fisheries, insisted, “The necessity has arisen to 
advance into Alaska as new fishing grounds that would replace this [Far Eastern Russian waters]. 
In any case, the expansion of Japanese salmon fishermen into Alaska is only a question of time 
and they are destined to go eastward sooner or later.”20 Moreover, the Marine Fisheries Promotion 
Association (Kaiyō Gyogyō Shinkō Kyōkai), established by Ichijiro Itani, President of the Imperial 
Fisheries Association (Dainihon Suisankai), in 1936, published a small pamphlet in 1937 about 
fisheries in the Northeastern Pacific, including Alaskan waters. The pamphlet triumphantly 
claimed, “we no longer regard the ‘Bering Sea’ as the ‘rough northern sea’ or as arctic waters 
associated with polar bears; rather, we have come to consider the ‘Bering Sea’ as an extension of 
Tokyo Bay and Shinagawa Bay.”21  This statement emphasized spatial homogeneity between 
Alaskan waters and the Japanese littoral and stressed that Alaskan waters were being integrated 
into “Japan’s” maritime space to conquer in the Japanese imagination. These ethnocentric and 
exceptionalist logics ideologically justified the Japanese fishermen’s advance into Alaskan waters.  
 Mass media was complicit in helping Japanese nationals “possess” Alaskan waters in their 
consciousness. In November 1934, Yomiuri Shimbun published an advertisement of a film entitled 
“Japan Advancing Northward” (Hokushin Nippon) and produced with the sponsorship of the Navy 
Department as a companion volume to a 1933 film called “the Lifeline in the Ocean” (Umi no 
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Seimeisen), which had focused on the South Pacific Islands (figure 33). The advertisement stated 
that the film showed a “heroic” process in which “30,000 stalwart youth of a maritime country 
conquer the northern sea of dense fogs and angry waves from the northern Kuril Islands to Far 
Eastern Russian coastal waters further to the edge of Alaska.”22 The advertisement’s map visually 
supported the Japanese imagined maritime empire in the north by including Alaskan waters as an 




Figure 33: Japan Advancing Northward (Hokushin Nippon). “Hokushin Nippon,” Yomiuri Shimbun, 
November 12, 1934. 
 
   In order to justify the “possession” of Alaskan waters, Japanese mass media and military 
officers frequently used the term, “northern lifeline” (Kita no Seimeisen). The intention was to 
stress that, because the Japanese empire’s fate was up to future developments in the north, Japan 
could never lose its sphere of influence in the northern sea and should enlarge it further northward 
and eastward. For example, a newspaper article, titled “Mamore Kita no Seimeisei (Defend the 
 





Northern Lifeline),” insisted, “Northern sea fisheries are called our northern lifeline and the history 
of northern sea fisheries is history of northward expansion of the Yamato race. Understanding 
northern sea fisheries in terms of national defense and economy must be an important mission for 
Japanese nationals from now on.”23 “Hokuyō Keibi no Uta (A Song for Guarding the Northern 
Sea),” produced in May 1939 by Lieutenant Colonel Keizo Matsushima of the Navy Department 
and sung by Taro Shoji, showed that it was not enough just to passively protect the “northern 
lifeline”; instead, Japan had to actively further extend it. The song said, “Break and open the thick 
ice. Protect our interests. The sun [symbol of Japan] rises high in a snowy sky. Extend the northern 
lifeline.”24 In the context of expanding the Japanese empire’s “northern lifeline” Alaskan waters 
were justified as a proper, desirable, and necessary destination of Japanese pelagic fishermen. 
   In addition to the mass media’s contribution, Seiji Konda, professor of the fisheries department 
of the Hokkaido Imperial University, demonstrated more explicitly Japan’s imagined imperial 
space in the northern sea called “the Japanese fisheries sphere”25 (figure 34). According to Konda, 
the Japanese fisheries sphere centered at Tokyo, the capital of the Japanese empire, and constituted 
three concentric circular areas. Although Konda did not mention what each area meant, it is 
possible to guess it indicated to what degree Japan had fisheries interests in each circled area. 
Given that the smallest circle contained within a radius of 1,180 miles from Tokyo almost overlaps 
with the Japanese sovereign territory, the smallest circle meant what I call an “absolute fisheries 
sphere” where Japan could not allow foreign fishermen’s interventions. Moreover, since the second 
largest circle covers Russian waters and Japan owned invested interests in fisheries there, the 
circled space meant an existing “bio-sphere of influence” where Japan should maintain its superior 
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fisheries interests. Further, taken into account that the largest circle reaches Alaskan waters, 
including Bristol Bay, where Japanese salmon fishermen were trying to advance, the outermost 
circle was a “prospective bio-sphere of influence” Japanese fishermen should develop in the future. 
Konda argued that the northern maritime space reaching up to Alaskan waters “evidently belong 
to our country’s fisheries sphere.”26 The following year Konda severely protested in a nationalist 
tone to the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry that “although Japanese are able to engaged in 
fisheries on high seas, if the Japanese government does not permit it, it means not a gentlemanly 
self-restraint but humiliating incapability.”27 
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Figure 34: A Rough Map of the Japanese Fisheries Sphere. Seiji Konda, “Hoppō Gyogyō no Tōsei 
Mondai,” Hokkai no Suisan 63 (1935): 1. 
 
   In addition to these domestic pressures, salmon fisheries in Alaskan waters were too promising 
and too significant for the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry to abandon. The ministry was 
originally ready to negotiate with the U.S. government over the regulation of Japanese fishing 
activities on high seas in Alaska to avoid controversies between the two powers in 1930.28 The 
U.S. Bureau of Fisheries too was still interested in discussing possible fisheries troubles between 
Japan and the United States. In October 1931 the U.S. Bureau of Fisheries indeed offered to make 
concessions to Japan and promised to help Japanese crabbers receive material support that was 
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necessary for operating crab factory ships, land their canned crabs directly on the U.S. West Coast, 
and sell their products in U.S. markets. In return, the U.S. Fisheries Bureau demanded that 
Japanese fishermen engage only in crabbing in Alaskan waters.29 This was a bargain between the 
United States and Japan, meaning that the United States would abandon crabbing and Japan would 
give up salmon fisheries in Alaska to protect the American salmon industry and advance interests 
of Japanese crabbers in Alaskan waters, respectively. Michitomo Iwakura, leader of the Factory 
Ship Crab Fisheries Association (Kōsen Kani Gyogyō Suisan Kumiai), preferred this political deal 
and tried to promote crab fisheries in Alaska even at the sacrifice of Japanese salmon fishermen’s 
interests.30 However, the fluid situation over fisheries not just in Alaska but also in the Russian 
Far East made the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry adopt diplomatic procrastination. In fact, 
exports of canned crabs from Japan to the United States declined almost by half from 230,793 
cases in 1929 to 115,516 cases in 1934.31 Although crab factory ships that operated in Bristol Bay 
produced 95,120 cases of canned crabs in 1930, crab products fell to between 30,000 and 50,000 
cases from 1931 to 1935 and to fewer than 20,000 cases in 1936.32 In contrast, the significance of 
offshore salmon fisheries dramatically heightened in the same period. Offshore fisheries extracted 
1.1 million tons of salmon worth 339,365 yen in 1930 and offshore production increased to 16 
million tons of salmon worth 8,050,485 yen in 1934.33 These changing situations in Alaska and 
the Russian Far East made it hard for the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry to accept in a timely 
manner the U.S. Fisheries Bureau’s offer that would have prevented a future salmon fisheries 
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controversy in Bristol Bay.  
 
Japan’s Scientific Investigation of Bristol Bay, 1936-1937 
   The Japanese government’s policy toward salmon fisheries in Alaskan waters clearly changed 
in late 1935. On September 6, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry informed the Foreign 
Ministry of the “final policy” (kyūkyoku no hōshin) about salmon fisheries in Alaska. The “final 
policy” consisted of two parts. First, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry concluded that it was 
“an inappropriate bargain” to receive a favorable treatment on crabbing in Alaska in return for 
abandoning salmon fisheries in the waters.34  The Foreign Ministry accepted the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Forestry’s decision and promised to terminate negotiations with the United States 
over fisheries in Alaska.35 However, the Foreign Ministry was concerned that Japanese fisheries 
in Alaska might cause “grave conflicts,” like Japanese fishermen’s intrusion into America’s 
territorial waters, between Japan and the United States. Thus, in order to avoid such possible 
troubles, the Foreign Ministry requested the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry to report to the 
Foreign Ministry when the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry would either permit Japanese 
nationals to operate salmon fisheries on high seas in Alaska or conduct research in Alaskan waters 
in the future.36  
   Second, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry announced it would take a middle-ground 
approach to salmon fisheries in Alaska: scientific survey of the waters. In April 1936, since “the 
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salmon industry’s demand is growing strong recently and it is impossible to keep ignoring it 
indefinitely,” the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry announced that it would spend about 89,000 
yen annually and carry out a three-year scientific research in Alaskan waters from 1936 to 1938.37 
The research had two goals. First, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry tried to make Alaskan 
waters scientifically legible and aimed to “determine the [salmon] fisheries policy through an on-
site survey of migration patterns of salmon and of the size of appropriate [salmon] fishing grounds 
[in Alaska].”38 This scientific approach to salmon fisheries in Alaska was an extension of what 
Japanese fisheries scientists had done in the Sea of Okhotsk and the western Bering Sea since 1935. 
The ministry planned to scientifically understand Bristol Bay and salmon’s habits there in a 
comprehensive manner. It was supposed to investigate (1) climate (weather, air temperature, wind 
direction, and wind strength), (2) oceanic conditions (temperature, transparency, salinity, and 
currents of the sea), (3) salmon’s migration patterns, (4) amount of salmon catches during the early, 
peak, and late fishing season, (5) biological data of salmon (length, age, diet, and maturation of 
the sexual organ), and (6) the size of fishing grounds with commercial values.39 Second, since the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry was aware that salmon fisheries were an important industry 
for the United States, the ministry sought to know through the survey “the space of fishing grounds 
in which Japanese salmon fishermen could operate and the number of factory ships and auxiliary 
vessels they could employ without provoking the United States” in Alaskan waters.40 This shows 
that the scientific survey was not necessarily an opportunistic political performance to buy time 
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and procrastinate; rather, officials of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry were serious about 
the possibility of expanding Japan’s salmon fisheries into Alaskan waters. 
   To make Bristol Bay and the salmon swimming there scientifically visible, the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Forestry ran the risk of provoking the United States. As the figure 35 shows, the 
ministry knew that the United States sought to exclude Japanese pelagic fishermen from the east 
of the line connecting Cape Avirof and the western edge of Unimak Island. However, the Ministry 
of Agriculture and Forestry’s survey team was ready to cross the line and advance deep into Bristol 
Bay. The ministry planned to conduct research in waters east of the longitude 160° west in 1936 
and undertake survey of the maritime space between the longitude 160° west and the line 
connecting Cape Newenham and the western edge of the Unimak Island in 1937 and 1938.41 This 
Japanese scientific research in Bristol Bay caused vigorous reactions from the American public, 
Congressmen, and, mostly, fishermen and fishing industry leaders on the Pacific Coast in 1936. 
 







Figure 35: A Rough Map of Bristol Bay for Scientific Research by the Ministry of Agriculture of 
Forestry from 1936 to 1938. Msataka Ide, “Hokubu Taiheiyō Gyojō Chōsa Yōkō,” April 28, 1936, 
JACAR B09042208400, Honpō Gyogyō Beikoku, Daiikkan (slide # 210), GGS. 
 
The Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry was attentive to possible adverse effects on U.S.-
Japan relations exerted by the advance of Japanese salmon fishermen into Alaskan waters. This 
was because the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry needed the Foreign Ministry’s assent and 





Ministry. Moreover, the scientific research plan was also a concession to the Japanese fishing 
industry. The Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry tried to appease the fishing industry and avoid 
criticism from it by demonstrating that the ministry was seriously committing itself to promoting 
salmon fishermen’s interests by the scientific survey of Alaskan waters. Indeed, Masataka Ide of 
the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry argued, “the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry 
considers appropriate undertaking the scientific research as an excuse for rejecting fishing 
companies’ applications” for operating salmon fisheries in Alaskan waters. Ide added, “the 
research vessel is small and weighs only 500 or 600 tons. . . . The ministry believes that it would 
not attract much attention” from the United States.42  
The Foreign Ministry had opposed the scientific survey of Bristol Bay for fear that it “would 
have bad impacts on the United States.”43 According to the ministry, the scientific investigation 
would just confirm that Bristol Bay was a lucrative and desirable fishing ground for offshore 
salmon fisheries, making it necessary for the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry to permit 
Japanese fishing companies to engage in salmon fisheries there. If the permission should be 
granted, the ministry warned, Japanese fishing companies with gigantic factory ships, motor-
propelled boats, extensive drift nets, and cheap labor forces, would easily outdo American 
counterparts and dominate salmon in Bristol Bay.44 But the ministry finally decided to approve 
the research, arguing, “given the domestic situation your ministry [Ministry of Agriculture and 
Forestry] has faced, we consider undertaking the survey inevitable,” though the research was “not 
appropriate” in terms of U.S.-Japan relations.45 But the Foreign Ministry requested the Ministry 
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of Agriculture and Forestry not grant permission to Japanese fishing companies to operate salmon 
fisheries in Alaskan waters “to avoid a grave international conflict” with the United States.46 Thus 
the Japanese government was not interested in negotiating with the United States about fisheries 
regulations in Bristol Bay.47 This failure to preemptively solve a possible fishery clash in Bristol 
Bay forced the U.S. and Japanese governments to tackle the dispute with a more limited freedom 
of action after 1936. 
 
Japan’s Scientific Research in Bristol Bay and the Outbreak of “Alaska’s Salmon War,” 
1936-1937 
 
   The Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry began surveying Bristol Bay in June 1936. The 
research vessel left Hakodate on June 10 and arrived in Bristol Bay two weeks later. It engaged in 
one-month survey of the waters until the research vessel left the bay on August 1.48 On July 22, 
the research ship’s captain, Seiichi Yamamoto, sent a telegram to the Bureau of Fisheries to update 
the situation. The telegram reported direct interactions and a tense situation between Japanese 
surveyors and Anglo-American fishermen and a patrol boat in Bristol Bay. It seems that the 
American purpose was to know and supervise the alien newcomers. On July 17, for example, an 
American cod-fishing vessel Lewis almost interfered with the research ship’s drift nets and this 
trouble was prevented after a negotiation between the two vessels. The following day four 
fishermen on board Dolly, an auxiliary ship of the Lewis, came to the research ship, saying that 
they had lost sight of their mother ship in a dense fog. They asked if they could board the research 
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vessel and exchange newspapers. Although Yamamoto rejected these requests, he offered some 
information to them about the research vessel’s purpose and affiliation. On July 20, a U.S. patrol 
boat, Alert, wandered around Matsumaru, the research vessel’s auxiliary ship, for an hour to 
engage in a perceived “silent inspection” and tracked the Japanese auxiliary vessel until it finally 
reached the research ship.49 
This one-month survey of 1936 finally enabled the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry to 
know that salmon runs in Bristol Bay were “relatively large” and that there were “fishing grounds 
with entrepreneurial values” that were “larger than expected” in the bay.50 The ministry found that 
the density of salmon schools in Bristol Bay was three times as high as that in Kamchatkan waters. 
More importantly, the ministry also discovered that salmon fishing grounds in Bristol Bay seemed 
to spread fifty to sixty miles off the shore. But the ministry was not fully sure of the density of 
salmon schools and the size of salmon fishing grounds in Bristol Bay. 51  Thus the ministry 
concluded that the scale of their investigation was “not big enough” to comprehensively 
understand the Bristol Bay fishing grounds and evaluate their commercial value. 52  This 
conclusion confirmed that the ministry would need to conduct another bigger survey of the bay 
the following year. 
Despite angry protests on the U.S. Pacific coast against the scientific survey, Japanese public 
opinion strongly demanded that the Japanese government continue the investigation of Bristol Bay. 
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For example, an editorial of the Chūgai Shōgyō Shimpō, a representative business newspaper, 
referred to a possible agreement between Japan, the United States, and Canada that would restrain 
and prohibit Japanese pelagic fisheries in American and Canadian waters. The editorial claimed, 
“the Japanese Government should refuse to respond favorably to such a proposal, considering that 
there is no reason why such an agreement should be concluded.”53 The Asahi Shimbun, one of the 
mainstream newspapers in Japan, also supported the Japanese scientific survey in Bristol Bay, 
regarding it as the “first step to advance” into Alaskan waters.54 The public opinion stood behind 
Japanese salmon fishermen and advocated the necessity of Japanese fisheries expansion into 
Alaska. 
   The Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry decided to make a more intensive survey of Bristol 
Bay in 1937 for a longer period with better equipment, a larger budget, and more human resources. 
It lengthened the research period from one month in 1936 to one and half months in 1937. The 
ministry increased the number of auxiliary ships to three. It almost doubled the budget to 169,000 
yen (approximately 270 million yen in 2017) in 1937. To offset the increase in the research costs, 
the ministry planned to catch about 100,000 Alaskan salmon in 1937, compared to 25,000 in 1936, 
and to sell them to a Japanese fishing company for 113,000 yen (roughly 180 million yen in 
2017).55 The number of crews and staff joining the survey was nearly doubled from fifty-one in 
1936 to ninety-five in 1937.56 
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   In June 1937, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry offered Seiichi Yamamoto, captain of 
the research vessel, Taiyōmaru, detailed instructions about the upcoming research in Bristol Bay. 
The instructions ultimately emphasized two objectives. One was to complete the survey within the 
specified period. In the instructions the ministry repeatedly stressed that the research team should 
finish the survey according to the original schedule even with possible American interference in 
the research. The other goal was to “avoid provoking the United States . . . and causing troubles 
with it as much as possible.” The ministry assumed that a problematic situation would emerge in 
encounters and interactions between the Japanese research team and American nationals in Bristol 
Bay. The ministry instructed Yamamoto to respond to Americans in two ways and ordered him to 
use either way according to if the Americans belonged to Coast Guard and the Navy Department 
or if they were private citizens. In either case, the ministry instructed Yamamoto to minimize 
interactions with Americans. The ministry demanded that Yamamoto should not permit Americans 
to board the research ship. It forbade visits to American ships and the exchange of goods and 
instructed the researchers not to offer more information than necessary, and to drop nets only in 
locations where American vessels would not become entwined with them. The ministry also 
limited Yamamoto’s authority and ordered him to exercise self-restraint and report to the ministry 
when a problematic situation happened. Thus, if the U.S. authorities should force their way onto 
the research ship for inspection, the ministry allowed him to accept the demand and update the 
ministry about details as soon as possible. 57  The ministry paid much attention to avoiding 
skirmishes with the United States in Bristol Bay to retain the Foreign Ministry’s essential support 
for the survey. 
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   As the U.S. government failed to take any concrete measure for regulating Japanese research 
operations in Bristol Bay, fishing industry leaders on the West Coast put mounting pressure on the 
White House and Congress in 1936. They often emphasized the economic importance of salmon 
fisheries in Bristol Bay. C. E. Cocks, Vice President of the Bristol Bay Packing Company, for 
example, informed President Franklin D. Roosevelt that Alaska had produced in 1936 
approximately 8.5 million cases of canned salmon valued at about $44 million and that almost 
three quarters of the total revenue of the Alaska Territory had derived from taxes on the fisheries.58 
He also ominously asserted, “the amount [of salmon] taken by the Japanese would mean the death 
of the most valuable of all American fishing industries . . .”59 
   To make a more convincing case about the necessity to oust Japanese pelagic fishermen from 
Bristol Bay, American fishing industry leaders added that fisheries in Alaskan waters had 
considerable implications for America’s military and food security. In a petition to Roosevelt, 
Elwyn C. Hale, Secretary of the Alaska Salmon Company, stressed Japanese distant-water 
fishermen’s geostrategic identity as a vanguard of the Japanese empire. He warned, “Establishment 
of large operations by foreigners in the Alaska area will constitute a serious military menace.”60 
Hale also paid attention to the consumption process of salmon and highlighted the fish as “one of 
the nations [sic] greatest sources of protein food.”61 Fishing industry leaders exploited America’s 
perceived geostrategic and dietary concerns of the late 1930s.62 
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American fishing industry leaders sought to exclude Japanese deep-sea fishermen from Bristol 
Bay by enclosing the entire waters. Two structurally different legal regimes existed in Bristol Bay: 
U.S. national laws within its three-mile territorial waters and the Law of the Sea on the vast high 
seas outside the territorial waters. The freedom of the seas doctrine, which constituted the core of 
the customary Law of the Sea, allowed Japanese pelagic fishermen to catch as many salmon as 
they wanted on the high seas of Bristol Bay without observing the tough conservation measures 
imposed by the White Act of 1924. West Coast fishing industry leaders advocated a radical revision 
of the customary Law of the Sea through renouncing the freedom of the seas doctrine and 
expanding U.S. jurisdiction over Alaskan salmon into the entire Bristol Bay. Harold Grotle, 
secretary of the Deep Sea Fishermen’s Union, for example, claimed ambitiously, “We would like 
to have the entire Bering Sea.”63 The United States and Japan contested jurisdiction over Alaskan 
salmon in Bristol Bay and their different legal approaches to the fish transformed Bristol Bay into 
a maritime legal borderland where two qualitatively different legal standards coexisted and 
operated.  
To solve the structural inconsistency between the two legal regimes in Bristol Bay and remake 
the oceanic legal borderland into legally bordered “American” waters, fishing industry leaders on 
the Pacific coast introduced a revolutionary legal idea. They insisted that salmon were no longer 
common-pool resources equally available to all exploiters but private property whose use was 
restricted to those who had invested their time, labor, and money in preserving it.64 The Pacific 
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Fisherman magazine, published by Miller Freeman, a public spokesman for the fishing industry, 
explained this new legal logic. It deemphasized the dynamic, cross-border character of salmon by 
highlighting the fish’s static “American” nationality, contending that Alaskan salmon were born 
and raised in inland waters of Alaska before going to the ocean and returned to Alaska to spawn at 
the end of their lifecycle. The magazine also stressed the “Americanness” of Alaskan salmon, 
pointing out that Americans had nurtured and sustained the fish through costly conservation efforts 
represented by fishing regulations and hatchery projects. The magazine concluded with 
emphasizing that the domestication work made salmon an object of private possession. It stated, 
“the position of the salmon is similar to that of a litter of pigs or a flock of chickens, bred and cared 
for on a farmer’s land and at his expense, which wander onto the public domain—they do not by 
such wandering pass from his ownership, and cannot rightly be appropriated by his neighbor.”65 
Fishing industry leaders destabilized the categorical border of livestock and conceptually blurred 
the cognitive boundary between marine and terrestrial animals and between wild and domesticated 
spaces. 
Newspapers, magazines, and short films helped American fishing industry leaders mobilize the 
public’s attention to build support for their position. The media presented U.S. possession of 
Bristol Bay and Alaskan salmon as a fait accompli. It used a discursive strategy of conceptualizing 
Japanese pelagic fishermen’s advance into Bristol Bay as “invasion” and “encroachment” and the 
fishery dispute there as “Alaska’s salmon war.”66 These sensational terms helped increase the 
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public’s awareness of the fishery problem in Bristol Bay and effectively gather their nationalistic 
support for the fishing industry’s demands.67  But, more significantly, declaring that Alaskan 
salmon were invaded or encroached upon implied the precondition in which the fish had been 
owned beforehand. Using the words “invasion” and “encroachment” produced a mythical popular 
understanding that the United States had legitimately and legally possessed Bristol Bay and 
Alaskan salmon before the U.S.-Japanese fishery controversy broke out in the 1930s. 
   Americans viewed the Japanese “invasion” or “encroachment” into Bristol Bay in the context 
of Japan’s advancing imperialism not only in the northern sea but also on the Asian Continent. The 
geopolitical developments in China, particularly the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War in 
July 1937, strengthened Americans’ dehumanizing racialization of the Japanese and racialized 
images helped justify America’s aggressive and confrontational attitude toward Japanese. For 
example, an American named Peter Syerhnis at Portland, wrote, “Japan seems to have sinister 
purpose in mind . . . She rapes China in underland war – now she pushes her belligerent[?] more 
in American fishing waters.” He continued, “Japan is like a hungry monster—‘Ogre.’ . . . In plain 
English – she is a cowardly slinking octopus.” Or, at best, Japan was an immature child in contrast 
to mature and grown-up America. Syerhnis said, “America put her [Japan] on her feet – Now she 
tries to bite America. . . . They can’t seem to govern selves properly. Japan – Germany – Italy – 
Spain [should] wake up[,] be men[,] not fools[,] – grow up – [and] do not be children.”68 The 
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Japanese image as vicious invaders and intruders justified America’s confrontational approach to 
the fisheries dispute in Bristol Bay. For example, Louis Spangler, an American at Ontario, Canada, 
claimed, “It is reasonable that if the Japs. have the freedom to ruin a fishing industry built up by 
the Canadian and U.S.A. governments through claiming the right to the freedom of the seas[,] it is 
just as logical and reasonable that the home govts. have the same right of freedom to ruin the Japs. 
fishing industry by sailing the seas with dragging anchors” and destroying their deep sea nets.69 
Lawmakers at Washington shared this nationalist sentiment with the American public. In a hearing 
about salmon fisheries in Alaska, a Representative William I. Sirovich (D-NY) proposed the use 
of armed forces, insisting, “It’s time this pussyfooting with the Japanese is done with. I’m in favor 
of sending our torpedoes, our airplanes and our bombers up there and getting rid of all of them.”70 
   Political cartoons visually strengthened the mythical popular view that Japanese pelagic 
fishermen were “poaching” “America’s” salmon in Bristol Bay. A cartoon published on the Seattle 
Post-Intelligencer, for instance, described a situation in which a cat “intruded” into a private room 
of a heterosexual couple—the United States and Canada—and was “stealing” fish from a water 
tank and the Uncle Sam looked embarrassed and unable to do anything about it (figure 36). The 
cartoon exploited Americans’ deep racial animosity toward Japanese and dehumanized Japanese 
fishermen as a cat, a cultural symbol of being cunning and sly. The term “planting” in the Uncle 
Sam’s caption reveals Americans’ ecological assumption that Alaskan salmon were not wild but 
domesticated fish. The water tank meant that Bristol Bay was an enclosed maritime space, and the 
fish swimming in the tank showed that Alaskan salmon were America’s exclusive property.71 The 
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cartoon gave political, legal, and moral legitimacy to the claim that the United States should keep 
Japanese pelagic fishermen away from Bristol Bay to protect “America’s” salmon from them.  
 
 
Figure 36: Why Not Chase the Cat Away? Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Date Unknown (c. 1936).72  
 
The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs was aware of these vigorous reactions to Japan’s 
efforts to investigate Bristol Bay and develop its fishing interests there. After June 1936, when 
Japanese scientists conducted the first survey of Bristol Bay, Japanese consuls at Portland and 
 





Seattle repeatedly reported to Tokyo that anti-Japanese sentiment on the West Coast was rising and 
stressed the importance of quickly settling the fishery row.73 But the Foreign Ministry ignored 
their suggestions because the ministry had agreed on the three-year program of investigating 
Bristol Bay. In fact, Foreign Minister Naotake Sato replied to the consuls that, since salmon fishing 
was a crucial Japanese industry worth 30 million yen per year (approximately 49 billion yen 
currently), Tokyo could not determine its policy until the three-year investigation was completed 
in mid-1938.74 Therefore, Sato instructed the consuls to “pretend to be ignorant of anything except 
that Japan will conduct research in Bristol Bay in 1937” and to “avoid making any commitment” 
to ending the fishery controversy “without offending Washington officials as much as possible by 
showing a seemingly cooperative attitude.”75 The Foreign Ministry maintained this wait-and-see 
policy until December 1937, when the U.S. State Department finally put enormous pressure on the 
Foreign Ministry to grant concessions in the fishery controversy. 
 
The U.S.-Japan Contest for Scientific Knowledge about Alaskan Salmon, 1937-1938 
 
While American fishing industry leaders sought to possess Alaskan salmon by abandoning the 
freedom of the seas principle and remaking the customary Law of the Sea, Washington officials 
opposed claiming proprietary rights to the fish for five reasons. The first was legal precedent. In 
the 1890s the United States made a similar claim about protecting fur seals and declared that, since 
the Bering Sea was a “closed” ocean, Washington could exercise exclusive jurisdiction over fur 
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seals in the eastern Bering Sea. But in 1893 the international arbitration committee, established to 
arbitrate conflicting claims to fur seals in the Bering Sea between the United States and Britain, 
decided that U.S. jurisdiction over fur seals in the Bering Sea was restricted to the ordinary three-
mile limit.76 Referring to this legal precedent, Eugene H. Dooman of the Division of Far Eastern 
Affairs of the State Department concluded that expanding America’s jurisdiction over Alaskan 
salmon into the high seas of Bristol Bay was “not a tenable” argument.77 Attorney General Homer 
S. Cummings agreed on this point.78 Second, unilaterally transforming the customary Law of the 
Sea would be economically disadvantageous. The freedom of the seas doctrine was essential to 
American deep-sea fishermen as it guaranteed America’s worldwide offshore fishing interests. 
Thus, if another country followed America’s precedent and one-sidedly expanded its oceanic 
jurisdiction, it would be difficult for the United States to oppose and overturn such an effort.79 
Third, Washington could not morally support the unilateral extension of its jurisdiction in Bristol 
Bay. Since the United States had advocated the freedom of the seas principle from the beginning 
of the Republic, the policy of enclosing Bristol Bay was “not in line with the traditional attitude 
and policy of the United States.”80 Fourth, it was technically impossible to monitor all Japanese 
fishing boats during the season in the entire Bristol Bay. Ward T. Bower of the Bureau of Fisheries 
claimed that the U.S. patrol service could not be “effective, owing to the number of Japanese 
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vessels operating, extent of the fishing areas, and variable weather conditions.”81 Fifth, if the 
United States insisted on excluding foreign fishing boats from Bristol Bay, it might lead to an 
armed conflict with foreign powers, most likely with Japan. Leo D. Sturgeon of the Division of 
Far Eastern Affairs warned, “The exercise of such jurisdiction would undoubtedly require a show 
of force by this Government if foreign vessels were interfered with.”82  
State Department officials pursued a solution that would not upset the status quo of the 
customary Law of the Sea. The best option for them was a multilateral salmon conservation treaty 
that included Japan as a contracting party. But they had to consider the geostrategic relationship 
with Japan. In April 1937, Edward W. Allen, a Seattle-based lawyer and a public spokesman for 
the fishing industry, proposed to Assistant Secretary of State Francis B. Sayre that Washington first 
conclude a multilateral salmon conservation agreement with Ottawa and London. Then, if Tokyo 
refused to join this conservation regime, the three Anglo-American powers could collaboratively 
close their markets to Japanese canned salmon and thus force Tokyo to join the salmon 
conservation treaty.83 But such high-handed diplomacy, founded on the threat of embargo, was 
too risky for State Department officials, for whom preventing further deterioration in U.S.-Japan 
relations was the top priority. Joseph W. Ballantine of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs warned 
that Allen’s plan “would be likely to invite reprisals [from Japan] and injure good relations [with 
it].”84 Sayre concurred and added that Allen’s solution would be “likely to be considered by 
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Japanese as being like pointing a gun toward them.”85 Secretary of Commerce Daniel C. Roper 
agreed to approach Tokyo cautiously in addressing this question. He insisted, “We should bear in 
mind that we are dealing with a country which is considerably wrought up and in a nervous state, 
and in which the question of a food supply, particularly fish food, is highly important.”86  
These Washington discussions reveal that although Japan’s voluntary participation in an 
Anglo-American multilateral salmon conservation regime might theoretically be the best way for 
the United States to keep Alaskan salmon from Japanese pelagic fishermen, it was not considered 
to be an effective solution. Even if Japan were to join such a multilateral conservation arrangement, 
it would be difficult to implement because American ichthyologists knew too little about Alaskan 
salmon. The State Department as well as the Bureau of Fisheries had limited data about Alaskan 
salmon’s lifecycle, habits, and migration patterns. For example, Secretary of State Cordell Hull 
straightforwardly confessed to President Roosevelt, “We do not . . . understand that the salmon 
resources of Alaskan waters have thus far been depleted or are in imminent danger of early 
depletion.”87 In a Congressional hearing in June 1937, moreover, Elmer Higgins, chief of the 
Division of Scientific Inquiry of the Bureau of Fisheries, succinctly admitted, “We know nothing 
about the life and growth of salmon during their life outside territorial waters.”88 
In the face of this situation, Gardner Poole, chairman of the Fishery Advisory Committee of 
the Business Advisory Council, stressed that the United States must have as “thorough” scientific 
data and facts about the fish as Japan had before starting negotiations toward a multilateral salmon 
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conservation agreement. Poole wrote: 
We are somewhat at a disadvantage as we lack thorough scientific knowledge and facts as to 
the habits and movement of Salmon and Halibut in their migration from the sea to our shores. 
On the other hand, the Japanese, through a very definite policy, have a thorough knowledge 
of these matters based on scientific surveys which they have made through the operations of 
a fully equipped and modern research vessel. . . . As a result of their work, the Japanese are 
in possession of data and facts today not known to any other nation. . . . If, by any chance, 
we should be called upon to approach this Pacific Coast troublesome situation in any manner 
leading up to treaty relationships . . . we would be seriously handicapped because of the 
definite lack of authoritative data based on scientific investigations. . . . We should at least 
follow the example of the other countries in providing for proper facilities for securing 
scientific data and knowledge which we do not now have on our deep sea fisheries.89 
 
State Department officials agreed that the United States must immediately study the topographical 
features of Bristol Bay and the biological characteristics of Alaskan salmon as comprehensively 
as its competitor, Japan. Ballantine suggested to Stanley K. Hornbeck, adviser on political relations 
to the State Department that, “as the Japanese investigations are more recent than some of ours 
appear to be and as the habits of some fish, at least, have been known to change, I think we should 
overlook no possibility of having our information as up to date and scientifically sound as 
possible.”90 Ballantine highlighted the urgency of the problem and concluded, “Action should be 
taken as speedily as possible to remedy the situation” “in view of the possibility that we should 
have to bear the brunt of any criticism for failure arising from insufficient knowledge of the 
facts.”91  
   Washington officials’ lack of scientific knowledge about sockeye salmon resulted from the 
federal government’s drastic reduction of budgets for studying the fish in the midst of the Great 
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Depression. The work of the Division of Scientific Inquiry was supported chiefly by the 
appropriation called “Inquiry Respecting Food Fishes.” As the figure 37 shows, the appropriation 
steadily increased from 1928 to 1932, offering $77,000 in 1928, $108,000 in 1929, $108,000 in 
1930, $172,000 in 1931, and $300,340 in 1932.92 However, President Roosevelt’s promise to 
reduce the national deficit with balanced budget led to a substantial fall of appropriations for the 
scientific research by the Bureau of Fisheries. In 1933 Congress provided the bureau with 
$200,000 for advancing its scientific work, but the Economy Act of 1933 deducted more than ten 
percent from the amount and finally granted $178,000 to the Bureau of Fisheries for its scientific 
research. This fiscal regulation got tighter the following year. In 1934 Congress allocated $173,000 
to the Bureau of Fisheries for its scientific inquiry, but only $122,000 was available to the bureau 
for the scientific work.93 These reduced appropriations for the scientific study of fish badly hit the 
bureau’s scientific research projects. The Division of Scientific Inquiry curtailed field works, 
dismissed the division’s regular staff, and diverted the limited human and financial resources from 
fishery research into other fields, in addition to the closure of two biological laboratories of the 
bureau and the decommission of the Albatross II, a sea-going research vessel the bureau needed to 
investigate major fishing grounds.94 The scientific research in sockeye salmon in Bristol Bay 
suffered these severe cuts in appropriations and this made it more difficult for officials of the 
Bureau of Fisheries to expand their biological understanding of sockeye salmon. 
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Washington changed from its traditional neglect of studying the oceanic ecology of Alaska and 
immediately began intensive scientific research in Bristol Bay and on Alaskan salmon. Roosevelt 
had neglected investigating Alaskan waters and in June 1936 vetoed a congressional plan for 
constructing and operating a special research vessel for $500,000 (approximately $9.3 million in 
2019). The president viewed such research-related expenses as “wholly unnecessary” and insisted 
that it would be enough to transfer some out-of-date naval or Coast Guard ships to the Fisheries 
Bureau to convert into research vessels.95 A June 1937 congressional hearing, however, revealed 
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that the government had no ships that could be transformed into research vessels.96 To address 
this situation, Roper included in the budget of the Fisheries Bureau $95,000 (roughly $1.7 million 
in 2019) for chartering one or two survey vessels.97 The Congress of 1938 approved a five-year 
investigation of Bristol Bay and Alaskan salmon and appropriated $76,000 (approximately $1.4 
million in 2019) for the first year of the research.98 This shift in Washington’s attitude toward 
surveying Bristol Bay and studying Alaskan salmon aimed to counter Tokyo’s three-year scientific 
project for investigating the same waters and the same fish. But a problem was that this American 
research program would take many years to conduct and would not help in providing a quick 
solution to the ongoing fishery problem with Japan. 
Lack of scientific knowledge about Alaskan salmon restricted the State Department’s options 
in settling the fishery controversy. One crucial question was how far the United States should 
expand its jurisdiction over salmon in Bristol Bay. State Department officials were originally 
convinced that the United States would be able to protect salmon in Bristol Bay if it banned 
Japanese pelagic fishermen’s operations within twenty miles of America’s coastlines. They 
believed that “salmon fishing cannot be practically conducted more than twenty miles from our 
coastline.”99 They soon found their ideas too optimistic and conjectural to effectively preserve 
Alaskan salmon. State Department counselor Robert Walton Moore wrote to Roosevelt: 
It seems very certain from the information available that a fifty mile limit or even a 
substantially higher mile limit would not effectively protect the [salmon] industry. The run 
of the salmon into our rivers could be intercepted in Bristol Bay, for instance by Japanese 
fishing vessels using long gill nets, say seventy-five or one hundred miles off the coast. We 
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can have no assurance of the industry being maintained unless the Japanese will forego their 
fishing activities a very considerable distance beyond the coast line.100 
 
State Department officials also realized that they were ignorant of geographical features of Bristol 
Bay and that they needed to study how the shallowness of the waters for a long way offshore 
affected salmon habits and their migration routes.101 Therefore, the State Department decided, 
“Until such an investigation [of Alaskan salmon and Bristol Bay] is made, we are in no position to 
conclude definitive negotiations with Japan. All we can do in that direction would seem to be 
limited to endeavoring to obtain Japan’s agreement in principle.”102 
The State Department increasingly leaned toward concluding a bilateral interim fishery 
agreement with Japan until the U.S. government could complete a scientific investigation of 
Alaskan salmon in Bristol Bay. State Department officials were nevertheless willing to discuss any 
solution that would not overturn the freedom of the seas doctrine. Ernest W. Sawyer, former 
Assistant Secretary of the Interior, offered a unique idea of building artificial islands in Bristol Bay 
and gradually extending America’s sovereignty in the waters within the existing international legal 
framework. Sawyer suggested that Army engineers “drop a few barges of rock out on the tideflats 
of Bristol Bay and build a fish boat refuge where we could run up the flag and step by step ease 
the japs out of Bristol Bay.”103 Although State Department officials gave careful consideration to 
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this intriguing idea, their conclusion was negative due to America’s limited scientific information 
about Bristol Bay and the salmon swimming there. Sturgeon answered: 
The shallow area of Bristol Bay, in a fishing sense, covers almost the entire Bay. . . . The 
snag is that we do not have sufficient scientific data to say just how far offshore it would be 
possible for alien fishermen to break up or intercept the salmon runs. Neither do we have 
adequate information as to the various routes followed by the salmon as they head from the 
open sea to the rivers which they eventually enter for spawning purposes.104 
 
   After October 1937, when the State Department began addressing the fishery controversy more 
seriously because of the strong possibility of an anti-Japanese boycott on the West Coast, Tokyo’s 
noncommittal attitude toward the fishery question also began changing. The Foreign Ministry gave 
up its wait-and-see attitude and took the initiative toward settling the fishery trouble. The Foreign 
Ministry was deeply concerned about a possible anti-Japanese boycott and how it might affect the 
Second Sino-Japanese War, which had begun in July 1937. This meant that Foreign Ministry 
officials viewed Japan’s armed terrestrial expansion in China after 1937 and its more peaceful, 
science-oriented maritime advance into Alaska within a same political framework of Japan’s 
empire-building projects. Indeed, Foreign Ministry officials, who believed that public opinion was 
decisive in U.S. foreign policymaking, worried that American fishing-industry union workers, in 
cooperation with other labor unions, would take advantage of the fishery situation to agitate for a 
nationwide boycott of Japanese goods.105 Such a boycott would impact Japan’s silk exports to the 
United States, which were worth 400 million yen (roughly 650 billion yen in 2017).106 This 
foreign trade revenue was essential for Japan’s empire-making efforts on the Asian Continent. 
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Foreign Ministry officials were also concerned that a boycott would further arouse anti-Japanese 
sentiment and invite America’s intervention in the war in China. Because they believed that 
America’s attitude and behavior could significantly affect the war on the Asian Continent, the 
Foreign Ministry sought to appease the United States and keep it out of the warfare.107 When Vice 
Foreign Minister Kensuke Horinouchi claimed that it was urgently necessary to suspend the 
scientific survey of Bristol Bay in order to appease the American public and improve relations with 
the United States, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry reluctantly heeded the request in the 
“wide perspective of Japan-U.S. reconciliation and cooperation.”108 
In March 1938, Washington and Tokyo finally settled the fishery controversy through a 
gentleman’s agreement. In the past, the United States and Japan had employed this informal 
convention to resolve or preempt U.S.-Japan problems, such as a question of Japanese immigration 
to the United States in 1907-1908.109 In the agreement of 1938, Tokyo offered three concessions. 
First, Japan would suspend its three-year scientific investigation of Bristol Bay. Second, Japan 
would continue restraining Japanese nationals from fishing for salmon in Alaskan waters. Third, 
Japan would withhold their fishing permits if Japanese nationals were found catching salmon in 
Alaskan waters. 110  Although earlier scholarship has undervalued the importance of the first 
concession with focus on the second one, the first promise was the most significant factor for 
Washington officials because protecting Alaskan salmon hinged ultimately on the scientific 
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understanding of the habits and migration patterns of the fish. Despite these three concessions, 
Washington officials and American fishing industry leaders were far from being satisfied. This was 
because, as Vice Minister of Agriculture and Forestry Hiroya Ino emphasized in December 1937, 
although Japan voluntarily refrained from exercising its legitimate right, guaranteed by the 
customary Law of the Sea, to fish in Alaskan waters, Japan never renounced this legal privilege 
nor recognized the entire Bristol Bay as America’s sovereign waters. 111  The gentleman’s 
agreement was, at the time, the only practical way for Washington to temporarily protect Bristol 
Bay salmon from Japanese pelagic fishermen and for Japan to promote the most important imperial 
project on the Asian Continent. Since this gentlemen’s agreement considerably reflected sensitive 
geopolitical relations between the United States and Japan on the eve of the Pacific War, a 
drastically novel salmon fisheries regime would emerge from the final outcome of the warfare 
after August 1945. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has reconsidered the nature of the Bristol Bay crisis by examining how 
Washington officials perceived, addressed, and solved the fishery dispute. The fishery controversy 
contained a political question of how the United States ought to go about protecting Alaskan 
salmon from Japanese deep-sea fishermen. It provoked considerable discussion among Americans 
as to how to transform Bristol Bay from an oceanic legal borderland, where Japanese pelagic 
fishermen could catch as many salmon as they wanted, to legally bordered American waters where 
the United States could exercise exclusive jurisdiction over the fish. While American fishing 
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industry leaders and their allies in the media and Congress demanded that the United States 
unilaterally abandon the freedom of the seas doctrine and expand its jurisdiction over Alaskan 
salmon into the entire Bristol Bay, Washington officials rejected this demand.  
The Bristol Bay crisis was, structurally, a U.S.-Japan contest for the legal authority to exploit 
Alaskan salmon in the waters. It was not only a legal matter, however, but it rested on the technical 
question of how the United States might be able to preserve Alaskan salmon from Japanese deep-
sea fishermen. This question occupied the center of Washington officials’ discussions about 
settling the fishery controversy. Washington officials found that access to Alaskan salmon 
depended ultimately on available scientific information about the fish. Indeed, Washington 
officials’ very limited scientific knowledge about Alaskan salmon compared to Japan’s made it 
necessary for them to rely on the Japanese government’s voluntary promise not to catch salmon in 
Alaskan waters, which had the effect of practically changing Bristol Bay into de facto American 















CHAPTER 6: THE SECOND WORLD WAR AND THE ESTABLISHMENT 
OF A NEW MULTILATERAL SALMON FISHERIES REGIME 
IN THE BERING SEA AND THE NORTH PACIFIC, 1938-1952 
 
This chapter examines the formation of a multilateral sockeye salmon fisheries regime in the 
Bering Sea with focus on the process leading up to the conclusion of the International Convention 
for the High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean (hereafter the North Pacific Convention) in 
May 1952.1 The agreement constructed a conservationist institutional framework within which 
the three signatories—the United States, Canada, and Japan—conducted salmon fisheries in the 
North Pacific. Interpreting the adoption of the North Pacific Convention as a logical consequence 
of the Bristol Bay crisis, a U.S.-Japanese dispute over sockeye salmon in the bay in the 1930s, 
historians have analyzed America’s policymaking process regarding Alaskan salmon fisheries 
from 1938 to 1952. They have looked at the legal questions presented by the Bristol Bay crisis and 
described how American policymakers solved the problems by creating a revolutionary salmon 
fisheries regime through the North Pacific Convention that aimed to refuse Japanese pelagic 
fishermen legal privileges to catch Alaskan salmon on the high seas in the Bering Sea and the 
North Pacific. Focusing on the fact that the convention introduced the innovative “abstention” 
principle based on the scientific concept of “maximum sustainable yield” (MSY) and challenged 
the prevailing freedom of the seas doctrine, the historians have argued that the North Pacific 
Convention was a crucial milestone in the historical development of the Law of the Sea after World 
War II. The historians have also stressed the exclusive character of the North Pacific Convention 
and the superior power of the United States as a hegemon projecting its political authority into the 
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Bering Sea and the North Pacific to dominate sockeye salmon in the waters.2 
   Contrary to the earlier scholarship, which centers on legal issues, this chapter pays more 
attention to scientific perspectives and explores how the North Pacific Convention emerged from 
intertwining legal and scientific discussions about salmon fisheries in the Bering Sea and the North 
Pacific. To be sure, as the previous accounts have pointed out, a lesson U.S. policymakers learned 
from the Bristol Bay crisis of the 1930s was that the freedom of the seas principle was outdated 
and ineffective enough to be reformed. The adoption of the abstention doctrine in the North Pacific 
Convention offered an innovative solution for the legal problem by structurally modifying the 
freedom of the seas principle and claiming exclusive proprietary rights to marine animals on the 
high seas. But another more important lesson U.S. policymakers got from the Bristol Bay crisis 
was that law and science were inextricably knitted together and that increasing ichthyological 
knowledge was essential to preserving sockeye salmon in Bristol Bay. This was because physical 
access to the fish depended more on the degree to which ichthyologists could make the fish’s 
migration patterns scientifically legible than on a restrictive salmon fisheries regime. I stress that 
we need to look at the interplay of law and science to better evaluate the historical significance of 
the North Pacific Convention. 
Placing the North Pacific Convention in the context of growing scientific approach to salmon 
fisheries, I reveal a more ambivalent nature of the tripartite fisheries agreement. This chapter shows 
that the North Pacific Convention, despite its legal achievements, failed to solve the question about 
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legal and physical access to sockeye salmon in the Bering Sea, including Bristol Bay, and the North 
Pacific in a satisfactory and fundamental manner. This was because the trilateral fisheries 
agreement reflected America’s insufficient scientific data about Alaskan salmon’s ecology 
necessary to effectively preserve the fish from Japanese pelagic fishermen in Bristol Bay and the 
Bering Sea. I argue that the North Pacific Convention’s essence was that it just translated legal 
questions about access to Alaskan salmon into scientific ones. I also insist that the main historical 
significance of the North Pacific Convention was not the introduction of the abstention doctrine, 
as overemphasized by the previous scholarly research but the establishment of the International 
North Pacific Salmon Fisheries Commission (hereafter the North Pacific Commission), a 
politically integrated research board designed to scientifically visualize the ecology of sockeye 
salmon in the Bering Sea and the North Pacific in a comprehensive manner by systematically 
producing, sharing, and evaluating data about the fish. The creation of the North Pacific 
Commission mattered because physical and legal access to sockeye salmon in Bristol Bay became 
ultimately contingent on the scientific knowledge about the fish produced by the tripartite, inter-
governmental scientific board consisting of American, Canadian, and Japanese ichthyologists.  
Indeed, the North Pacific Convention theoretically deprived Japan of its legal privileges to 
catch Alaskan salmon in the Bering Sea and the North Pacific by drawing the abstention line in 
the middle of the oceans. However, the legal restrictions were meaningless and impractical to 
effectively protect Alaskan salmon from Japanese deep-sea fishermen unless ichthyologists could 
scientifically demonstrate that the political border marked by the abstention line adequately 
corresponded to the biological boundary of the fish in the Bering Sea and the North Pacific. The 
United States needed the North Pacific Commission’s scientific knowledge-producing work to 





about sockeye salmon in the Bering Sea and the North Pacific was a key for Japan to securing its 
legal and physical access to the fish in the waters. By spotlighting scientific perspectives, I 
highlight the North Pacific Convention’s integrative and disruptive characters, America’s limited 
authority in the field of ichthyology despite its status as a hegemon, and more negotiated power 
relations between the United States and Japan over salmon fisheries in the Bering Sea and the 
North Pacific. 
 
Identifying the Migration Range of Sockeye Salmon in Bristol Bay and the Bering Sea, 1938-
1941 
 
This section examines how American ichthyologists deepened their scientific understanding of 
sockeye salmon in Bristol Bay and the Bering Sea following the settlement of the Bristol Bay crisis 
in March 1938. More specifically, I look at the four-year survey of the fish in the waters from 1938 
to 1941. Although the U.S. government originally planned a five-year survey, it suspended the 
research after the 1941 season due to America’s official participation in the Second World War 
with the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor in December 1941. The war caused the lack of financial, 
material, and human resources necessary for continuing the scientific survey, and security 
regulations on the Pacific Coast made continuing the research in the ocean physically and 
technically impossible.3 Despite such setbacks, the four-year scientific investigation of sockeye 
salmon swimming in Bristol Bay and the Bering Sea allowed American ichthyologists and 
Washington officials to possess valuable information about the fish’s ecology. The collected and 
evaluated data about sockeye salmon in Bristol Bay and the Bering Sea crucially affected the final 
shape of the North Pacific Convention after the war. 
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Although a gentlemen’s agreement between the United States and Japan solved the Bristol Bay 
crisis, U.S. officials at Washington were convinced that the settlement was only temporary and 
provisional. To prepare for future negotiations with Japan over Alaskan salmon fisheries, 
Washington officials felt the urgent necessity to have better and more comprehensive scientific 
understanding of sockeye salmon swimming in Bristol Bay. Elmer Higgins, Chief of the Division 
of Scientific Inquiry of the Bureau of Fisheries, stated, “The fact that there is little available 
knowledge of the life history of salmon in this area [Bristol Bay], and of the factors affecting the 
survival of the populations as a whole, made it imperative to inaugurate a thorough biological 
study of the fish of this region [Bristol Bay], their migration routes and the factors affecting their 
survival.”4 It was also important for American ichthyologists to launch such intensive and well-
funded scientific surveys of the Bristol Bay region immediately. Secretary of Commerce Daniel C. 
Roper wrote to Secretary of State Cordell Hull: 
For some time we have realized the necessity of scientific studies of salmon in this important 
region of Alaska [Bristol Bay], but so far funds have not been available. It is hoped that the 
supplemental estimate now under consideration by the Bureau of the Budget will receive 
prompt and favorable action and will be transmitted to Congress, so that funds can become 
available for undertaking this important investigation without delay. It seems highly 
desirable that it be launched in the current season, so that in any future discussions which 
may arise with the Japanese Government regarding the Bristol Bay problem, we shall be in 
possession of information now wholly lacking.5 
 
   The Bureau of Fisheries started the scientific investigation of Bristol Bay in summer of 1938. 
Because officials of the bureau sought to know the life history as well as migration patterns of 
sockeye salmon, they had originally planned a five-year investigation of Bristol Bay, and Congress 
approved appropriating $76,000 for the first year of the research project. The Bureau of Fisheries 
 
4 Elmer Higgins, “Progress in Biological Inquiries 1938” (Washington, DC: Government Printing 
Office, 1939), 36. 
5 Daniel C. Roper to Cordell Hull, April 11, 1938, DF 1930-39, 711.008 North Pacific/331, Box 





instructed Frederick A. Davidson, who was in charge of the bureau’s scientific studies in the 
northern Pacific and Alaska areas, to manage the survey, and George B. Kelez and Joseph T. 
Barnaby, both of whom possessed wide experiences in salmon studies, became assistants for 
Davidson. Their research goals were ambitious and covered both offshore and inshore fisheries in 
Bristol Bay with the help of the Coast Guard cutter Redwing. They would conduct experimental 
fishing with various types of gear to discover the location of sockeye salmon’s feeding grounds in 
offshore waters. Moreover, they would attach tags to ascending sockeye salmon to reveal their 
migratory routes and collect biological data on their growth, age composition, and feeding habits. 
Further, the ichthyologists would carry out hydrographic observations to learn about conditions 
believed to impact sockeye salmon’s movements, such as water temperature, salinity, and 
abundance of food.6 Despite such plan, the time for research and preparation was limited to only 
a month from August 6 to September 7. Consequently, the 1938 survey of Bristol Bay focused on 
collecting detailed oceanographic data about the bay, particularly hydrographic casts, current 
measurement, and bottom samplings (figure 38).7  
 
6 “Bureau of Fisheries Begins Five-Year Survey of Bristol Bay Salmon Resources,” c. June 30, 1938, 
DF 1930-1939, 711.008 North Pacific/399, Box 3914, RG 59, NACP. 
7 Felix Favorite and Glenn Pedersen, “Bristol Bay Oceanography, August-September 1938” 







Figure 38: Oceanographic Surveys in Bristol Bay. Felix Favorite and Glenn Pedersen, “Bristol Bay 
Oceanography, August-September 1938” (Washington, DC: United States Department of Interior, 
1959), 2.8 
 
The biological investigation of sockeye salmon and the hydrographic survey of Bristol Bay 
continued on a larger scale in summer 1939. The research team headed by Davidson covered not 
only Bristol Bay but also its contiguous waters in the Bering Sea, reaching Nunivak Island on the 
north, the Pribilof Islands on the west, and the Aleutian Islands on the southwest. In the waters, 
Davidson conducted physico-chemical surveys and gathered detailed data on currents, both tidal 
and drift as well as on salinities, oxygen contents, and water temperature at every ten meters from 
 





the surface to the bottom. In the biological surveys, Davidson carried out experimental seining and 
gillnetting, focusing on the relative abundance of the plankton in the waters of the Bering Sea, the 
character of the bottom flora and fauna, the location and availability of the adult and young salmon 
in the region, the character of the food consumed by the salmon, and the migratory patterns of the 
mature salmon.9 
   The results of the scientific survey of sockeye salmon in Bristol Bay and its contiguous waters 
shattered State Department officials’ former optimism about protecting salmon fisheries there. As 
discussed in the previous chapter, State Department officials had originally believed that it would 
be enough to restrict and prohibit foreigners’ sockeye salmon fisheries within twenty miles from 
the shores in Bristol Bay in order to preserve the fish from possible interceptions by foreign pelagic 
fishermen in the waters. However, the investigation revealed that “the fish were traveling fairly 
close to the surface regardless of the distance from shore at which they were found.” Moreover, 
the survey team discovered that “Fish [sockeye salmon] were more abundant in the southern half 
of the section than they were in the northern half of the section [of the bay]. The greatest abundance 
of fish [sockeye salmon] was encountered fifty to seventy miles from shore.”10 These results 
surprised the ichthyologists too and showed how limited their scientific information about sockeye 
salmon was. They wrote, “this was not anticipated in view of the assertions by commercial 
fishermen that the salmon always travel close to shore when on their spawning migrations.” Further, 
the research team found that “regardless of the stage of the tide or the direction of the current the 
majority of the fish were traveling easterly, that is toward the head of the Bay.” The team’s 
conclusion was “salmon can be captured on the high seas,” suggesting that the United States would 
 
9 Frederick A. Davidson to L. D. Sturgeon, March 17, 1939, DF 1930-1939, 711.008 North 
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need to compromise the freedom of the seas doctrine and extend its oceanic sovereignty in Bristol 
Bay to keep the fish physically from foreign pelagic fishermen.11  
   In addition, the survey offered useful data about fishing gear to be used for salmon fisheries in 
Bristol Bay. Because American fishermen had not conducted fishing operations for sockeye 
salmon so far from shore in the bay, no data was available as to the type of fishing apparatus that 
would be most efficient and practical there.12 The investigation revealed that sockeye salmon 
could be caught between Cape Seniavin and Cape Newenham by means of both purse seines and 
gill nets. But the survey demonstrated that sockeye salmon did not school in large aggregations in 
the area under discussion and that hence purse seining was not a practical method for catching 
them. Instead, fishing with gill nets would be much more efficient if carried on at night.13 
   Besides, tagging experiments near the Shumagin Islands in 1939 offered another important 
finding for American ichthyologists. Charles H. Gilbert and Willis H. Rich once concluded in 1923 
that a majority of sockeye salmon bound for Bristol Bay for spawning travelled westward in waters 
south of the Alaska Peninsula, entered the Bering Sea through False Pass, east of Unimak Island, 
and proceeded to Bristol Bay. In contrast, the 1939 tagging experiments revealed that a fairly large 
number of sockeye salmon released near the Shumagin Islands travelled more westward than had 
been expected, reached the Bering Sea via Unimak Pass, west of Unimak Island, and other passes 
to the westward, and proceeded to Bristol Bay for spawning.14 This showed how hard it was for 
American ichthyologists to accurately identify sockeye salmon’s migratory routes even at the final 
stage of their life, not to mention their far more complicated and mysterious migration patterns 
 
11 Ibid. 
12 Joseph T. Barnaby, “Offshore Fishing in Bristol Bay and the Bering Sea” (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Department of the Interior, 1952), 6. 
13 Ibid., 13. 
14 Elmer Higgins, “Progress in Biological Inquiries 1939” (Washington, DC: Government Printing 





before the beginning of the ascent for spawning (figure 40).  
 
 
Figure 39: Map of Bristol Bay and the Alaska Peninsula. Felix Favorite, John W. Schantz, and 
Charles R. Hebard, “Oceanographic Observations in Bristol Bay and the Bering Sea, 1939-1941 








Figure 40: Oceanographic Surveys in Bristol Bay. Joseph T. Barnaby, “Offshore Fishing in Bristol 
Bay and the Bering Sea” (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Interior, 1952), 9.15 
 
As was clear from that the research team headed by Davidson investigated not only Bristol 
Bay but also its contiguous waters in the Bering Sea, the spatial and biological understanding about 
sockeye salmon swimming in Bristol Bay had changed amid the Bristol Bay crisis. Until the 
outbreak of the U.S.-Japanese fisheries dispute in the late 1930s, Americans had perceived Bristol 
Bay as politically and ecologically independent from the rest of the Bering Sea. In fact, until the 
Bristol Bay crisis happened, few foreign deep-sea fishermen had customarily visited Bristol Bay 
 
15 Dots indicate localities fished during 1939. Figures beside dots are station numbers referred to in 





except some Japanese crabbers, and few Americans had recognized the necessity to enlarge 
America’s jurisdiction over sockeye salmon into the Bering Sea and the North Pacific. For most 
Americans the Bering Sea was a political and ecological barrier dividing Asia and North America, 
making Bristol Bay de facto America’s bordered waters and sockeye salmon swimming there de 
facto America’s exclusive property institutionally controlled and managed by U.S. federal fisheries 
laws. When the development of factory ship allowed Japanese pelagic fishermen to operate in 
Bristol Bay in pursuit of sockeye salmon in the mid-1930s, a growing number of Americans looked 
at the Bering Sea as connecting, no longer separating, Asia and North America and viewed Bristol 
Bay as a constituting part of the Bering Sea. The vigorous discussions about extending America’s 
jurisdiction over sockeye salmon in Bristol Bay into the Bering Sea reflected this new conviction 
that the Bering Sea should be the basic geographical unit for considering questions about salmon 
fisheries in Bristol Bay. Likewise, the American ichthyologists’ effort to scientifically visualize 
sockeye salmon’s migratory routes in Bristol Bay and the Bering Sea was based on the new 
assumption that the two waters were ecologically and environmentally interactive and 
interconnected rather than independent and separated. 
   A letter from H. G. Fergus, a New York businessman, to the State Department in August 1938 
clearly showed this new belief that Bristol Bay should be conceived as an ecologically and 
environmentally seamless part of the Bering Sea. In the correspondence to Hull, Fergus made an 
intriguing suggestion that the United States construct a canal at the southern entrance of Bristol 
Bay, change the oceanic tides, and restrict the mobility of sockeye salmon for conservation 
purposes. Fergus wrote: 
As the current known as the Japan Stream sweeps easterly and north directly toward the 
Aleutian Islands. . . . There is created a “whirlpool effect” at both spots as the cold waters 
from the North come into contact with those streams (“maelstroms” so called). If a broad 





deemed better) . . . the fish (which seem to be congregate within its circle or tangent there 
to) would move their feeding grounds easterly over 500 miles . . .16 
 
As Fergus’s hand-written map visually demonstrates, it is noteworthy that he viewed the Bering 
Sea and the North Pacific as the fundamental geographical unit for studying the biology of 
sockeye salmon migrating in Bristol Bay (figure 41). 
 
 
Figure 41: Plan to Build a Canal on the Alaska Peninsula. H. G. Fergus to Cordell Hull, August 21, 
1938, DF 1930-1939, 711.008 North Pacific/401, Box 3914, RG 59, NACP. 
 
   Fergus’s letter was also significant in revealing the increasingly popular idea that humans could 
and should tame and control the marine environment and ecology, including even oceanic currents 
and sockeye salmon’s migratory patterns. State Department officials did not necessarily treat 
Fergus’s unique suggestion as ridiculous and unrealistic from the beginning; instead, the 
department carefully and positively considered it as a “novel proposal.” Samuel Whittemore Boggs, 
 






the department’s official geographer, called Harry A. Marmer of the U.S. Coast and Geodetic 
Survey and asked for his expertise on oceanic tides. Marmer was skeptical of Fergus’s idea simply 
because the North Pacific was too huge for humans to tame. He said, “[B]ecause the Pacific Ocean 
is so large the Japan current is quite diffuse in the North Pacific, . . . in considering the effect of 
any possible canal it would be necessary to compute the great volume of water which would have 
to pass through the canal in order to have an appreciable effect.”17 Boggs concurred with Marmer 
and suggested that it was technically impractical and even impossible to artificially divert oceanic 
tides and change sockeye salmon’s migration patterns. Boggs claimed: 
As I regard it at the present time if it were designed to produce a climatic effect by diverting 
more of the Japan current to southeastern Alaska the breadth of the canal would be very 
important. . . . I presume a breadth of a mile would produce almost no effect and that it 
would need to be perhaps 25 or even 100 miles to have even a perceptible effect on the 
climate. It is a matter of diverting a large volume of surface waters of the Japan current, in 
an area in which winds prevailing from the southwest would carry the warmth of the sea to 
the land. 
 
If the objective is to shift the fish and their feeding grounds easterly, I presume the problem 
would be appreciably different. The fish feed at depths of many fathoms, some of them 
apparently out close to the edge of the continental shelf at depths approximating 600 feet. I 
would not hazard a guess as to the depth of a canal across the Alaska peninsula which would 
be sufficient to alter the movements of the subsurface waters to a significant degree. I 
suspect the depth would have to exceed greatly any depth that might be considered for 
navigation purposes.18 
 
   This anecdote provides another example of America’s ambitious, though unsuccessful, effort 
to transform the ecosystem of Bristol Bay and the Bering Sea in a sockeye salmon-centered way. 
As discussed in a former chapter, ichthyologists of the Bureau of Fisheries had engaged in the 
“stream improvement” project in the Bristol Bay district during and after the 1920s. Its primary 
objective was to make the local ecology and environment more friendly to sockeye salmon even 
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at the sacrifice of the complex biodiversity of the region. The grandiose plan to construct a canal 
across the Alaska Peninsula was founded on the same ideological genealogy. What mattered for 
Washington officials was to maintain dominant access to sockeye salmon in Bristol Bay, and what 
they primarily cared about was if it was technically possible and practical by reconfiguring the 
local environmental and ecological structure. Federal government officials paid scant attention to 
the impacts their effort would have on animals other than sockeye salmon. For them, the 
environment and ecology were objects, rather than subjects, of human control and domestication.19 
   The 1940 sockeye salmon investigation in Bristol Bay and the Bering Sea mostly followed the 
1939 survey process to examine the validity of the 1939 research results. One notable difference 
between the two surveys was that American ichthyologists extended their investigation area further 
westward beyond the continental shelf to the Islands of Four Mountains, the easternmost part of 
the Aleutian Islands. The investigation reconfirmed the 1939 survey results and brought some new 
findings. First, the researchers could catch salmon in all areas fished in the Bering Sea and salmon 
were as abundant in the vicinity of the Pribilof Islands as in any other locality along the line 
between the Cape Mordvinof, the Pribilof Islands, and Nunivak Island. But, contrary to the 
prevailing belief that sockeye salmon were inaccessible outside the continental shelf, the 
ichthyologists could easily catch the fish in the upper six fathoms of water in the area as deep as 
1,600 fathoms between the Islands of Four Mountains and the Pribilof Islands. Second, the 
researchers observed that spawning salmon should enter the Bering Sea through Unimak Pass en 
 
19 It should be noted that ambitious attempts of environmental and ecological manipulation on a 
grandiose scale often appeared in discussions about how to protect Bristol Bay salmon from foreign 
pelagic fishermen. In 1965, for example, Alaskan governor William Egan proposed a plan to build a low 
dam across Bristol Bay to stop the migration of sockeye salmon there to the sea if Japanese fishermen 
continued catching Bristol Bay salmon on the high seas. Not surprisingly, American marine scientists 
considered Egan’s proposal biologically absurd and the plan did not materialize. See Ralph W. Johnson, 





route to Bristol Bay. But it seemed highly probable that many salmon would also go to the Bering 
Sea through other passes to the westward, such as straits near Akutan, Umnak, and Amukta Islands, 
in the eastern part of the Aleutian Islands. Finally, the American ichthyologists hypothesized that 
some of the Bristol Bay salmon might never migrate south of the Aleutian Islands but remain in 
the Bering Sea during their entire life in the ocean (figure 42).20  
 
 
Figure 42: Oceanographic Surveys in Bristol Bay and the Bering Sea. Joseph T. Barnaby, 
“Offshore Fishing in Bristol Bay and the Bering Sea” (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the 
Interior, 1952), 15.21 
 
 
20 Barnaby, “Offshore Fishing in Bristol Bay and the Bering Sea,” 20-21. 
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   The 1941 investigation primarily aimed to identify the western limit of the sockeye salmon’s 
migration routes. The research team carried out experimental fishing beyond the Islands of Four 
Mountains in Atka Island, Adak Island, and Semisopochnoi Island. What surprised the researchers 
was that the catch of salmon dropped to virtually nothing in the aforementioned three islands west 
of the Islands of Four Mountains. In addition, the 1941 research studied conditions of sockeye 
salmon migration along the line between Nunivak Island and St. Matthew Island and the line 
between St. Matthew Island and the Pribilof Islands. The ichthyologists could catch almost no 
sockeye salmon along the two lines except at station #60. In other ways the 1941 survey verified 
the consequences obtained in those of 1939 and 1940 (figures 43 and 44).22 These results allowed 
American ichthyologists to identify, though hypothetically, the approximate geographical range of 
sockeye salmon’s migratory routes in Bristol Bay and the Bering Sea. The fish should usually 
travel in the waters east of the line connecting the Nunivak Island, the Pribilof Islands, and the 
Islands of the Four Mountains. This implied that, if the United States prevented foreign pelagic 
fishermen from crossing the line, American fishermen would be able to dominate their access to 
sockeye salmon effectively in Bristol Bay. In reality, however, the ichthyologists’ conclusion 
underestimated the far greater mobility of sockeye salmon in the waters. But this accumulated 
scientific knowledge about sockeye salmon obtained through the four-year survey played a key 
role in determining the geographical area from which the United States worked to exclude Japanese 
deep-sea fishermen in the Bering Sea after World War II. 
 
 







Figure 43: Oceanographic Surveys in Bristol Bay and the Bering Sea. Joseph T. Barnaby, 
“Offshore Fishing in Bristol Bay and the Bering Sea” (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the 
Interior, 1952), 24.23 
 








Figure 44: Oceanographic Surveys in Bristol Bay and the Bering Sea. Joseph T. Barnaby, 
“Offshore Fishing in Bristol Bay and the Bering Sea” (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the 
Interior, 1952), 25.24 
 
 
World War II, the Truman Proclamations, and America’s New Ocean Law Policy 
Diplomatic historians and legal scholars have described the political process leading up to the 
issuance of the Truman Proclamations in September 1945.25 The proclamations consisted of two 
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declarations concerning the control of oceanic resources: “the policy of the United States with 
respect to the natural resources of the subsoil and sea bed of the continental shelf” and “the policy 
of the United States with respect to coastal fisheries in certain areas of the high seas.” This section 
focuses more on the latter proclamation about high seas fisheries, which Ann L. Hollick claims 
has been “largely forgotten in the United States.”26 This section does not repeat what the earlier 
accounts have revealed about the Truman proclamations; instead, it briefly describes how and why 
the presidential statement about high seas fisheries emerged soon after the end of the Second World 
War.  
   As Harry N. Scheiber points out, the doctrinal origin of the Truman proclamation was in a State 
Department memorandum that was passed to the Japanese government in November 1937.27 In 
the memo Hull asserted: 
It must be taken as a sound principle of justice that an industry such as described [Alaska 
fishing industry] which has been built up by the nationals of one country can not in fairness 
be left to be destroyed by the nationals of other countries. The American Government 
believes that the right or obligation to protect the Alaska salmon fisheries is not only 
overwhelmingly sustained by conditions of their development and perpetuation, but that it 
is a matter which must be regarded as important in the comity of the nations concerned.28  
 
This implied a notable ideological departure from the freedom of the seas principle, which 
stipulated that access to marine animals on the high seas should be open to everyone without any 
condition and regardless of their national and legal identity. Hull’s memorandum showed a distinct 
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Diplomatic History 44, no. 3 (2020): 447–65. 
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shift in the legal discourse on sockeye salmon on the high seas, claiming that exclusive proprietary 
rights to the fish on the high seas could be granted to political entities that had invested their capital, 
time, and labor for systematically preserving the fish. 
   As was clear in the way the State Department settled the Bristol Bay crisis, however, the 
department continued to oppose rejecting the freedom of the seas doctrine. What concerned State 
Department officials was that, if they unilaterally extended America’s jurisdiction over sockeye 
salmon beyond its three-mile territorial waters, the action might establish an unfavorable precedent 
that would allow other maritime powers to do the same in their contiguous waters and compromise 
America’s deep-sea fishing interests.29 In addition, concluding a multilateral arrangement was not 
promising. The Canadian government was hesitant to cooperate with the United States in 
reconfiguring the maritime legal regime.30 Unsurprisingly, the Japanese government was adamant 
and insisted that it would neither consider waiving its legitimate privileges guaranteed by the 
customary Law of the Sea nor intend to discuss such unacceptable possibility.31 Moreover, the 
Soviet government protested against the American plan to expand its jurisdiction over sockeye 
salmon in the Bering Sea, saying that such initiative would have adverse effects on Russian 
fisheries and whaling in the waters.32  Even if the three Pacific powers had been willing to 
negotiate a multilateral agreement on fisheries in the Bering Sea, the United States could not have 
effectively preserved sockeye salmon in Bristol Bay because, as pointed out in the earlier chapter, 
Washington officials did not possess sufficient and definitive scientific knowledge about the fish’s 
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migratory patterns in Bristol Bay and the Bering Sea. Thus, the State Department’s policy was to 
maintain the status quo, observe the freedom of the seas principle, and wait and see the future 
developments in sockeye salmon fisheries in Bristol Bay and the Bering Sea. 
   It was notable that the U.S. and Canadian governments started working together in addressing 
the questions about high seas fisheries in the North Pacific after the Bristol Bay crisis. Ottawa was 
originally negative about the possibility of forming a common front with Washington against 
Tokyo regarding salmon fisheries in the North Pacific. The major reason was that Canadian 
government officials were convinced that the threat of Japanese pelagic fisheries was less grave 
and imminent because British Columbia was geographically far more away from Japan and 
produced less sockeye salmon than the Bristol Bay area. Thus, officials at Ottawa believed, “The 
Japanese threat hits their [America’s] waters first, and has already done so, while our concern on 
that score is more in the future.” As a result, Ottawa’s position was that it should “await more 
specific and formal proposals [from Washington] before expressing any views beyond a general, 
informal expression of sympathy if occasion arose.”33 However, the Canadian position concerning 
high seas fisheries in the North Pacific changed in 1939, when the State Department inquired if 
Ottawa was ready to study and discuss the question with Washington as the first step to take the 
common front against Japanese pelagic fisheries off North America. Although Canadian 
government officials still believed that Japanese pelagic fisheries would not badly affect Canadian 
fisheries off British Columbia, Ottawa decided to work with Washington “to help to keep things 
running smoothly internationally.” 34  This meant that Ottawa tried to prevent further fishery 
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disputes between the United States and Japan in Alaskan waters by deterring and restraining 
Japanese deep-sea fishermen from crossing the Bering Sea., which would ultimately lessen 
Ottawa’s concern about Japanese pelagic fishermen’s possible operations off British Columbia. 
This U.S.-Canadian cooperation, though rather informal, was the crucial first step to birthing a 
politically integrated multilateral institution for managing and controlling sockeye salmon 
fisheries in the Bering Sea and the North Pacific. 
   World War II afforded a favorable opportunity for the United States to transform the maritime 
legal regime and extend America’s jurisdiction over sockeye salmon in the Bering Sea. The conflict 
dramatically changed the balance of power in military and economic terms among the imperial 
belligerents and the United States emerged as a hegemonic world power. As the U.S. hard power 
greatly increased compared to the other powers in relative terms, a growing number of Roosevelt 
administration officials treated the freedom of the seas principle as an unreasonable restraint 
imposed on America’s expanding influences and espoused renouncing the freedom of the seas 
doctrine. For instance, the Interior Department’s General Land Office members pointed out in a 
memorandum the necessity to remove “the shackles of the three-mile limit for territorial waters,”35 
stressing the injustice and unfairness of the three-mile territorial waters system and the legitimacy 
of breaking the troubling legal structure. Even some State Department officials had expanded the 
imagination about the U.S. territory, possessed Bristol Bay in their consciousness, and supported 
the idea that the United States should abandon the freedom of the seas principle. Green H. 
Hackworth, a legal adviser in the State Department, for example, claimed, “We should be prepared 
to say that these areas [Bristol Bay] are our fishing grounds and that we do not want others, who 
have no interest in conserving these resources, to come in.”36 Now that the United States no longer 
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had to care about maintaining friendly relations with Japan, America’s chief competitor over 
salmon fisheries in Alaskan waters, in the midst of the war, it was an excellent chance to reform 
the maritime legal regime for high seas fisheries to America’s redefined and enlarged national 
interests. Hackworth added self-righteously, “[W]e are entitled to do what we are setting out to do, 
and should go ahead with it; . . . [W]e should also indicate to the rest of the world that we are 
willing for them to do the same thing.”37 
   Congressmen and fishing industry leaders on the Pacific coast put increasing pressure on the 
Roosevelt administration to make a new oceanic legal structure before the end of the war that 
would prohibit Japanese pelagic fishermen’s salmon fisheries in Alaskan waters. In June 1943, 
Secretary of the Interior Harold L. Ickes insisted in a memorandum to Roosevelt that the United 
States should expand its jurisdiction over marine animals on the high seas and seabed mineral 
resources.38 The president concurred and instructed Hull to work with the Interior Department and 
reconsider the appropriate range within which the United States could exercise its jurisdiction over 
marine animals and seabed minerals.39 Although the secretary of state agreed to the president’s 
request, the major problem was how to reconcile the two irreconcilable objectives: extending the 
jurisdiction into the high seas contiguous to the United States while maintaining America’s 
offshore fisheries interests intact guaranteed by the freedom of the seas principle in foreign 
waters.40 
   The Canadian government provided the State Department with a solution for the question. In 
a joint meeting held at New York on June 14, 1943, Hugh L. Keenleyside, Assistant Under 
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Secretary of State for External Affairs, showed the concept of “exclusive right to exploitation of 
coastal fisheries” and presented the four possible conditions required for claiming the “exclusive 
right.” The four conditions were: (1) The fisheries were located in contiguous waters of a country; 
(2) The country or countries had habitually and exclusively exploited those fisheries over a 
reasonable period; (3) The country or countries had regulated those fisheries in the interest of 
conservation; and (4) the breeding grounds of some of the species of fish were located within the 
area to be protected.41 Many Americans were familiar with these conditions given that they had 
similarly advocated amid the Bristol Bay crisis that the history of investing capital, labor, and time 
in the management of marine animals was sufficient to claim exclusive proprietary rights to them. 
The fact that Ottawa presented these four conditions showed that the Canadian government was 
prepared to transform the freedom of the seas doctrine. Indeed, Canadian officials of the 
Department of External Affairs, like some nationalist Washington officials, believed that they 
should use the war as a golden opportunity to exclude Japanese pelagic fishermen from the high 
seas off the Pacific coast of North America. Norman A. Robertson, Canadian Under Secretary of 
State for External Affairs, for instance, wrote straightforwardly in March 1943, “it might be 
desirable to take advantage of the opportunity presented by the war to go back to the consideration 
of some of these problems. I have in mind particularly the matter of the protection of the North 
Pacific fisheries from Japanese competition in the post-war period . . .”42  
   The concept of “exclusive right to exploitation of coastal fisheries” laid a doctrinal foundation 
for the Truman Proclamation about high seas fisheries. The presidential statement said: 
Where such [fishing] activities have been or shall hereafter be developed and maintained by 
its nationals alone, the United States regards it as proper to establish explicitly bounded 
conservation zones in which fishing activities shall be subject to the regulation and control 
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of the United States. Where such [fishing] activities have been or shall hereafter be 
legitimately developed and maintained jointly by nationals of the United States and 
nationals of other States, explicitly bounded conservation zones may be established under 
agreements between the United States and such other States; and all fishing activities in such 
zones shall be subject to regulation and control as provided in such agreements. The right 
of any State to establish conservation zones off its shores in accordance with the above 
principles is conceded, provided that corresponding recognition is given to any fishing 
interests of nationals of the United States which may exist in such areas.43  
 
The Truman Proclamation represented a legal paradigm shift about high seas fisheries. Until 
the presidential declaration, America’s jurisdiction over marine animals had been contingent 
primarily on an ahistorical factor of geography. The customary Law of the Sea had provided that 
any country be able to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over marine animals within its three-mile 
territorial waters and that access to them in extraterritorial waters be open to everyone without any 
condition and regardless of their national and legal identity. In contrast, the Truman proclamation 
stated that proprietary rights to marine animals should depend not only on geography but also on 
history, more specifically historically established fishing interests. This meant that claiming 
exclusive proprietary rights to marine animals required both geographical proximity and 
customary practice of exploiting the marine animals. In other words, exercising an exclusive legal 
privilege to control marine animals on high seas necessitated the precondition that the marine 
animals had already been solely controlled. 
 
World War II and Changed Discourse on the Ocean 
   Truman’s declaration to exclusively control marine animals on the high seas was a product of 
structural changes caused by World War II, particularly America’s achievement of hegemonic 
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status in world politics. The Truman proclamation also reflected innovative environmental and 
ecological discourse on the ocean. In fact, the ocean experienced terrestrialization in the 
imagination of Americans. More specifically, Americans spoke of the sea in relation to the dry 
land, stressed similarities between the two, and argued that humans could territorialize the ocean 
as they had done the dry land. This discursive terrestrialization of the sea helped the United States 
claim exclusive proprietary rights to marine animals on the high seas in the Bering Sea and the 
North Pacific after the Second World War.  
American intellectuals advocated the significance of advancing America’s oceanic expansion 
by promoting the discourse that equated the ocean with dry land. In an article published in May 
1946, Harold F. Clark and George T. Renner, professors of Economics and Geography of Columbia 
University, respectively, referred to the Truman Proclamations and asserted that the two 
declarations were not ambitious enough. Assuming that the degree of sovereign oceanic territory 
would determine the fate of great powers in the latter half of the twentieth century, Clark and 
Renner insisted that the United States should “annex” more maritime spaces for economic 
prosperity, military defense, and national prestige. They wrote: 
The only fault of America’s action in taking over a big piece of ocean is that it did not go 
nearly far enough. Instead of stopping at the edge of the continental shelf, we should extend 
our claim outward to the centers of the oceans. We must, however, act promptly if we are to 
establish title to the adjacent water areas. If America fails to get a big share of these resources, 
it faces the possibility of ultimately declining to the rank of a third or fourth rate power. 
Annexation of 15,000,000 or 20,000,000 square miles might keep us a second-rate nation. 
Forty million square miles would assure us the probability of remaining a first-rate world 
power. Quite in addition to this matter of natural resources is the increasing value of the 
ocean areas for military-defense purpose. In the end, this latter consideration may prove to 
be even more important than the economic side of the matter.44 
 
   More notable is the article’s discursive equation of the ocean and dry land, which promoted 
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the exclusive control of marine animals on high seas. Clark and Renner emphasized environmental 
and ecological similarities between the ocean and dry land. First, the ocean could become future 
farms, as the two Columbia scholars stated, “The average citizen may be inclined to scoff at the 
idea of raising crops in ocean water. As a matter of fact, edible plants have been growing there 
longer and in greater quantity than on dry land. . . . The development of hydroponics . . . during 
the past few decades or so . . . clearly demonstrates the possibility of ocean agriculture.”45 Clark 
and Renner also applied to the ocean the logic of social development from hunting and gathering 
to farming and harvesting. The scholars predicted that humans would soon modernize the ways to 
exploit the ocean as they had progressed methods of using dry land. Clark and Renner wrote, “This 
[fishing] industry is still carried on, but on the oceans we are still in the primitive hunting stage. 
Necessity has not yet driven us beyond that stage, and only recently have we realized the possibility 
of anything better. . . . The time will surely come when there will be fences and landholdings in 
the ocean, . . . Territory will be divided and crops and animals will be grown and minerals extracted 
within these divisions.”46  Thus, when the significance of mariculture increased compared to 
agriculture during and after World War II, the ocean was growingly viewed as productive farmland 
under the waves, as one newspaper article claimed that people should “realize that the ocean is 
really a great underwater farm.”47 The ideas that the ocean functioned in the same way as did dry 
land and that marine animals were an object of domestication by humans supported the policy of 
exclusively enclosing the oceanic animals on the high seas (figure 45). 
 
45 Ibid. 
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Deltch, “Sea Farmers Expect to Reap Salty Harvests,” Christian Science Monitor, July 24, 1948. 







Figure 45: The United States and the Ocean. Clark and Renner, “We Should Annex 50,000,000 
Square Miles of Ocean,” 17.48  
 
   In addition, World War II also transformed American white fishermen’s spatial and 
geographical conception of Alaska and the Bering Sea. Although the Bering Sea separated Alaska 
and Siberia in the imagination of American fishermen before the outbreak of the Second World 
War, they growingly perceived the ocean as linking, rather than dividing, the two “remote” regions 
during the conflict. W. C. Arnold, an attorney of Ketchikan, Alaska, and a spokesperson of the 
Alaskan salmon industry, wrote, “[T]his section of Alaska is quite remote from the Siberian coast 
but nevertheless I find that people here, as elsewhere, are shortening their conception of distance 
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and are really beginning to see that the Russians are our postwar neighbors and fishing partners.”49 
In fact, the wartime description about the Bering Sea saw a similar discursive shift and the Bering 
Sea connected Asia and North America in the American geographical consciousness due to the 
improvement of transportation technology, especially airplanes. For example, a newspaper article 
stated, “Aside from its current military value, the northern route to Russia is of importance because 
it means that the USSR is no longer a ‘European’ nation. She is now a neighbor which the airplane 
has brought almost as close as Canada and Mexico.”50 Moreover, Ruth Gruber, a field worker of 
the Interior Department, stated, “In a world shrunken by air transportation, Kamchatka is virtually 
at New York’s back door. Alaska is the crossroads of that shrunken world.”51 American fishing 
industry leaders on the Pacific coast and policymakers at Washington began looking at Bristol Bay 
as part of the Bering Sea and thinking about fisheries in Bristol Bay in relation to fishing in entire 
Bering Sea. This meant that they could no longer ignore Japan and the Soviet Union, both of which 
had possessed huge interests in fisheries in the Bering Sea, in remaking the maritime legal regime 
for salmon fisheries in Bristol Bay and the Bering Sea. 
 
The North Pacific Convention of 1952 and the Establishment of a Transpacific Multilateral 
Scientific Board on Salmon Fisheries 
 
When Japan accepted the Potsdam Declaration in September 1945 and World War II officially 
ended, Japan lost both its overseas colonies and pelagic fishing grounds.52 The United States and 
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its allies took advantage of the opportunity presented by the war to alter Japan’s “exploitative,” 
“invasive,” and “wasteful” fishing practices. 53  General Douglas MacArthur, Supreme 
Commander for the Allied Powers (hereafter SCAP), ordered Japanese fishermen to engage in 
inland water and coastal fisheries and strictly prohibited Japanese fishers from operating in waters 
near the United States and its allies across a geographical and political boundary called the 
“MacArthur Line” (figure 46). In order to expand the permitted pelagic fishing zones, the Japanese 
government needed approval from the countries concerned, and Washington required Japan to 
observe America’s domestic and international fisheries regulations if Japanese fishermen should 
be allowed to operate in waters near the U.S. territories in the future.54 In other words, the defeat 
in the Second World War deprived Japan of its legal privilege of the free and equal access to marine 
animals on the high seas guaranteed by the freedom of the seas principle. 
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Figure 46: MacArthur Line. Harry N. Scheiber, “Origins of the Abstention Doctrine in Ocean Law: 
Japanese-U.S. Relations and the Pacific Fisheries, 1937-1958,” Ecology Law Quarterly 16, no. 1 
(1989): 38.55  
 
Although the areas where Japanese fishermen could operate expanded eastward into the 
Central Pacific, southward into the South Pacific, and westward into East China Sea during the 
Allied occupation of Japan, SCAP did not approve enlarging Japan’s fishing zones northward into 
the Sea of Okhotsk and the Bering Sea because of consistent opposition from the Soviet Union to 
such an attempt. In September 1946 the Japanese government requested SCAP to allow Japanese 
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fishermen to operate in “northern waters,” around the Kamchatka Peninsula and the Kurile Islands, 
in order to relieve the food shortage and nutritional deficiency, especially protein and fat, that the 
Japanese people were suffering from.56 It is notable that, contrary to before 1941, the Japanese 
government restricted the spatial range of “northern waters” to the Sea of Okhotsk and the western 
Bering Sea and consciously excluded the eastern half of the Bering Sea from their definition of the 
“northern waters.” This was because Japanese government officials knew that SCAP and 
Washington officials would never approve Japanese fisheries in the eastern Bering Sea. This was 
also because Japanese government officials tried to emphasize Japan’s historically established 
fishing rights in Russian Far East to claim legitimate fishing rights based on the Truman 
Proclamation about high seas fisheries issued the year earlier. The Soviet government rejected the 
Japanese request by ignoring it. The Soviet Union planned to promote the settlement, improve the 
infrastructure, and more than double the output of marine products in the Far East by 1950.57 Thus 
Moscow tried to monopolize fishing grounds in Russian Far East and had no intention to share 
access to marine animals with Japan there as Russian fishermen had needed to do before the war. 
   As documented in the earlier accounts, State Department officials had different views on 
America’s policy toward fisheries in the Bering Sea. SCAP and Washington officials agreed that 
the Kremlin would continue rejecting Tokyo’s request to expand its fishing areas into the 
Kamchatka Peninsula and the Kurile Islands. Still, policymakers at Washington had no plan to 
open the eastern half of the Bering Sea to Japanese deep-sea fishermen, though they understood 
that Japan had to increase food production and foreign currency. The prevailing idea of Washington 
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about America’s policy toward fisheries in the Bering Sea was to split the waters into half along 
the U.S.-Soviet boundary, dominate access to salmon in the eastern half of the Bering Sea, and 
contain the fisheries expansion of both Japan and the Soviet Union within the Sea of Okhotsk and 
the western Bering Sea. In contrast, the Office of the International Trade Policy (ITP) of the State 
Department opposed to dispossessing Japan of its legal privilege to catch Alaskan salmon on the 
high seas in the Bering Sea. ITP officers critiqued the exclusionist measure as violating the Atlantic 
Charter, particularly the principle of economic internationalism.  
The doctrine of “abstention” codified in the North Pacific Convention of 1952 was invented to 
settle this dilemma: depriving Japan of its fishing privileges on the high seas in the eastern half of 
the Bering Sea without compromising the liberal, internationalist principle of open and free access 
to natural resources sanctioned by the Atlantic Charter. Wilbert M. Chapman, Special Assistant to 
the Under Secretary of State for Fisheries and Wildlife, was a chief spokesperson for the American 
fishing industry and a vigorous advocate of excluding Japanese pelagic fishermen from Alaskan 
waters. He believed that geographically splitting the North Pacific into spheres of influence for 
fisheries was the only practical way to relieve the American fishing industry and avoid future 
possible fisheries disputes with Japan. In February 1950, Chapman insisted: 
[Because] Japan possesses nothing more than illusory rights at the present time to enter such 
[salmon] fisheries [off North America] . . . Japanese fishermen would stay 150 miles away 
from land under the jurisdiction of the United States or Canada east of the International Date 
Line and the United States and Canadian vessels would stay 150 miles away from land under 
the jurisdiction of Japan west of the Date Line.”58 
 
Although this principle of mutual forbearance seemingly equal and equitable, it was totally 
disadvantageous to Japan given that the United States and Canada had few established fishing 
interests in the western Bering Sea and the Sea of Okhotsk.  
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   The State Department had to take into account its allies’ concerns about this exclusionist policy. 
Echoing critiques presented by the Office of ITP, the Canadian government opposed imposing on 
Japan the 150-mile no-fishing zones in the eastern half of the Bering Sea. Ottawa’s concerns were 
that it would infringe on the Japanese right to fish on the high seas and violate the Potsdam 
Declaration’s principle of open and equal access to raw materials. Ottawa also did not want to 
damage its relations with other Commonwealth countries by taking a double-standard, hypocritical 
approach to Japanese pelagic fisheries: encouraging Japan’s high seas fisheries near Australia and 
New Zealand, while restricting them off North America.59 In addition, the Japanese government 
objected to “a policy which seeks to establish sovereign ownership of the seas by any nation” and 
insisted that high seas fisheries “must be operated on the basis of ‘free enterprise and free 
competition, based upon fair methods of cooperation.’”60 Tokyo officials had worried that the 
North Pacific Convention would set a bad precedent for future fisheries agreements with their 
neighboring countries if the convention should restrict Japanese fishing privileges on the high seas 
in the Bering Sea.61  
   The escalating geopolitical reality of the Cold War in the Asia-Pacific region after the outbreak 
of the Korean War in June 1950 further limited America’s exercise of its hegemonic political power.  
Within two weeks following the beginning of the conflict, Dean Rusk, Assistant Secretary of State 
for Far Eastern Affairs, suggested that Washington take a more conciliatory attitude toward Japan’s 
high seas fisheries in the Bering Sea than Chapman had demanded. Concurring with the Office of 
ITP, Rusk pointed out that Chapman’s proposal would have adverse impacts on Japan’s fishing 
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industry and obstruct the primary objective of the United States in Japan: creating an economically 
self-sufficient and socially stable ally in Northeast Asia.62 Rusk also emphasized that it was 
critical for the United States to stop behaving as a victorious power toward defeated Japan. Rather, 
in his opinion, the United States must treat Japan not as its colony but as an equal Asian partner. 
Rusk insisted: 
In view of the foregoing it becomes increasingly evident that any convention of the nature 
proposed by U/FW [Chapman] would in fact be an unequal treaty imposed upon Japan under 
duress. Should the convention be negotiated on such a basis with the possible developments 
discussed above relative to the Japanese economy and Japan’s fishery relation with other 
Far Eastern countries, the effects would be far flung and could not help but prejudice future 
US-Japanese relations. At this time when the Japanese economy may be able to make a 
worthwhile contribution to the objectives of the US and the United Nations and in the Far 
East, it would appear overwhelmingly inadvisable for the US to go out of its way not only 
to create a “sore spot” in its relations with Japan, but also to lend support to the establishment 
of restrictive fishery relationships among the nations of the Far East.63 
 
As a consequence of long, heated discussions inside the State Department, Washington officials 
compromised and included the science-oriented abstention doctrine, according to which Japan 
had to refrain from catching fish judged fully exploited for maximum sustainable yield. 
   To be sure, as the earlier scholarship has pointed out, economic questions were at the center of 
discussions about the North Pacific Convention and the tripartite fisheries agreement was a result 
of negotiations and compromises over different economic approaches to high seas fisheries in the 
Bering Sea. But, more importantly, the North Pacific Convention also reflected two clashing views 
on the environment and ecology of the Bering Sea, and how to understand the biodiversity of the 
waters was a more fundamental question for Washington officials who sought to refuse Japanese 
deep-sea fishermen physical access to sockeye salmon in the waters. Ultimately, what mattered for 
Washington officials was the conception of the relationship between two qualitatively different 
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boundaries in the Bering Sea: a rigid and artificial political border between the United States and 
the Soviet Union and a more unstable and unknown biological one conditioned by sockeye 
salmon’s instinctive habits and variable oceanic environment and ecology. 
Some State Department officials, particularly those in the Office of Fisheries and Wildlife, 
stressed the practicality of the view of dividing the Bering Sea in half by the United States and the 
Soviet Union along the 1867 International Boundary Line to preserve Alaskan salmon. Their idea 
was that the United States and the Soviet Union should exclusively possess and control marine 
animals in the eastern and western half of the Bering Sea, respectively, and grant fishing licenses 
to the other when requested. Although this idea of creating spheres of influence for fisheries was 
exclusionist in nature and challenged the internationalist and liberal economic order the United 
States tried to establish, it was thought the only practical solution for preserving Alaskan salmon 
without overturning the freedom of the seas doctrine. The Office of Fisheries and Wildlife of the 
State Department was a chief advocate of this position, and William E. S. Flory of the office, for 
example, claimed, “This [idea of making spheres of influence for fisheries], of course, was an 
extremely thin subterfuge but, nevertheless, it appeared to be the only practical way to avoid 
precipitating the issue of exclusion of foreign vessels from American coastal fisheries versus 
freedom of access to raw materials.”64  
The conflictive views on the environment and ecology of the Bering Sea were primarily 
because of America’s limited scientific knowledge about the ocean and sockeye salmon migrating 
there. The question was how and to what extent American policymakers should and could employ 
the accumulated scientific information about the Bering Sea and Alaskan salmon to create a legal 
system that would allow the United States to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over the fish in the 
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sea. Those in the Office of Fisheries and Wildlife insisted that the United States and the Soviet 
Union make spheres of influence for fisheries in the Bering Sea because they simplistically 
assumed that the U.S.-Soviet political border in the Bering Sea could fit with the biological 
boundary of Alaskan salmon in the waters. For instance, a memorandum by Warren F. Looney, a 
special assistant to the Undersecretary of State for Fisheries and Wildlife, stated: 
On both sides [the Asiatic and North American sides of the Bering Sea], the areas of 
intensive fishing are well concentrated on the coastal margins. The great preponderance of 
the water area lying between the American and Asiatic shores is a zone in which no 
commercial fishing occurs. The narrowest part of that zone, about 200 marine miles, lying 
between Attu and Cooper Islands, is water in which no commercial fishing does not and is 
not expected to occur. 
 
This zone of no-fishing indicates that the fish in the North American side do not cross over 
to the Asiatic side and vice-versa, and that there is no commingling of the stocks. To the best 
of our scientific knowledge, this is generally correct. These stocks of fish are, therefore, as 
independent of each other as they are of the salmon of the Scottish coasts. This leads to the 
very important conclusion that conservation of the stocks on the Asiatic side can be 
undertaken by the USSR independently of any conservation measures or operations on the 
American side. Neither American nor Soviet interests need fear that fishing operations on 
the opposite shore will undo careful conservation undertaken off their own coasts or reap 
the benefits of their self-denial.65 
 
It was apparent that Looney’s claim relied much on what America’s four-year survey of Bristol 
Bay and the Bering Sea from 1938 to 1941 had revealed: Alaskan salmon usually traveled in the 
waters east of the line connecting the Nunivak Island, the Pribilof Islands, and the Islands of the 
Four Mountains without crossing the U.S.-Soviet political border in the Bering Sea. 
   However, the theory was open to question that the eastern Bering Sea was biologically 
independent from the western one as far as sockeye salmon were concerned and that American and 
Asiatic stocks of the fish rarely migrated across the International Date Line in the Bering Sea. W. 
C. Arnold, for example, challenged the hypothesis and stressed the necessity to treat the Bering 
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Sea as a biologically seamless, though politically divided, maritime space. Arnold also pointed out 
the limit of America’s capability to scientifically visualize the migratory routes of Alaskan salmon 
and highlighted the significance of working with its Pacific neighbors, especially Japan and the 
Soviet Union, for the project. Arnold wrote: 
Men from this area [Ketchikan, Alaska] are naturally interested in salmon fisheries and have 
a practical knowledge concerning salmon and their habits. Various men returning from the 
western [Aleutian] islands report observing sizable migrations of salmon in that area. Since 
the far western [Aleutian] islands themselves do not contain streams or rivers adapted to the 
spawning of salmon in the opinion of returning travelers, the inference is that schools of 
salmon observed in those areas are largely migrations destined for the Bering Sea. Neither 
does it follow that they are destined for our side of the Bering Sea. All salmon spawning in 
Bering Sea streams, whether on the American side or Russian side, must pass into Bering 
Sea waters through one of the many passages which abound between the Aleutian mainland 
(False Pass) and Kamchatka, it does not necessarily follow that American salmon migrate 
through American territorial waters. I am quite sure that our fisheries authorities have no 
definite information on this point and it is highly improbable that the Russians are any better 
informed. The only people likely to be informed are the Japanese. All of which goes to prove 
that . . . we should consult with the Russians.66 
 
The Office of the International Trade Policy of the State Department was harshly critical of the 
exclusionist purpose of the fisheries agreement with the Soviet Union. E. M. Martin stated that the 
convention would “erect formidable barriers to the accessibility of natural resources” and it would 
provide new sources of friction with our powers by intensifying isolationism and restricting 
America’s free and equal access to natural resources.67 More significantly, like Arnold, Martin 
also critiqued the approach of splitting the Bering Sea into half along the U.S.-Soviet political 
boundary from biological perspectives by pointing out that Looney’s memorandum relied on 
simplistic environmental and ecological assumptions. In addition, Martin advised that the new 
fisheries agreement should be flexible and that its duration period must be short because its 
effectiveness depended on future scientific findings on Alaskan salmon swimming in Bristol Bay 
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and the Bering Sea. Martin insisted: 
As regards the convention covering Russia, I understand that one of the arguments advanced 
for the demarcation line in that convention is that there is no intermingling between the 
schools of fish on each side of the proposed boundary line insofar as known types of fish 
are concerned. Scientists are currently exploring and studying the life of the area, however, 
and have reported that there appears to be some life which moves at a very deep level in the 
sea. It is possible that with respect to this deep-sea life there may not be such lack of 
intermingling on either side of the proposed boundary as is claimed for the life nearer the 
surface. Thus a major assumption of the proposed convention may be somewhat invalidated. 
 
Should the presently proposed conventions be pursued despite ITP’s objections, it is urged 
that consideration be given to the possibility of a shorter duration period than the fifteen-
year period suggested. It would seem desirable to select a shorter period, say five years, in 
view of possible changes in the political picture which might affect the problem and possible 
shifts in the fishing picture as a result of such factors as the above-mentioned deep-sea 
explorations. In this connection it would be useful to have an article in the conventions 
providing for possible modification of them before the expiration date.68 
 
The position of those who criticized the politics-driven approach to managing Alaskan salmon 
in the Bering Sea was that the United States should address the question in a more science-oriented 
and politically collaborative manner. Based on the assumption that the environment and ecology 
of the Bering Sea were interactive and interconnected across the U.S.-Soviet political border, those 
critical of the politics-driven approach insisted that the United States take into account not only 
geography and history of fisheries, or established interests, but also marine ecosystems to 
effectively control Alaskan salmon in the Bering Sea. In order to do so, they also claimed, the 
United States should cooperate with concerned countries to make the environment and ecology of 
the Bering Sea scientifically legible in a more comprehensive way because, they believed, the 
United States alone could not do so. This position totally echoed what Rokuji Sato, a Japanese 
ichthyologist of the Imperial Fisheries Institute, once insisted before the Second World War. H. A. 
Dunlop, Director of the International Fisheries Commission, wrote: 
To be effective, fishery conservation areas must correspond at least roughly to the individual 
populations of fish that they are designed to protect. Accurate definition of such natural 
 





conservation areas may not be possible, with our present inadequate knowledge, but should 
be one of the first objectives of any administrative commission or council. . . . 
 
[T]he coastal fisheries [should] be recognized as the property of the adjacent nation or 
nations, depending upon migrations of each species and the history of the fishery for it, and 
that the adjacent nation or nations be given the management of them. . . . Oceanic fisheries, 
on the other hand, are such general international problems that they must be managed by a 
suitable international body for the good of all interested nations.69 
 
   Despite these comments stressing the importance of a science-oriented approach to the 
management of Alaskan salmon in the Bering Sea, the draft convention prepared by the State 
Department and later approved by the Department of the Interior set the U.S.-Soviet political 
border in the Bering Sea as the abstention line. This did not mean that most Washington officials 
completely ignored the significance of the science-based approach to the management of Alaskan 
salmon; instead, it meant that the abstention line was provisional and would change based on future 
scientific research. For example, as Dunlop had advised, the draft convention promised to establish 
a research board consisting of marine scientists of the signatories to study the Bering Sea and 
sockeye salmon swimming there. More notably, the draft agreement also reflected Martin’s 
suggestion that the agreement be reviewed five years after its ratification though it was to be 
effective for fifteen years. The Article VI of the draft convention stipulated, “The Commission . . . 
[will] make recommendation to the Contracting Parties in accord with its findings, provided, 
however, that with respect to those fishery resources originally specified in the Annex, no such 
recommendation shall be made until the Convention shall have been in effect for five years.”70  
   That the draft convention promised the review of the abstention line five years, not ten or 
fifteen years, after its ratification reflected the fact that the United States needed to investigate the 
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Bering Sea and sockeye salmon migrating there in a more holistic way. William C. Herrington, 
who played a central role in completing the draft agreement as Special Assistant for Fisheries and 
Wildlife to the Under Secretary of State, pointed out structural problems the U.S. government had 
faced in terms of scientific research in the Bering Sea and sockeye salmon travelling there. 
Herrington recollected: 
At that time neither the United States nor Canada had definitive information regarding the 
offshore migration of salmon. U.S. and Canadian fishing was carried on inshore, mostly 
near the mouths of rivers where the salmon were pretty well sorted out as to their spawning 
rivers. Exploratory offshore fishing by U.S. scientists had been discouraged for fear it would 
stimulate the development of offshore commercial fishing, despite my urging that such a 
study be undertaken. Such exploratory fishing was considered undesirable because it would 
result in immature fish being taken and would make managing of spawning escapement for 
individual rivers and tributaries much more difficult. Extensive intermingling with Asiatic 
salmon was not suspected.71 
 
The shortage of scientific knowledge about the Bering Sea and sockeye salmon migrating there 
troubled Washington officials in negotiations over the convention with Japanese delegates. 
Although the earlier accounts have stressed the powerlessness of occupied Japan and the 
hegemony of the United States as the occupier, looking at the negotiation process over the location 
of the abstention line offers an analytical window through which to find more nuanced power 
relations between Japan and the United States at the end of the occupation period. The quality and 
quantity of scientific data about sockeye salmon swimming in the Bering Sea made it possible for 
Japanese delegates to challenge America’s preponderant political authority, underlaid by superior 
economic and military power, in the negotiation over the North Pacific Convention.  
In the one-month conference held at Tokyo from November to December 1951, U.S. and 
Japanese delegates harshly confronted over the location of the provisional abstention line. In the 
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third meeting of Committee on Biology and Conservation on December 1, 1951, Milton C. James, 
who joined the conference as Assistant Director of the Fish and Wildlife Service, presented two 
draft plans about demarcation for abstention. Draft A was:  
The waters to be subject to the terms of this Convention and its Annex with respect to salmon 
fishing shall be those waters west of the coasts of Canada and the United States and south 
of Point Hope, Alaska, to the seaward limits of the area in which Pacific Salmon (name 
species) may be found in commercial quantities, but not west of the line of demarcation 
between Alaska and the U.S.S.R. as defined in the treaty of 1867 (and east of the 
International Date Line, exclusive of territorial waters).72 
 
Draft B was: 
The waters to be subject to the terms of this Convention and its Annex shall be the waters 
west of the coasts of the United States and Canada and south of Point Hope, Alaska, and 
east of the line of demarcation between U.S.S.R. and Alaska, as defined in the treaty of 1867 
(and east of the International Date Line) and north of Latitude 50°N. and east of Longitude 
135°W. to the seaward limits of the area frequented by Pacific Salmon of the species 
(name).73 
 
In either plan, the U.S. delegation wanted to include geographical delineation, set the U.S.-Soviet 
political border as the western end of the abstention area, and oust Japanese pelagic salmon 
fishermen from the eastern Bering Sea to preserve sockeye salmon migrating in Bristol Bay. 
   The Japanese representatives strongly opposed to the American drafts. The Japanese 
negotiators did not want the abstention area to be defined in specific geographical terms because 
of their conviction that the United States possessed too primitive scientific knowledge about 
sockeye salmon migrating in the Bering Sea to demarcate the abstention area in geographical 
terms.74 The technique of exploiting the American representatives’ scientific ignorance about 
sockeye salmon made it possible for Japanese negotiators to exercise more political leverage 
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against American counterparts than allowed by the relationship of the occupier and the occupied. 
The Japanese delegates used the concept of MSY to maximize their access to salmon in the Bering 
Sea. The Japanese position was that stocks of salmon originating in the Aleutian Islands were not 
sufficiently utilized.75 They asked for the American counterparts to submit definitive scientific 
evidence supporting their claim that since salmon were fully exploited in the Western Aleutians, 
Japanese fishermen must abstain catching the fish there.76 All the U.S. delegates could say was 
that they “did not have extensive records to show that the catch there [the Western Aleutians] was 
being fully utilized, but by utilizing what knowledge was available in the area,” they “believed 
maximum productivity was being obtained.”77 This answer was not scientifically objective and 
did not satisfy the Japanese delegation. 
   In addition, the Japanese representatives presented an important question about how to treat 
varying stocks of salmon swimming in the Bering Sea. The Japanese pointed out the possibility 
that the salmon found in the northern part of the Bering Sea belonged to a different stock from 
those caught in the Bristol Bay region.78 In contrast to the Japanese insistence that each stock of 
salmon be treated individually and separately, the American delegates insisted that they 
theoretically consider salmon in the Bering Sea as belonging to one stock in order to avoid drawing 
any geographical lines of demarcation in defining the abstention area.79  
   Further, the possibility of different stocks of salmon intermingling in the Bering Sea troubled 
both Japanese and American representatives. The Japanese delegates argued: 
Both the Asiatic stocks and the American stocks of salmon intermingle in the (Pacific) 
Ocean during the period when they mature before they start returning to their original 
(mother) rivers for spawning. On their way, they pass through the waterways (straits) 
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between the Aleutian Islands and then separate themselves into two groups, one heading 
towards the rivers of the American continent while the other goes towards the rivers of the 
Asiatic continent. It is the established rule that they always return to their respective original 
rivers and they never go to any other rivers. The majority of the stocks of salmon that pass 
through the waterways in the western part of the Aleutian Islands, with few exceptions, head 
towards the rivers in Asia, and they are the ones that Japan used to exploit on the high seas 
(before the war). It is the earnest desire of Japan to catch (exploit) those salmon resources 
in the future.80  
 
Thus, the Japanese delegates fully mobilized their richer scientific knowledge about the Pacific 
salmon’s ecology and opposed to the American demand that Japanese fishermen should refrain 
from catching salmon in the western Aleutian Islands. 
   Again, the U.S. delegation refused to accept the Japanese position. The Americans repeated 
their view that local salmon stocks of the Aleutian Islands were fully utilized and should be treated 
as an object of conservation. They also challenged the Japanese explanation about salmon’s 
migration patterns in the Bering Sea, claiming that “salmon north of the Aleutians [a]re 
predominantly migrating toward North America” and that the fish there were not “going to Asiatic 
waters.” 81  The American and Japanese representatives decided to refer these controversial 
questions to the heads of their delegations.  
In the face of the deadlock situation, the Japanese delegates changed their original position and 
suggested that the North Pacific Convention strictly specify the abstention line in geographical 
terms to avoid future disputes between Japanese and American fishermen.82 Iwao Fujita, Director 
of the Fisheries Agency of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry and a principal negotiator of 
Japan, proposed that the abstention line be along the 165 degrees west longitude given that Asiatic 
salmon migrated eastward to the line.83 The Japanese members justified the legitimacy of their 
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proposal by saying that “the salmon originating in the rivers of North America are limited in their 
distribution in the Bering Sea to the continental shelf and the nearby waters.”84 The Japanese 
suggestion astounded the American delegation, who insisted that Alaskan salmon traveled beyond 
the continental shelf and far across the meridian 165 degrees west. The American delegates 
considered the 180 degrees meridian as the most appropriate abstention line.85 
Deeper scientific knowledge about the biology of sockeye salmon made it possible for the 
Japanese delegates to negotiate with the American counterparts from a more equal position. Indeed, 
Japanese ichthyologists had conducted numerous tagging experiments in the Bering Sea before the 
outbreak of the Pacific War and possessed even more detailed data about migratory routes of 
sockeye salmon swimming there than American counterparts. This fact gave confidence and 
credence to the position of Japanese delegates and allowed them to translate their scientific 
knowledge into political power in the negotiation. Meanwhile, the fact greatly embarrassed the 
American representatives and prevented them from exercising their hegemonic authority and 
imposing their desires on Japan as they had originally intended. Herrington, who joined the 
meeting as the chairman of the U.S. delegation, recalled:  
In the course of the debate that ensued, Fujita refused to budge from the line he had proposed. 
It became clear that the Japanese had convincing information that there were a hell of a lot 
of salmon in that area and, from the presumptive knowledge in our possession, they had to 
be mostly of North American origin. We struggled over this issue well into the night, and on 
adjourning Fujita remarked he would rather continue under the present restraints on 
Japanese fishing than make any concessions on moving the line westward.86 
 
Edward Allen, a representative of the U.S. delegation, recalled in the same tone in 1957 that 
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American ichthyologists first knew in recent months that Asian and Alaskan stocks of salmon 
intermingled in the North Pacific as far west as 165 degrees East (20 degrees west beyond the 
established abstention line set in the North Pacific Convention). Allen also recollected, “[A]s the 
Japanese now admit that they knew when negotiating the treaty [in 1951], but we did not (in fact 
our scientists thought otherwise), salmon from both sides [of the North Pacific] are found all over 
the North Pacific north of about 48 degrees N., and [the] Bering Sea.”87 William J. Sebald, 
political adviser to SCAP and practical ambassador to Japan during the occupation, broke the 
deadlock by talking to Fujita’s superior, Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida. Yoshida approved the 
compromise plan of marking the meridian 175 degrees west as the abstention line and, if necessary, 
modifying the line according to future scientific research.88 In contrast to their original expectation, 
the U.S. delegates had to accept this undesirable compromise and put it in the convention. In a 
telegraph to the State Department, Herrington wrote, “Believe ref to line in Bering Sea as described 
in protocol unavoidable,”89 admitting America’s limited political authority vis-à-vis Japan due to 
the absence of definitive scientific knowledge about the ecology of sockeye salmon. 
   On May 9, 1952, the representatives of the United States, Canada, and Japan signed the North 
Pacific Convention. The atmosphere of the ceremony was celebratory and triumphant. The 
delegates of each signatory delivered short speeches and commemorated their memorable 
achievement. In their addresses the representatives emphasized the significance of promoting 
cooperative and friendly relationship between the three powers in managing marine animals in the 
North Pacific. Kozen Hirokawa, Minister of Agriculture and Forestry, stated, “It is my expectation 
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that the fisheries activities of the Japanese people will develop in a friendly atmosphere with other 
interested nations under satisfactory agreements with them . . .”90 Similarly, Robert D. Murphy, 
U.S. Ambassador to Japan, remarked likewise, “This Convention . . . joins our three Governments 
in a cooperative effort to insure conservation of valuable fisheries in these waters [North 
Pacific]. . . . [T]he Convention and Protocol . . . clearly illustrate the resolve of our three 
Governments . . . ‘to cooperate in friendly association to promote their common welfare.’”91 In 
contrast to their optimistic prediction of a rosy relationship over future salmon fisheries in the 
Bering Sea, the North Pacific Convention did not completely solve possible disputes over sockeye 
salmon in the waters. Instead, the agreement created a situation in which the United States and 
Japan would continue competing over access to sockeye salmon in the Bering Sea again in a 
different form. Now the key to the access to sockeye salmon in the Bering Sea was the quality and 
quantity of available scientific data about the fish and the waters. The roles of American and 
Japanese ichthyologists as scientific knowledge producers mattered more than ever and the 
International North Pacific Fisheries Commission, established by the North Pacific Convention, 
became the new stage where they would not only “cooperate” but also contest to secure access to 




   The North Pacific Convention was a solution for the question the Bristol Bay crisis presented 
to the United States: how to deprive Japanese pelagic fishermen of their legal privilege to catch 
sockeye salmon on the high seas off Alaska without compromising the freedom the seas principle. 
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The convention allowed the United States to claim exclusive proprietary rights to salmon 
swimming in the Bering Sea east of the 175 degrees West. This meant that the convention 
dispossessed Japan of its legal privilege to operate salmon fisheries on the high seas in the eastern 
half of the Bering Sea. But it also meant that the convention guaranteed that Japan should 
legitimately catch Pacific salmon in waters west of the 175 degrees West. More significant than 
the fact that Japan lost legal access to salmon migrating in the waters east of the 175 degrees West 
was the rationale underlying America’s exclusive possession of salmon in the eastern half of the 
Bering Sea. The convention prohibited salmon fisheries of Japanese pelagic fishermen in the 
waters east of the 175 degrees West because the fish migrating in the waters were considered 
originating in Alaskan rivers. But the rationale was only hypothetical and indefinitive. The North 
Pacific Convention made legal access to salmon in the Bering Sea contingent upon the quality and 
quantity of available scientific information about the fish, over which American and Japanese 















CHAPTER 7: THE INTERNATIONAL NORTH PACIFIC FISHERIES 
COMMISSION AND CONSUMMATION OF AN AMERICAN 
ICHTHYOLOGICAL EMPIRE, 1953-1970s 
 
Scientific Collaboration and Contestation at the International North Pacific Fisheries 
Commission 
 
The establishment of a bio-sphere of influence in the Bering Sea and the North Pacific was a 
crucial step for the United States to maintain dominant access to Bristol Bay salmon. But 
America’s bio-sphere of influence in the Bering Sea and the North Pacific was neither static nor 
stable; rather, its legal legitimacy was contingent upon the quality and quantity of available 
scientific data about Bristol Bay salmon. It was the International North Pacific Fisheries 
Commission (hereafter the INPFC), a tripartite research board established in 1953 by the 
International Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean (hereafter the 
North Pacific Convention), that played a leading role in creating scientific data about Bristol Bay 
salmon after the early 1950s. This chapter examines how the United States managed its bio-sphere 
of influence in the Bering Sea and the North Pacific with focus on scientific knowledge production 
activities in the INPFC from 1953 to the 1970s. 
This chapter reveals nuanced and complex relationships to scientific understanding of salmon 
swimming in the Bering Sea and the North Pacific. What characterized the INPFC was an anomaly 
of the Cold War paradigm, particularly U.S.-Japanese confrontation over and U.S.-Soviet 
cooperation in studying and understanding Bristol Bay salmon. To be sure, the INPFC allowed 
ichthyologists of the United States, Canada, and Japan to work collaboratively and share their 
scientific findings about Bristol Bay salmon. However, American and Japanese policymakers 
interpreted them in conflictive ways to achieve their own goal: enlarge their bio-sphere of influence 





scientists participated in activities of the INPFC and worked together with their American, 
Canadian, and Japanese counterparts, though the extent of collaboration was limited, despite 
geopolitical and ideological rivalries. In this chapter I stress that the United States greatly increased 
its scientific information about sockeye salmon’s migration patterns and lifecycles in the Bering 
Sea and the North Pacific. I argue that American ichthyologists’ holistic understanding of sockeye 
salmon’s ecology by the end of the 1970s meant consummation of an American ichthyological 
empire because the United States completed the structure in which Anglo-American canners and 
fishermen dominated access to sockeye salmon by imposing exclusive fisheries regimes founded 
on superior scientific knowledge about the fish.  
The INPFC was the core of the science-based salmon fisheries regime created by the North 
Pacific Convention. The tripartite fisheries protocol assigned three major responsibilities to the 
INPFC. First, the North Pacific Convention provided that the United States, Canada, and Japan 
conduct scientific studies on salmon originating in the rivers of North America, particularly 
southwest Alaska, and determine if they were qualified for abstention or not. Second, the North 
Pacific Convention required the INPFC to examine if Alaskan salmon intermingled with those 
originating in the rivers of Asia across the abstention line set on the 175 degrees West longitude in 
the Bering Sea and the North Pacific (figure 47). Third, the North Pacific Convention stipulated 
that the United States, Canada, and Japan should share their scientific information and statistical 
data about salmon and found the salmon fisheries regime on those records.1 The American effort 
to totally control the lifecycle of Bristol Bay salmon was dependent on what kind of scientific 
information about salmon the members of the INPFC could have and how they would review and 
interpret them. What mattered most for the United States was the second responsibility: to 
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rearrange the location of the abstention line so that the line would accurately correspond to the 
migration routes of Bristol Bay salmon. 
 
 
Figure 47: Provisional Salmon Abstention Line. International North Pacific Fisheries Commission, 
“Annual Report 1962” (Vancouver: International North Pacific Fisheries Commission, 1964), 5. 
 
   It was notable that the North Pacific Convention created a cooperative research mechanism 
through which the United States and Canada worked with Japan to deepen their scientific 
understanding of salmon migrating in the Bering Sea and the North Pacific. The United States, 
Canada, and Japan basically carried out scientific studies independently and shared the research 
results through the INPFC for discussion and negotiation. The three countries also agreed to 
exchange workers and technicians in order to gain “full first-hand knowledge of the experience 
and techniques of the others” and “details of plans of research projects and of the techniques and 
resources to be used.”2 Sharing research techniques and resources was useful for standardizing 
the research methodology across cultural boundaries, and this methodological standardization was 
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essential to having a scientifically accurate and objective understanding of the results without 
prejudice.3 Despite these collaborative characters of the INPFC, the commission’s nationalistic 
nature was apparent in the division of labor in scientific investigations according to geography. 
Japanese ichthyologists were responsible for carrying out research mainly in the west of the 
abstention line and American and Canadian counterparts usually studied salmon in the east of the 
abstention line.4 It is safe to say that, for the United States, the INPFC’s inter-governmental 
cooperative approach to investigating Pacific salmon was a means to achieve its nationalistic goal 
of monopolizing access to Bristol Bay salmon by excluding foreign pelagic fishermen in the 
Bering Sea and the North Pacific. 
   Regarding the problem of possible intermingling of Asian and Alaskan salmon in the Bering 
Sea and the North Pacific, the INPFC faced some crucial questions. The most fundamental and 
immediate one was that the commission needed to investigate if such intermingling of different 
stocks of Pacific salmon was scientifically correct. If all the members of the INPFC had agreed 
that this intermingling could never happen in the Bering Sea and the North Pacific, it would have 
been much easier for the United States to maintain dominant access to Bristol Bay salmon and 
keep foreign deep-sea fishers from catching the fish. But, if the INPFC was convinced that the 
intermingling of Asian and Alaskan salmon actually happened in the Bering Sea and the North 
Pacific, the commission had to address even more complicated questions, particularly the one of 
to what extent Asian and Alaskan salmon crossed the abstention line when and how.  
   It was not an easy task to just demonstrate if different stocks of Pacific salmon intermingled 
somewhere in the Bering Sea and the North Pacific because of the lack of sufficient data about the 
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migration patterns of the fish. To scientifically visualize the offshore distribution of sockeye 
salmon in the Bering Sea and the North Pacific, ichthyologists of the United States, Canada, and 
Japan adopted two different methods: empirical and analogical. The empirical method was tagging, 
and the ichthyologists tried to reveal sockeye salmon’s migration routes by physically tracking the 
movement of marked salmon from the point of release to that of recapture. The analogical method 
used comparison and examined various similarities and differences seen in sockeye salmon to 
identify the origins of the fish. The ichthyologists focused on four techniques and perspectives: 
comparison of parasite infection; analysis of counts of meristic characters; study of blood serum 
reactions; and comparison of salmon scale sculpture characteristics.5 The fact that combining 
these empirical and analogical techniques was necessary for ichthyologists to identify the stocks 
of sockeye salmon swimming in the Bering Sea and the North Pacific shows how challenging and 
laborious it was to make sockeye salmon’s migration patterns scientifically legible. 
   In 1957, intensive investigations by the United States, Canada, and Japan found that sockeye 
salmon from Asia and North America actually intermingled in the central zone of the Bering Sea 
and the North Pacific. Canadian ichthyologists focused mainly on three types of parasites—
Hemiurus, Tubulovesicula, and Echinorhynchus—and analyzed distributive patterns of sockeye 
salmon infected with each parasite in the Bering Sea and the North Pacific. The Canadian 
researchers discovered that Hermiurus existed in sockeye salmon from the Sea of Okhotsk to 171° 
East and that sockeye salmon between 172° East and 155° West were not infected with Hermiurus. 
In addition, Tubulovesicula, usually present in Bristol Bay salmon, was found in sockeye salmon 
from 175° East to 150° West in the Bering Sea and the North Pacific. Further, Echinorhynchus 
occurred in sockeye salmon from the Sea of Okhotsk to 172° East, while it was absent in the fish 
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from 175° East to 140° West in the North Pacific. The occurrence of Echinorhynchus in the Bering 
Sea also showed that sockeye salmon were of Asiatic origin from 165° West to 180° in the waters. 
These findings allowed Canadian scientists to conclude that sockeye salmon east of 175° East 
predominantly originated in rivers of North America and that most of the fish west of 171° East 
were of Asiatic origin6 (figure 48). 
 
 
Figure 48: Distribution of Sockeye Salmon Samples Examined for Parasites from 1956 Collections, 
and Incidence, in Percent of Hemiurus, Tubulovesicula and Echinorhynchus in These Samples. 
International North Pacific Fisheries Commission, “Annual Report for the Year 1957” (Vancouver: 
International North Pacific Fisheries Commission, 1958), 27. 
 
   Contrary to Canadian marine scientists, American ichthyologists studied sockeye salmon’s 
 





habits in different ways, reaching an almost identical conclusion. American researchers compared 
scales of sockeye salmon caught near the central and western Aleutian Islands and found that half 
of sockeye salmon swimming in waters of around 170° East were of North American origin7 
(figure 49). American ichthyologists also analyzed different serological composition of the 
sockeye salmon and discovered that a considerable proportion of Bristol Bay salmon were present 
in waters as far west as 175° East (figure 50). In addition, American ichthyologists examined 
meristic characters of the sockeye salmon and learned that sockeye salmon migrating in waters as 
far west as 172° East were morphologically similar to Bristol Bay salmon (figure 51). Based on 
these results obtained by three different methods, American ichthyologists concluded, “90% of the 
catches of salmon east of 175° E. are predominantly of North American origin.”8 American and 
Canadian researchers agreed that the abstention line for sockeye salmon should not be along 175° 
West; instead, the line should be moved westward to at least 175° East across the International 
Date Line. 
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Figure 49: Distribution of Asian and American Type Red Salmon during 1956 Fishing Season as 
Determined by Scales. International North Pacific Fisheries Commission, “Annual Report for the 








Figure 50: Occurrence of Antigens I and II, 1957. International North Pacific Fisheries 
Commission, “Annual Report for the Year 1957” (Vancouver: International North Pacific Fisheries 








Figure 51: Relative Similarity of High Seas Samples to Okhotsk Sea and Bristol Bay Samples. 
International North Pacific Fisheries Commission, “Annual Report for the Year 1957” (Vancouver: 
International North Pacific Fisheries Commission, 1958), 69. 
 
 
Expanding Bio-Spheres of Influence during the Cold War 
 
   What should be noted is the relationship between the Soviet Union, on one hand, and the United 
States, Canada, and Japan, on the other, in ichthyological research in sockeye salmon in the Bering 
Sea and the North Pacific. Historians have frequently used the Cold War paradigm to explain the 
relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union after the Second World War and 
emphasized confrontational and antagonistic characters of the relationship. 9  However, this 
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conflict-focused conception of the Cold War structure cannot persuasively explain scientific 
collaboration between the United States and the Soviet Union over ichthyological studies. In fact, 
F. V. Krogius, a Russian marine scientist of the Kamchatka Branch of the Pacific Research Institute 
of Fisheries and Oceanography (TINRO), provided in 1958 the Fisheries Research Board of 
Canada with samples of sockeye salmon scales taken in August 1956, 100 fish each from the 
Bolshaya, Ozernaya, and Kamchatka Rivers of the Kamchatka Peninsula. Copies of these scales 
were also sent to the United States too, helping American ichthyologists possess morphological 
data about sockeye salmon originating in Kamchatkan rivers, which was essential to biological 
identification of the fish in the Bering Sea and the North Pacific.10 This Soviet cooperation was 
not an exceptional case; rather, the Soviet Union participated in the INPFC as an “observer” or an 
informal member. Indeed, K. I. Panin, Director of the TINRO at Vladivostok, joined the annual 
meeting of the INPFC held at Seattle in November 1956 and reported the situation of Russian 
fisheries research in Far Eastern waters.11 It should be highlighted that, although the Cold War 
structure turned the Bering Sea and the North Pacific into a frontline of confrontation between the 
United States and Soviet Union, the ocean was not necessarily a divided and disrupted space in 
political terms. Instead, there existed counterforces of integration and consolidation in the Bering 
Sea and the North Pacific through scientific collaboration and cooperation beyond geopolitical and 
ideological antagonism. This situation was possible thanks to circum-Pacific mobility of sockeye 
salmon and perceived necessity to treat the Bering Sea and the North Pacific as an environmentally 
and ecologically connected and seamless space in order to scientifically visualize various habits 
of the fish. 
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   The scientific finding that “90% of the catches of salmon east of 175° E. are predominantly of 
North American origin” allowed American ichthyologists to claim political illegitimacy of the 
abstention line set along 175° West and criticize Japanese salmon fisheries in waters east of 175° 
East. For example, Bristol Bay saw “unexpectedly low” return of sockeye salmon in 1957, and 
American delegates to the INPFC argued that intensive salmon fishing operations by Japanese 
vessels on the high seas west of 175° West in the Bering Sea and the North Pacific had caused the 
“unexpected decrease” in return of sockeye salmon to Bristol Bay in 1957.12 This claim was 
founded on an assumption that sockeye salmon were not always ecologically resilient and were 
vulnerable to human intervention. Although this supposition had not been scientifically verified, it 
was convenient and useful to dispossess Japanese pelagic fishermen of their legal privilege 
guaranteed by the North Pacific Convention to extract as many salmon, regardless of types and 
stocks, as they wanted on high seas west of 175° West in the Bering Sea and the North Pacific. In 
the annual meeting of 1957, the American delegates to the INPFC also proposed “a cessation of 
all fishing in waters where a substantial proportion of salmon of North American origin are 
found.”13 This was practically an attempt to move the abstention line from 175° West to 175° East 
and, since Japanese deep-sea fishermen conducted salmon fisheries in these disputed areas located 
between 175° West and 175° East, the American proposal primarily targeted Japanese pelagic 
salmon fishermen and aimed to contain their fishing activities in waters west of 175° East in the 
Bering Sea and the North Pacific by expanding America’s bio-sphere of influence in the waters. 
   In order to justify the exclusion of Japanese deep-sea fishermen in areas between 175° West 
and 175° East, the position of the United States was that continuously vibrant salmon fisheries in 
Bristol Bay and Japanese intensive fishing operations to catch salmon in the disputed waters of the 
 






Bering Sea and the North Pacific were mutually exclusive. In the annual meeting of the INPFC in 
1958, a U.S. delegate to the conference insisted: 
The 1959 Bristol Bay sockeye salmon run would be about the same size as the poor run of 
1958 and that, therefore, even if extensive conservation measures were applied to the 
Japanese high-seas fishery, it would still be necessary to impose regulations on the United 
States inshore fishery far more drastic even than in 1958. If the Japanese high-seas fishery 
was not subject to conservation restrictions, such as cessation of fishing in the areas of 
intermingling or the equivalent, the United States faced the prospect of closing down entirely 
the fishery in Bristol Bay.14 
 
   Japanese representatives to the INPFC reacted to the American proposal negatively and 
continued exploiting American ichthyologists’ scientific ignorance to their advantage. The 
American request was in essence merely a moral and ethical question for the Japanese 
representatives because Japanese deep-sea fishermen just exercised legal privileges granted by the 
North Pacific Convention of 1952. Indeed, Japanese delegates claimed, “The Japanese Section was 
confident that Japan would give full consideration to necessary and appropriate measures for the 
conservation of salmon resources in the North Pacific area, even though they may not be required 
by the provisions of the Convention.”15 Moreover, even if Japan should have to respond to the 
American proposal favorably, the American insistence was still scientifically contested. To be sure, 
Japanese ichthyologists agreed what American and Canadian counterparts had discovered, saying 
that salmon from Asia and those from North America intermingled in “very wide areas between 
approximately 170° E. and 165° W.”16 But the Japanese researchers stressed remaining problems, 
particularly dynamic characters of salmon’s habits, more than achievements. They argued that their 
findings “show only qualitatively the range of distribution of salmon from each continent, mostly 
based on scale studies, and, therefore, quantitative questions, such as the variations in the relative 
 
14 International North Pacific Fisheries Commission, “Annual Report for the Year 1958,” 12. 
15 International North Pacific Fisheries Commission, “Annual Report for the Year 1957,” 12. 





abundance of salmon from each continent by periods and by areas, cannot be answered as yet. 
Future studies should be in this direction.”17 Moreover, Japanese delegates voiced skepticism 
about the American ichthyologists’ opinion that sockeye salmon were not necessarily ecologically 
resilient and that Japanese high-seas fisheries crucially impacted Bristol Bay salmon runs. A 
Japanese representative said, “the Commission [INPFC] should urge the scientists of the three 
countries to continue further scientific studies of salmon distribution questions, including the 
question as to whether the Japanese offshore salmon fishery has any effect on the red salmon 
resources of Bristol Bay.”18 The scientific ignorance about the sockeye salmon’s ecology made it 
possible for Japanese delegates to maintain the status quo about salmon fisheries in the Bering Sea 
and the North Pacific, while preventing American counterparts from claiming sufficient political 
legitimacy of their demand that the abstention line should be shifted westward from 175° West to 
175° East. 
   It was difficult for the Japanese government to accept the American request and refrain from 
catching salmon in the disputed waters of the Bering Sea and the North Pacific because of new 
fisheries restrictions by the Soviet Union. In March 1956 Kremlin suddenly notified Tokyo of the 
imposition of the so-called Bulganin Line (figure 52), strict fisheries regulations in the Sea of 
Okhotsk and the western Bering Sea, insisting that Japanese factory ships “completely” blocked 
migratory paths of salmon spawning in the Russian territory. This measure aimed to establish 
Russia’s bio-sphere of influence in the Sea of Okhotsk and the Bering Sea by containing Japanese 
salmon fisheries, which had been expanding northward into the Russian Far East since the 
termination of the U.S. occupation of Japan in 1952.19 The Russian fisheries edict stipulated that 
 
17 Ibid., 61. 
18 Ibid., 13. 
19 Hakodateshishi Hensanshitsu, ed., Hakodate Shishi: Tsūsetsuhen Daiyonkan (Hakodate: 





the total annual catch of salmon within the line should be limited up to 25 million (50,000 tons),20 
and this amount was about only a quarter of what Japanese salmon fishermen once caught within 
Russian territorial waters, not including offshore salmon fisheries, in 1934.21 To prevent Japanese 
fishermen from facing serious troubles with the Soviet authorities in the Sea of Okhotsk and the 
western Bering Sea,22 Tokyo concluded a fisheries agreement with Moscow in May 1956 and 
accepted the Bulganin Line as a new salmon fisheries regime on the high seas in the Sea of Okhotsk 
and the western Bering Sea.23  
 
20 Ibid. 
21 Nōrinshō Suisankyoku, ed., Hokuyō Gyogyō Kankei Tōkei Tekiyō Daisanji (Tokyo: Nōrinshō 
Suisankyoku, 1936), 23. 
22 Since Japan had not restored a diplomatic relation with the Soviet Union until 1956, the Japanese 
government tried to avoid fisheries disputes with the Soviet Union as much as possible after 1952. Still, 
the seizure of Japanese fishing vessels by the Soviet authorities took place frequently and the Soviet 
Union detained 62 vessels and 152 fishermen as of July 1954. Since the risk of being captured by Soviet 
authorities was so high that there was a “seizure insurance” for those who operated salmon fisheries in the 
Russian Far East. “Kōwago no Jishu Gyogyō Kuiki,” Asahi Shimbun, April 20, 1952; “Hokuyō no Sake 
Masu Gyogyō,” Asahi Shimbun, June 26, 1954; “Gyogyō o Hogo Seyo,” Asahi Shimbun, July 19, 1954. 
23 Hakodateshishi Hensanshitsu, ed., Hakodate Shishi: Tsūsetsuhen Daiyonkan, 371-373. Regarding 
the process of negotiation over fisheries between Japan and the Soviet Union, see Takahiko Tanaka, 
“Soviet-Japanese Normalization Talks in 1955-56: With Special Reference to the Attitude of Britain” 







Figure 52: The Bulganin Line in 1956. Hiroshi Hara, “Impact of the USSR’s 200 Mile Fishery 
Zone on the Japanese-Soviet Fishery Negotiations” (Master Thesis, University of Rhode Island, 
1979), 13. 
 
   The fisheries agreement of 1956 between Japan and the Soviet Union gradually pushed out 
Japanese pelagic fishermen from the Russian Far East and increased the relative importance of the 
disputed areas between175° East and 175° West in the Bering Sea and the North Pacific. The 
amount of salmon Japanese fishermen could catch within the Bulganin Line depended on scientific 
evaluation of salmon runs by Japanese and Russian ichthyologists and they were rarely able to 
agree on the result of scientific assessment of the fish. Thus, the final decision was usually made 
by political negotiations and compromises between Tokyo and Moscow. In 1957, for instance, 
Tokyo demanded 165,000 tons while Moscow insisted 100,000 tons. As a consequence, they 





Bulganin Line.24 But Kremlin annually decreased this allowance and Japanese fishermen could 
catch only 65,000 tons of salmon in the Russian Far East in 1961. In addition, Moscow declared 
the entire Sea of Okhotsk off-limits after 1959 and enlarged its no-fishing zones into the waters 
east of the Kamchatka Peninsula. Further, Moscow imposed fisheries restrictions stipulated by the 
treaty on waters outside the Bulganin Line after 1962 and Japanese salmon fisheries suffered tough 
regulations in whole areas of the western Bering Sea and the western North Pacific (figures 53 and 
54).25 Given that Japanese salmon fisheries could no longer advance into the Russian Far East 
after 1956, maintaining the status quo about salmon fisheries in the disputed waters between175° 
East and 175° West in the Bering Sea and the North Pacific mattered all the more for Japan. It 
should be noted that the United States and the Soviet Union at least shared a common interest in 
containing Japan’s northward fisheries expansion and excluding Japanese pelagic salmon 
fishermen from their respective bio-sphere of influence in the Bering Sea and the North Pacific.26 
 
24 Regarding the difficulty of negotiations over salmon fisheries faced by scientists and diplomats of 
Japan and the Soviet Union, see Gregory Ferguson-Cradler, “Science, States, and Salmon: 
Communicating through Disagreement over a Cold War Fault Line,” Environment and Planning A 48, no. 
9 (2016): 1864–80. 
25 Hakodateshishi Hensanshitsu, ed., Hakodate Shishi: Tsūsetsuhen Daiyonkan, 376-377. 
26 According to Ralph Johnson, the possibility of U.S.-Soviet formation of a common front against 
Japanese northward fisheries expansion did not materialize because the two superpowers did not wish to 
push Japan that hard for different reasons. The biggest reason was that salmon fisheries questions were 
linked to other non-fisheries issues and both the United States and the Soviet Union sought to stay on 
good terms with Japan. In addition, the mutual distrust between the two superpowers made their political 
collaboration impossible. Ralph W. Johnson, “The Japan-United States Salmon Conflict,” Washington 







Figure 53: Annual Changes in Japanese Mothership Salmon Fisheries. Hakodateshishi 
Hensanshitsu, ed., Hakodate Shishi: Tsūsetsuhen Daiyonkan (Hakodate: Hakodateshi, 2002), 376-
377, 379-381.27 
 
27 The red bar shows the number of motherships and the blue bar the number of auxiliary ships. The 
number on the left corresponds to those of motherships and auxiliary ships (the unit is ten). The line with 
a blue triangle means salmon catch and the number on the right corresponds to it (the unit is a thousand 
tons). The numbers on the bottom are years and S33 is 1958 and S63 is 1988. The Japanese salmon catch 
in the Bering Sea and the North Pacific declined almost by half from S51 (1976) to S53 (1978) because 
the United States and the Soviet Union officially established 200-mile bio-spheres of influence, fishing 







Figure 54: Fishing Zones for Japanese Salmon Fisheries in 1962. Hakodateshishi Hensanshitsu, 
ed., Hakodate Shishi: Tsūsetsuhen Daiyonkan (Hakodate: Hakodateshi, 2002), 376-377.28 
 
   In addition to the gradual shrinkage of salmon fishing zones for Japanese pelagic fishermen in 
the Bering Sea and the North Pacific, roughly fluctuating salmon runs in Bristol Bay in the 1960s 
promoted Japan’s uncompromising attitude toward salmon fisheries in the disputed waters between 
between175° East and 175° West. As far as annual salmon runs were poor in Bristol Bay, it gave 
some credence to the American contention that it was because of Japanese interception of 
migrating Bristol Bay salmon on the high seas, though this claim was still scientifically 
 
28 The shaded part means off-limits and Japanese pelagic fishermen operated salmon fisheries in 





hypothetical. Indeed, American representatives to the INPFC said in 1963 that spawning sockeye 
salmon were so small in Bristol Bay that year because Japanese deep-sea fishermen had taken a 
large proportion of the run on the high seas west of 175° West29 (figure 55). The problem was how 
to explain with persuasiveness abundant salmon runs in Bristol Bay. In the 1965 season Bristol 
Bay canneries caught more than 24 million sockeye salmon and the amount was the third largest 
harvest in the 73-year history of salmon fisheries in the region.30 American delegates to the INPFC 
interpreted this historical record harvest mainly as a consequence of long-established, tough 
fisheries regulations in Bristol Bay, insisting again that vibrant salmon fisheries in Bristol Bay and 
Japanese operations for exploiting salmon on the high seas were mutually exclusive.31 Japanese 
members of the INPFC viewed the wealthy salmon harvest in Bristol Bay in 1965 as clear evidence 
that Japan’s high seas fishery had had “no deleterious effect” on salmon runs in the bay. 32 
Although the Japanese argument was definitely oversimplified, American ichthyologists needed 
to present a more scientifically convincing and less politicized explanation about why salmon runs 
in Bristol Bay annually fluctuated on such a large scale.  
 
29 International North Pacific Fisheries Commission, “Annual Report 1963” (Vancouver: 
International North Pacific Fisheries Commission, 1964), 3. 
30 Alaska Department of Fish and Game, “Bristol Bay Area Annual Data Report” (Anchorage: Alaska 
Department of Fish and Game, 1966), 1. 
31 International North Pacific Fisheries Commission, “Annual Report 1965” (Vancouver: 
International North Pacific Fisheries Commission, 1967), 15-16. 







Figure 55: Annual Sockeye Salmon Catch in Bristol Bay. Alaska Department of Fish and Game, 
“Bristol Bay: Annual Management Report” (Anchorage: Alaska Department of Fish and Game, 
1967), 34. 
 
In order to demonstrate the correlation between Japanese high seas fisheries and poor salmon 
runs in the Bristol Bay region, American ichthyologists calculated how many mature and immature 
Bristol Bay salmon Japanese pelagic fishermen had caught in the Bering Sea and the North Pacific. 
Although the Japanese government provided only statistical data about the number of sockeye 
salmon fished in waters west of the abstention line, American ichthyologists applied their research 
findings to the Japanese data and obtained more concrete information about the proportion of 
maturity and origin of the sockeye salmon. In fact, American ichthyologists revealed that Japanese 
salmon motherships took almost three million immature sockeye salmon or 41 percent of their 
total catch in 1964. The comparable figure was 14 percent in 1965, 13 percent in 1966, and 16 
percent in 1967. The American researchers also found that Japanese deep-sea fishers caught a 
considerable amount of Bristol Bay salmon on high seas of the Bering Sea and the North Pacific. 


















in 1965, 1,537,019 in 1966, and 1,819,294 in 1967. Given that the total sockeye salmon catch in 
the Bristol Bay district was 5,596,120 in 1964, 24,255,239 in 1965, 9,314,240 in 1966, and 
4,330730 in 1967, Japanese pelagic fishers usually extracted about 15-25 percent, even 42 percent 
in 1967, of the Bristol Bay salmon catch on high seas of the Bering Sea and the North Pacific.33 
This was an intolerable situation for the American representatives. 
   It is noteworthy that the abstention line looked no longer provisional and seemed fixed for both 
the United States and Japan by the late 1960s. Although American ichthyologists showed with 
detailed data that Japanese deep-sea fishers took more than 40 percent of Bristol Bay salmon on 
high seas of the Bering Sea and the North Pacific, Japanese representatives refused to stop fishing 
operations in waters where Asian and Alaskan sockeye salmon intermingled. Indeed, Japanese 
representatives repeated its original position, insisting that Japanese salmon fisheries on high seas 
had not had adverse effects on the reproduction of Bristol Bay salmon stocks.34 More significantly, 
the Japanese delegates also stopped committing themselves to changing the location of the 
abstention line. In the annual meeting of 1968, a Japanese spokesperson said, “Japan has the right 
to catch salmon of any origin in the area west of the provisional line under the terms of the 
Convention.”35 As the Japanese spokesperson admitted, the abstention line was “provisional” and 
the United States, Canada, and Japan had agreed to move the line based on further scientific 
research so that the line should correspond to the biological boundary of Asian and Alaskan 
 
33 Richard J. Major, Sueto Murai, and James E. Mason, “Maturity and Continental Origin of Sockeye 
Salmon Caught by the Japanese Mothership Fishery, 1964 and 1965,” in International North Pacific 
Fisheries Commission, “Annual Report 1968” (Vancouver: International North Pacific Fisheries 
Commission, 1970), 113; Sueto Murai and Richard Major, “Maturity and Continental Origin of Sockeye 
Salmon Caught by the Japanese Mothership Fishery, 1966-67,” in International North Pacific Fisheries 
Commission, “Annual Report 1969” (Vancouver: International North Pacific Fisheries Commission, 
1971), 119. 






sockeye salmon. The purpose of setting the abstention line was to territorialize the Bering Sea and 
the North Pacific according to the migratory range of Asian and Alaskan sockeye salmon and create 
a legal mechanism through which the United States dominated access to Alaskan sockeye salmon 
and Japan exploited only Asian sockeye salmon in the waters. This meant that setting the abstention 
line was originally a means to achieve the objective of American and Japanese fishermen catching 
“their” side of sockeye salmon in the Bering Sea and the North Pacific. However, the Japanese 
spokesperson’s remark clearly showed that Japan had departed from this original position and 
switched the means with the end. What mattered most for Japan by the late 1960s was not to find 
the biological boundary of Asian and Alaskan sockeye salmon but to maintain the original location 




   This deadlock situation continued into the 1970s and the “provisional” abstention line moved 
neither eastward nor westward for the two decades after the conclusion of the North Pacific 
Convention in 1952. More significantly, these two decades saw great advancement of American 
ichthyologists’ scientific understanding of sockeye salmon’s ecology, particularly the distribution 
and migration patterns of the fish in the Bering Sea and the North Pacific. This newly acquired 
scientific knowledge about sockeye salmon allowed the United States to claim legal and moral 
legitimacy for expanding its bio-sphere of influence in the Bering Sea and the North Pacific and 
excluding Japanese deep-sea fishermen from salmon fishing grounds in the ocean. By making 
sockeye salmon’s ecology scientifically legible, Washington officials could control the lifecycle of 
the fish in a more accurate and holistic way. This was critical to maintaining an ichthyological 





the 1950s to the 1970s meant consummation of America’s science-oriented resource extractive 




























On March 10, 1983, President Ronald Reagan issued an important declaration about America’s 
ocean policy. In the statement Reagan proclaimed the establishment of an exclusive economic zone 
in which the United States would exercise exclusive jurisdiction over marine animals as well as 
submerged minerals within 200 nautical miles of its coast.36 To be sure, the Magnuson-Stevens 
Fishery Conservation and Management Act, which took effect on March 1, 1977, created a similar 
200-mile “fishery conservation zone” in which the United States could unilaterally control fish. 
But this fishery conservation zone system did not apply to “highly migratory fish,” such as salmon, 
and the North Pacific Convention system was practically intact though the tripartite protocol was 
amended for clarification in April 1978. 37  Contrary to the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery 
Conservation and Management Act, Reagan’s statement led to America’s further expansion of its 
bio-sphere of influence in the Bering Sea and the North Pacific to preserve sockeye salmon 
originating in Bristol Bay. Moreover, following America’s new ocean policy, delegates of the 
United States, Canada, and Japan renegotiated the North Pacific Convention in 1986. The amended 
agreement provided that the abstention line be moved from the original 175° West longitude to the 
175° East longitude and that Japanese salmon fisheries be prohibited in waters east of the 175° 
East longitude after 1994.38 This was another move of the United States to enlarge its bio-sphere 
 
36 Ronald Reagan, “Statement on United States Oceans Policy,” March 10, 1983. Available at 
https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/research/speeches/31083c (accessed September 4, 2020). 
37 “An Act to Provide for the Conservation and Management of the Fisheries, and for Other 
Purposes,” Pub. L. No. 94–265 (1976), available at https://uscode.house.gov/statutes/pl/94/265.pdf 
(accessed September 4, 2020); “Protocol Amending the International Convention for the High Seas 
Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean,” April 25, 1978, available at https://npafc.org/wp-
content/uploads/INPFC_Convention-English.pdf (accessed September 4, 2020). 
38 “Protocol Amending the International Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific 
Ocean,” April 25, 1978, available at https://npafc.org/wp-content/uploads/INPFC_Convention-





of influence in the Bering Sea and the North Pacific to maintain exclusive access to Bristol Bay 
salmon. 
This dissertation has shown that Anglo-Americans constructed a historically developmental 
ichthyological empire, a structure of perpetual and efficient exploitation of Bristol Bay salmon, by 
mobilizing law and science. For thousands of years indigenous peoples in the Bristol Bay region 
established a special relationship with salmon there. Salmon provided the indigenous inhabitants 
with valuable nutritious food for their subsistence. More significantly, the work of harvesting, 
processing, and preserving salmon allowed Bristol Bay natives to retain their cultural identity and 
way of life over generations. Since salmon constituted a crucial cultural and social keystone in 
their community and they were convinced that natural environment and ecology were vulnerable 
to human intervention, indigenous peoples in the Bristol Bay area adapted themselves to the local 
environment and ecology and paid close attention to not overexploiting salmon in the region for 
their long-term benefit. 
Anglo-Americans arrived in Bristol Bay with a totally different vision for and practice of 
salmon fisheries. For Anglo-Americans, salmon were neither a cornerstone of their cultural 
identity nor a means of their subsistence; rather, salmon were an object of commodification and a 
source of wealth. Believing that natural environment and ecology were resilient and resistant to 
human intervention, Anglo-Americans sought to achieve what they regarded as rational: 
maximizing the amount of salmon harvested and processed within a season without governmental 
interference. To conduct laissez-faire salmon fisheries in Bristol Bay, Anglo-Americans invested 
capital, constructed canneries, promoted technological development and mechanization, 
introduced experienced seasonal workers, and mobilized English legal customs for short-time 





colony. Another more dire consequence was a sudden, dramatic drop in sockeye salmon catches 
in Bristol Bay in 1919. 
   When sockeye salmon catches declined in Bristol Bay on an unprecedented scale, the 
foundation of an ichthyological empire emerged: the initiation of scientific conservation led by the 
federal government. This meant that the ichthyological empire was founded on the hybrid of law 
and science. Anglo-American canners and federal government officials viewed the massive drop 
in sockeye salmon harvests in Bristol Bay not as an environmental and ecological aberration or 
exception but as a logical consequence of the laissez-faire fisheries. This interpretation led to the 
end of the laissez-faire salmon fisheries with the federal government’s imposition of tough 
restrictions on them in Bristol Bay. Indigenous peoples in the region, too, did this kind of passive 
conservation. Contrary to the native inhabitants, however, federal government officials, who were 
convinced of powerful human agency in reconfiguring natural environment and ecology, initiated 
active conservation efforts. Based on the idea that humans should and could tame natural 
environment and ecology with science, federal government officials began comprehensive control 
of Bristol Bay salmon. To advance the lifecycle of sockeye salmon, federal government officials 
studied various habits of the fish and remade the local environment and ecosystem in a sockeye 
salmon-centered way in the Bristol Bay region. The production of scientific knowledge about 
sockeye salmon and the mobilization of it to perpetual and efficient exploitation of the fish in 
Bristol Bay made extractive colonialism evolve into an ichthyological empire there.  
   The ichthyological empire in Bristol Bay progressed in inter-imperial contexts and it was 
crucially contingent upon the development of Japanese salmon fisheries in the Bering Sea and the 
North Pacific. Chiefly due to the invention of factory ship by 1930, the Japanese salmon fisheries 





to actively pursuing the fish on the high seas outside Russia’s sovereign maritime space. This 
structural shift led to the spatial expansion of Japanese salmon fisheries into the eastern half of the 
Bering Sea and the North Pacific, especially Bristol Bay. As a result, Bristol Bay turned into an 
inter-imperially contested waters and the United States and Japan competed for access to sockeye 
salmon migrating in the bay. The U.S.-Japanese fisheries dispute over Bristol Bay salmon in the 
late 1930s made American government officials realize that establishing a bio-sphere of influence 
in Bristol Bay and outer waters through fuller mobilization of law and science was a key to 
retaining the rising ichthyological empire in the bay for Anglo-Americans. 
   The full-fledged ichthyological empire was expansive in nature given that it was founded on 
America’s projection of jurisdiction over Bristol Bay salmon into extraterritorial waters and its 
extension of scientific knowledge about the fish. America’s hegemonic status after World War II 
allowed the United States to impose the North Pacific Convention on Japan and Canada in 1952. 
The fisheries protocol turned the eastern half of the Bering Sea and the North Pacific into 
America’s bio-sphere of influence and the United States exercised exclusive control over Bristol 
Bay salmon migrating there. The legal legitimacy of America’s bio-sphere of influence in the 
Bering Sea and the North Pacific depended on the quality and quantity of American ichthyologists’ 
scientific understanding of Bristol Bay salmon’s various habits, particularly their migration 
patterns. This system of making the ecology of Bristol Bay salmon scientifically visible and of 
applying the available scientific knowledge to legally upholding America’s bio-sphere of influence 
in the Bering Sea and the North Pacific for totally and exclusively control the fish was the essence 
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